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"The relationship between sources and journalists resembles a
dance, for sources seek access to journalists and journalists, seek
access to sources. Although it takes two to tango. . more often
than not, sources do the leading."1
INTRODUCTION
The mythology of democracy reserves an honored place for the
press. Fiercely independent, vigorous and critical, the news media
of this vision serve the public interest in robust, informed debate
and accountable government. For true believers in this romantic
notion, the Watergate scandal represents the apotheosis of a
watchdog press, capable even of toppling a President.
Yet, skeptics might tell a conflicting story. History shows the
press as far more lapdog than watchdog. Today, spin doctors,
sound bites, staged media events, and campaign spot ads domi-
nate politics and the news.2 Instead of Watergate, we have the
authorized leak, through which political operatives plant mislead-
ing information, manage the news, and orchestrate public debate
from behind the scenes.'
1. H. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S NEWS 116 (1979), quoted in E. ABEL, LEAKING: WHO DOES
IT? WHO BENEFITS? AT WHAT COST? 1 (1987).
2. See, e.g., R. DINKIN, CAMPAIGNING IN AMERICA 159-68 (1989); D. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE
OR WHAT HAPPENED To THE AMERICAN DREAM 7-44 (1961); M. SCHUDSON, Deadlines,
Datelines and History, in READING THE NEWS 81-82 (1986) ("newsgathering is normally a
matter of the representatives of one bureaucracy picking up prefabricated news items from
representatives of another bureaucracy"); Collins & Skover, The First Amendment in an
Age of Paratroopers, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1095-97, 1100-02 (1990); Devlin, Introduction,
in POLITICAL PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 1-16 (L. Devlin ed. 1987) [hereinafter
POLITICAL PERSUASION]; Nimmo, Election as Ritual Drama, in POLITICAL PERSUASION,
supra, at 163-64; DuBrow, TV and the Gulf War, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 7, 1991, at A10,
col. 5 (defining spin doctors as "professional manipulators of television"); Carlson, The
Spin Doctor Awards, Wash. Post Mag., Jan. 1, 1989, at 22; Safire, On Language: Calling
Dr. Spin, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1986, § 6, at 8, col. 3 (on derivation of term "spin doctor").
See generally M. SCHRAM, THE GREAT AMERICAN VIDEO GAME (1987); K. JAMIESON, PACK-
AGING THE PRESIDENCY: A HISTORY AND CRITICISM OF PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING
(1984); L. SABATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS: NEW WAYS OF WINNING ELECTIONS
(1981); J. TEBBEL & S. WATTS, THE PRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY: FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON
TO RONALD REAGAN (1985).
3. See generally, e.g., M. HERTSGAARD, ON BENDED KNEE: THE PRESS AND THE REAGAN
PRESIDENCY (1988); E. ABEL, supra note 1; J. McGINNIS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT
(1969); Carlson, The Image Makers, Wash. Post Mag., Feb. 11, 1990, at 12. As pointed out
in a recent article in the popular press, professional publicity experts "have made a mul-
tibillion dollar industry" out of attempts to influence news reports, and "the White House
has raised press manipulation to a virtual art form." Cose, Shopping in the News Bazaar,
TIME, Mar. 26, 1990, at 64. The article quotes a journalism scholar's estimate that 40% of
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Neither version of the story, of course, captures the full truth.
Journalists and newsmakers both cooperate and compete to influ-
ence the public's perception of reality." Nowhere is this ambiguity
more evident than in the press' relationships with its confidential
sources. After all, while confidential sources provided the Wash-
ington Post with much of its ammunition during Watergate,6 it is
equally true that reliance on confidential sources makes the me-
dia dangerously vulnerable to manipulation.
The dilemma is particularly acute today, as relationships of
confidentiality between the press and its sources increasingly be-
come a staple of modern newsgathering.6 On the one hand, the
control of information under the aegis of the Imperial Presidency,
the centralized government information apparatus, and the se-
crecy-obsessed national security establishment all suggest that
much important information can only be obtained by promising
anonymity to sources.7
On the other hand, since anonymity for its own sake has come
to develop a certain cachet, journalists run the risk of overusing
the device and allowing confidential sources to manage the news
and use the press to mislead.8 References to anonymous sources
and unattributed information in published reports can reinforce
the impression that, far from arming the public with sufficient
the news comes from public relations specialists. See also N. ISAACS, UNTENDED GATES: THE
MISMANAGED PRESS 34-35 (1986).
4. See, e.g., M. LINSKY, IMPACT: HOW THE PRESS AFFECTS FEDERAL POLICYMAKING 36-37
(1986) [hereinafter IMPACT]; M. GROSSMAN & M. KUMAR, PORTRAYING THE PRESIDENT: THE
WHITE HOUSE AND THE NEWS MEDIA 3 (1981).
5. See generally B..WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974).
6. The institution of the confidential source is aptly, albeit facetiously, described in a
Washington Post editorial:
For the edification of those who may be unaware of the etymology, the family
tree, so to speak, of the wellsprings of news, it goes something like this: Walter
and Ann Source (Rumor) had four daughters (Highly-Placed, Authoritative, Un-
impeachable, and Well-Informed). The first married a diplomat named U.S. Of-
ficials, and the second, a government public relations man named Reliable In-
formant. (The Informant brothers are widely known and quoted here; among the
best known are White House, State Department, and Congressional.) Walter
Speculation's brother-in-law, Ian Rumor, married Alexandre Conjecture, from
which there were two sons, It Was Understood, and It Was Learned. It Was
Learned went to work yesterday in the Justice Department, where he will be
gainfully employed for four long years.
J. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIVES 79 (2d ed. 1985) (quoting F.Y.I., Wash. Post, Feb.
12, 1969, at A20, col. 1).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 245-50.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 284-302.
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information to understand events, reporters often mediate coded
conversations between elites with agendas impenetrable to all but
the most sophisticated pundits.' When reporting on the basis of
confidential sources, journalists become simultaneously active
and passive-uncovering some information which might not oth-
erwise come to light, but also serving as the carriers of someone
else's message without providing a dictionary with which to inter-
pret the vocabulary.
Although reporters typically abide by an ethic of preserving
confidentiality against government encroachment, the tensions
inherent in the press' reliance on confidential sources occasionally
lead news organizations to divulge the identities of their confiden-
tial sources voluntarily.10 Historically, most "burned"1 sources
have simply accepted their exposure or sought personal redress.
However, in a controversy recently in the public eye, one source
whose name was disclosed in the context of a state election cam-
paign retaliated against the press in the courts.12 He persuaded a
jury that by disclosing his name the newspapers had breached a
contract with him. While this source was not the first disap-
pointed promisee to sue the press for having disclosed his iden-
tity, he was the first to obtain a contract judgment at trial.'" His
verdict on the contract claim withstood judicial review both at
the trial and the intermediate appellate levels. Although his con-
tract victory was reversed by a sharply divided panel of the Min-
9. See infra note 306 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
11. Journalists colloquially refer to disclosure of their confidential sources as "burning"
the source. Oberdorfer, Is "Burning a Source" a Breach of Contract?, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 1,
1988, at 8.
12. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1460 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1987)
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment) [hereinafter Cohen I], 15 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2288 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1988) (denying motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or new trial) [hereinafter Cohen II], aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 445
N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) [hereinafter Cohen III], aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn.) [hereinafter Cohen IV], cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 578 (1990) [here-
inafter Cohen V].
13. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. Tort claims such as fraud, misrepresen-
tation, breach of confidentiality, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and invasion of privacy may be available to sources to whom promises of confidentiality
have been made and broken. See cases cited in infra note 107. Nevertheless, virtually all of
these tort claims are premised on the breach of the reporters' promise and not simply
upon the injury to the plaintiff. Accordingly, this Article will not separately address such
tort claims. Much of the contract analysis should prove relevant to the question of
whether to permit a tort action as well, particularly when the reason for bringing the ac-
tion in tort is principally to avoid technical rules regarding contract or contract damages.
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nesota Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court recently
agreed to hear his appeal.1'
The Court's review is limited to the question whether the first
amendment precludes recovery for confidential sources whose
identities have been disclosed by the press in the context of polit-
ical contests. 15 How the Court decides this case, 'however, will nat-
urally have a significant impact on the incidence and character of
contract claims by disclosed sources. If, for example, the Court
rejects any absolute first amendment defense in these circum-
stances, such claims are likely to appear before the courts with
greater frequency." Voluntary disclosures of source identities are
no longer aberrant situations discussed only within the journalis-
tic fraternity. In a way, recent national debate on the ethical obli-
gations of reporters toward their confidential sources has made
the practice of disclosure respectable, albeit controversial. It is
likely that, as politics continues to be dominated by "negative"
campaigning1 and new evidence surfaces about government dis-
information efforts, ' reporters will increasingly be confronted
with situations in which promises of confidentiality will test their
abilities to report events fully and independently. Thus, when
properly viewed, contract claims by sources will raise not only is-
14. Cohen V, cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 578 (1990).
15. Id.
16. See Note, Promises and the Press: First Amendment Limitations on News Source
Recovery for Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1553 (1989) [here-
inafter Minnesota Note]; Langley & Levine, Broken Promises, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 21
(July/Aug. 1988) (noting an increase in the number of instances of voluntary disclosures of
sources by the press).
17. See, e.g., L. SABATO, supra note 2, at 321-26; Devlin, Campaign Commercials, in
POLITICAL PERSUASION, supra note 2, at 207, 209-10; Schwartz, Radio Advertising in Cam-
paigns, in POLITICAL PERSUASION, supra note 2, at 65; Oreskes, "Attack" Politics, Rife in
'88, Comes into its Own, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1989, at A24, col. 4; Cocco, Smears and
Fears: The '88 Campaign, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6,1988, at 4; McDonald, Midterm Mudslinging,
McLEAN'S, Nov. 3, 1986, at 22; Peterson, Offbeat Issues Proliferate, Wash. Post, Nov. 5,
1984, at A3, col. 1; When "Dirty Tricks" Enter the '82 Campaign, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Sept. 20, 1982, at 37 (reporting on survey that showed increase in negative political
ads from one-fourth in the mid-1960's to one-half by the early 1980's); Clymer, Voters
Grow Weary of Negative Campaign Tactics, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1980, at B5, col. 3.
18. A report by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press cited nearly 100
instances of news orchestration, press restrictions, and disinformation in the Bush Admin-
istration alone. THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE BUSH ADMIN-
ISTRATION AND THE NEWS MEDIA (1990). See also notes 267 and 272 on previous govern-
ment disinformation efforts. More recently, reporters have voiced suspicions about the
completeness and accuracy of Pentagon reports concerning the Gulf War (and the main-
stream media's reliance on such official accounts). See, e.g., Mauro, Media Protest in Con-
gress, Courts, USA Today, Feb. 20, 1991, at 2A.
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sues concerning private actors but also fundamental issues about
the role of the press and the character of politics in a democracy.
Accordingly, the manner in which courts conceptualize the is-
sue has important consequences. Yet, neither the few cases on
point nor the scholarly literature persuasively address the circum-
stances in which the courts should grant relief to exposed
sources. 9 Three approaches predominate. The first emphasizes
freedom of contract; the second, the press' protection under the
first amendment; and the third, the courts' traditional "policing"
of agreement terms under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
The first two approaches simply beg the question; the third fails
to do it justice.
The freedom of contract approach 20 mechanically concludes
that all promises of confidentiality by the press should presump-
tively be enforced as contracts simply because of their voluntary
and promissory character. However, this misperceives the charac-
ter and overstates the simplicity of contract law. It is simply not
true that all promises are enforced as contracts without substan-
tive inquiry into whether enforcement is consistent with public
policy goals. Moreover, in simply assuming that first amendment
values are not implicated by the press' promises to sources, this
approach naively avoids all of the actual complexities of the issue.
The second approach, which relies on the first amendment, has
19. Despite significant commentary in the press on the issue, only three law review
pieces have thus far seriously attempted to address this specific problem. See Note, When
a Promise Is Not a Promise: The Legal Coniequences for Journalists Who Break
Promises of Confidentiality to Sources, 12 COMM./ENT. L.J. 565 (1990) [hereinafter CoMM./
ENT. Note]; Comment, Reporter Privilege: Shield or Sword? Applying a Modified Breach
of Contract Standard When a Newsperson "Burns" a Confidential Source, 42 FED. COMM.
L.J. 277 (1990) [hereinafter FED. COMM. Comment]; Minnesota Note, supra note 16.
Nor can much guidance be found in the numerous scholarly treatments of whether gov-
ernment may compel journalists to disclose the identities of their confidential sources. See
generally M. VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESS (1979); Blasi, The
Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229 (1971); Goodale,
Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 709 (1975); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18 (1969); Langley & Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confi-
dential Sources and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 13 (1988); Marcus,
The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis -of the Common Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and Re-
cent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 815 (1983); Murasky, The Journalist's
Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. REV. 829 (1974); Note, A Press Privi-
lege for the Worst of Times, 75 GEo. L.J. 361 (1986); Note, The Rights of Sources-The
Critical Element in the Clash Over Reporter's Privilege, 88 YALE L.J. 1202 (1979).
20. See infra Section II.A.
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both a strong and a less absolute version. The strong version2"
consists of an argument that any imposition of contract damages
on the press in these circumstances would flatly violate the free-
dom of the press guaranteed by the first amendment. Yet, the
issues posed by voluntary disclosures of sources cannot simply be
wished away by reflexive invocations of first amendment immu-
nity. The Supreme Court's consistent refusal to find the first
amendment a bar to private tort actions against the press22
strongly suggests that constitutional protection does not flatly im-
munize the media against all lawsuits by sources-whether in tort
or contract--for disclosure of their identities.
Neither can the problem be solved by a less absolute invocation
of the first amendment in the form of the constitutionalized stan-
dard of liability applied in defamation cases.2" First, an attempt
to translate that actual malice standard into the context of disclo-
sures of true information is unworkable and ironically leads to
press-restrictive, rather than press-protective results. Second,
while the defamation cases accept that the interest in reputation
always has some value, the same cannot be said of every source's
interest in confidentiality. 2' Moreover, even the defamation cases
recognize variable interests in the protection of reputation de-
pending on the public or private status of the plaintiff. Thus, the
defamation cases neither require the application of a constitu-
tionally heightened malice standard to all breaches of confidenti-
ality nor serve as useful guides for determining the weight to be
21. See infra Section II.B.l.
22. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (intentional infliction
of emotional distress); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (false light invasion of pri-
vacy); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation) and infra note
162 and accompanying text.
23. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280 (holding that first amendment requires public
official defamation plaintiffs to show actual malice); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967) (extending actual malice standard to public figure plaintiffs); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that states could impose any standard of
liability short of strict liability in defamation cases brought by private plaintiffs, but that
presumed or punitive damages would not be available without a showing of actual malice).
See infra Section II.B.2.
24. As will be discussed infra, in Sections III.B., IV.A. and IV.B., confidentiality has
both desirable and undesirable social effects in different circumstances. Cf. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972) (noting, in the process of rejecting first amendment re-
porter's privilege in grand jury proceedings, that the preference for anonymity of sources
involved in criminal conduct "is presumably a product of their desire to escape criminal
prosecution, and this preference, while understandable, is hardly deserving of constitu-
tional protection").
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accorded to different confidentiality promises. Third, the out-
come-determinative focus in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan25 on
the potential self-censorship or "chilling effect" of the imposition
of tort liability on the press is not helpful in this context because
any rule on this question. may theoretically cause a chilling ef-
fect-either on sources or on reporters.28
The third approach-to the problem of source disclosure-the
promissory estoppel model-is no less subject to criticism. While
abstractly suggesting that the approach requires a fact-specific
balancing of interests, the only court to have thus far attempted
to apply this analysis has sought recourse in a thinly-disguised
categorical first amendment rule and has provided virtually no
guidance for a more fact-specific analysis."
All current approaches to the issue of source exposure are also
inadequate in a final way. While we can discern unanalyzed as-
sumptions about the nature of the press in all of them, none take
the opportunity, so perfectly presented by the complexities of the
confidentiality problem, to develop a realistic and nuanced pic-
ture of the ambiguous institutional character of the modern press
in its relations with government and other authoritative sources.28
Those who favor the freedom of contract approach deny the press
any special role as one of the "great interpreters" between the
government and the people. 2e They perceive the press uni-dimen-
sionally, as a powerful and overly-privileged elite that improperly
seeks to use the Constitution to exempt itself from the ordinary
obligations of other citizens. The other two approaches which
consider first amendment interests presume a contrary, but
equally idealized vision of the press by eschewing any assessment
of its actual. power position. A more realistic assessment of the
press would admit both its power and independence as an institu-
tion and also its considerable manipulability by government.3 0 An
application of contract law or first amendment doctrine without
sensitivity to this "realpolitik" of the press is not jurispruden-
25. 376 U.S. 254, 277-79 (1964).
26. In the alternative, empirical data which can be read to cast doubt on the probability
of a chilling effect on either reporters or sources in the contract area makes it all the more
necessary to question the appropriateness of the defamation analogy. See infra text ac-
companying notes 177-81.
27. See Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 199; see also infra Section II.C.
28. See infra Section III.A.
29. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S 233, 250 (1936).
30. See infra Section III.A.
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tially sound or socially useful, and may not even be sufficiently
press-protective.
This Article proposes an alternative-contextualist-approach
to the problem of voluntary press disclosures of sources. 31 Recog-
nizing that practices of secrecy or confidentiality have both con-
structive and destructive consequences in social life generally and
in the press context specifically, this Article argues that there can
be no a priori, blanket rule concerning the enforcement of press
promises of confidentiality to sources. Rather, such cases must be
decided contextually, in light of the particular characteristics of
the relationship at issue, the history of the American press, and
the democratic values that we, as a society, consider to be impli-
cated in press-source confidentiality.
We can glean such values from the idealized models or proto-
types of news sources which pervade both legal and popular cul-
ture. The model of the sympathetic whistleblower, compelled by
altruistic concerns to disclose wrongdoing at significant personal
risk of retaliation, constitutes one extreme of the cultural proto-
types of news sources. At the opposite extreme is the "sourcerer,"
the despised prototype of a strategically manipulative political
operator.3 3 Obviously, these prototypes are too uni-dimensional
and unambiguous to represent most actual sources or real rela-
tionships of confidentiality in the press context. Instead, they
serve simply to organize discourse and provide a frame of refer-
ence from which to assess the character and consequences of par-
ticular promises of confidentiality.
Our sympathetic responses to prototypical whistleblowers and
our distaste for "sourcerers" suggest that we have both substan-
tive and institutional concerns about practices of press confiden-
tiality. Substantively, for example, we are concerned with the ef-
fect of a particular promise of confidentiality on well-informed,
truthful public discourse and the democratic process. Institution-
ally, our reactions to the prototypes demonstrate a concern about
the effect of a particular promise of confidentiality on the institu-
tional independence of the press.
The contextualist approach suggested by this Article requires
31. See infra Section IV.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 365-68.
33. See Smyser, There Are Sources and Then There are Sourcerers, 5 Soc. RESP.: JOUR-
NALISM, L. & MED. 13, 14 (1979) (coining the term "sourcerer"); see also infra text accom-
panying note 369.
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courts to address the particular ways in which these and other
social concerns are implicated in any given case. It does so by
encouraging triers of fact to develop both a realistic background
picture of the institutional relationship between the press and
government and a richly-textured, fact-specific, and context-sen-
sitive characterization of the circumstances of particular promises
of confidentiality. In more schematic terms, this descriptive en-
terprise requires that courts, when addressing particular breaches
of confidentiality, effectively strive to determine where they fit on
the continuum of press-source relationships bounded by the pro-
totypical whistleblower and the prototypical sourcerer. This Arti-
cle suggests a number of specific considerations as guideposts to
orient this kind of contextualizing sensibility.
While the approach suggested here rejects any slavish imitation
of the first amendment privilege in the defamation area, it is in
fact fully grounded in the democratic ideals underlying the first
amendment and compatible with a reinterpreted first amendment
approach. Constitutional law has long incorporated common law
language and modes of analysis. This Article suggests that the
constitutional values at stake in source confidentiality cases
would most fruitfully and sensitively be addressed by borrowing
from the common law its most nuanced forms of contextual
analysis.
Section I of this Article provides a typology of news sources,
discusses the background norm of confidentiality in journalism,
sets out the occasions of voluntary disclosure when that norm has
been subordinated to other interests, and describes the new retal-
iatory trend of suits against the press by exposed sources. Section
II analyzes and outlines the inadequacies of the three predomi-
nant current approaches to the problem of contract actions by
sources. Section III situates the problem by describing the history
of the institutional relationship between the press and govern-
ment, the particular dangers posed by confidentiality in the press
context, and the varying realities of interactions between report-
ers and sources. Section IV proposes a context-sensitive ap-
proach-without resort to simplistic first amendment or contrac-
tual conceptions-that takes into account the historical realities
of press relationships with government and sources, while provid-
ing guidance to courts in their determinations of whether to en-
force particular press promises of confidentiality.
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I. MEDIA ETHICS, VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE, AND SOURCE
RETALIATION
Confidential sources play a variety of roles in modern news cov-
erage.3 4 While reliance by the press on such sources goes back to
Colonial times,3 5 the practice has become pervasive since the
1960's.. 6 Consistent with the dominance of governmental and po-
34. See, e.g., D. BRODER, BEHIND THE FRONT PAGE 319-22 (1987); H. GOODWIN, GROPING
FOR ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 120-21 (1983); E. LAMBETH, COMMITTED JOURNALISM: AN ETHIC
FOR THE PROFESSION 142 (1986); Blasi, supra note 19, at 245; Osborn, The Reporter's Con-
fidentiality Privilege: Updating the Empirical Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 73 (1985). Even if a source's information is not directly
reported, it may lead a journalist to the discovery of reportable information; set the con-
text for publishable information; or confirm information already gathered from other
sources. Blasi, supra note 19, at 246. When confidential sources do provide information for
publication, they are often described by code words which refer to their positions. We are
all familiar with such general characterizations as "a State Department official," "a source
high in the Administration," "a source close to the campaign," and "a diplomatic ob-
server." The specificity of the description provided can range from "the highest authority"
(used to indicate the President) to the uninformative "TIME has learned." See C. PRESS &
K. VERBURG, AMERICAN POLITICIANS AND JOURNALISTS 131 (1988). Henry Kissinger often
required reporters to refer to him as "a senior official on the Secretary of State's plane." T.
GOLDSTEIN, THE NEWS AT ANY COST 189 (1985). One experienced journalist has noted that
extremely general attributions are often proxies for the reporter's own analysis, when
norms of objective journalism will not allow her to report that analysis in a "straight"
news story. T. WICKER, ON PRESS 150 (1978).
35. See M. VAN GERPEN, supra note 19, at'5-6; B. FRANKLIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 33-34 (L.
Lemisch ed. 1961).
36. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 4, 28, 63 (leaks have grown from "trickle to torrent"); N.
ISAACS, supra note 3, at 50, 52 (cloaking sources grew to "grotesque proportions"); J.
HULTENG, supra note 6, at 89; S. HESS, THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION 91 (1984)
[hereinafter PRESS CONNECTION] (leaking at an all time high in 1982); IMPACT, supra note
4, at 188, 197 (leaks prevalent part of interaction between press and officials); J. DEAKIN,
STRAIGHT STUFF 187-88 (1984) ("Most [leaks] are integral though informal instruments of
government and diplomacy. .... The government could' not conduct its business without
them."); N. HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM 226-27, 241 (1988) (reporting on "pervasive"
reliance on confidential sources found by 1973 study of newspaper editors); D. SCHORR,
CLEARING THE AIR 179 (1977) ("Watergate had brought the leak into its own."); D. BOOR-
STIN, supra note 2, at 29-35. One editor has called the reliance on unnamed sources a
"cozy" and "convenient" "Washington habit." Editor & Publisher, Sept. 27, 1980, at 22
(remarks of James P. Gannon, Executive Editor of the Des Moines Register and Tribune).
Indeed, some press critics lament what they see as an increasing practice on the part of
journalists to suggest anonymity themselves or assume that it is desired by the source. See
E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 39; H. GOODWIN, supra note 34,,at 123; see also D. SHAW, PRESS
WATCH 67 (1984).
Empirical research supports commentators' anecdotal observations regarding reliance on
unattributed sources. Professor Vincent. Blasi's empirical study of the press-source rela-
tionship in 1971 indicated that confidential sources were relied upon in 22.2% to 34.4% of
stories by average reporters surveyed. Blasi, supra note 19, at 247. See also S, HESS, THE
WASHINGTON REPORTERS 19 (1981) [hereinafter REPORTERS]; B. SWAIN, REPORTERS' ETHICS
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litical news in the media,3 7 by far the largest percentage of news
sources consists of government officials and politicians or their
representatives. 8  Non-attribution guidelines have developed for
47 (1978) (quoting one investigative reporter as saying that at least one-third of his stories
originate in off the record conversations). An attempt to update Professor Blasi's data
showed that 31.25% of the respondent reporters in a 1985 survey relied on confidential
sources in their news stories. Osborn, supra note 34, at 73. Recent studies indicate that
81% of national news magazine articles and 50% of wire stories include confidential
sources. Brown, Bybee, Wearden & Straighan, Invisible Power: Newspaper News Sources
and the Limits of Diversity, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 32, 45, 52 (1987) [hereinafter Brown, By-
bee]; Wulfemeyer, How and Why Anonymous Attribution is Used by Time and News-
week, 62 JOURNALISM Q. 81, 83 (1985). References to unnamed sources in published ac-
counts increase as stories gain in importance or when they concern national security.
REPORTERS, supra, at 20.
37. Empirical studies indicate that political news is by far the most significant compo-
nent of major national newspapers. Leon Sigal, for example, found that 46.5% of the front
pages of The Washington Post and The New York Times over a period of years consisted
of news provided by national officials, with 4.1% based on reports of state and local gov-
ernment officials. A bare 16.5% of stories on the front pages originated from non-govern-
mental sources. L. SIGAL, REPORTERS AND. OFFICIALS 123-25 (1973). Moreover, such political
news appears to be primarily national, even in newspapers located outside of Washington.
REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 94-95, 113-14 (finding that in 22 newspapers outside the
capital, "[a]ll the top stories from the community, the state capital, and other cities in the
home state combined, do not equal the percentage from Washington" and that nearly half
of all papers' lead stories came from Washington). One cause of this phenomenon might be
that most press outlets around the country often follow the lead of a small number of
media elites such as the wire services, the television networks, The New York Times, The
Washington Post, and the two leading news magazines in reporting the news. C. PRESS &
K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 59; REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 93. CNN's coverage of the
Persian Gulf conflict has assured it a place in that elite group. Zoglin, The Global Village:
Live from the Middle East!, TIME, Jan. 28, 1991, at,69-71; Cooper, The Very Nervy Win of
CNN, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 28, 1991, at 44.
38. See, e.g., REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 92-96, 121-22, 126; H. GANS, supra note 1, at
8-13, 15-18 (four sorts of "knowns"-incumbent presidents, presidential candidates, House
and Senate' members, and other federal officials-found to be subjects of over one-half of
domestic news stories in media studied); L. SIGAL, supra note 37, at 124 (American and
foreign government officials constitute more than three-fourths of all news sources);
Brown, Bybee, supra note 36, at 48-51 (more than one-half of sources for front page news
stories were affiliated with a governmental body, reaffirming earlier findings of dominance
by elite news sources); Osborn, supra note 34, at 73 (reporters relied- on confidential
sources most frequently in reporting on government affairs); Wulfemeyer, supra note 36,
at 82, 85 (high status, official sources quoted most frequently in national magazines). This
Article will focus on governmental sources because of their predominance in modern news.
The extensive use of governmental and other authoritative sources by reporters in the
conventional media has been credited to a variety of factors, including journalistic conven-
tions and organizational constraints. See, e.g., Brown, Bybee, supra note 36, at 45-46; H.
GANS, supra note 1, at 8-13; L. SIGAL, supra note 37, at 119-30; see also infra notes 245-59
and accompanying text. The primacy of governmental officials as news sources also follows
from the governmental or political character of most news reports in the conventional
press.
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government's routine, official communications with the press"9
and confidentiality is the rule for informal "leaks" of informa-
tion. 40 Indeed, Washington insiders have-the sense of participat-
ing in a "government by leak."
The very pervasiveness of confidential interactions between
sources and reporters discourages searching inquiry into journal-
39. A particularized vocabulary has developed, especially among Washington journalists
and politicians, to characterize the different degrees of confidentiality available to sources.
H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 128; Rosenfeld, Contradictions Abound in the Use of Con-
fidential Sources, ASNE BULL., Sept./Oct. 1988, at 7-10; Mohr, To Source or Not to
Source: That Is the Question, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1984, at A18, col. 3. Obviously, "on
the record" conversations refer to those which can, be published, quoted, and attributed
specifically. J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 69; W. RIVERS, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT 127
(1982).
Information provided "on background" can be quoted and published, but its source can-
not be identified by name or title. See C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 130-31;
T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 189 (1985); W. RIVERS, supra, at 127; D. WISE, THE POLIT-
ICS OF LYING: GOVERNMENT DECEPTION, SECRECY AND POWER 287-88 (1973). This terminol-
ogy is ascribed to Franklin Roosevelt, who coined the term for his press conferences. C.
PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 130; W. RIVERS, supra, at 32-33. It is still often
used to refer to the attribution rules at briefings held by officials for groups of reporters.
H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 127.
"Deep background" refers to news stories for which no source can be indicated by any
means. See Id.; W. RIVERS, supra, at 127 ("[alnything that is said is usable, but not in
direct quotation and not for any type of attribution"); T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 100
(attributing the phrase to George Reedy, Lyndon Johnson's press secretary and defining it
as requiring the reporter to "write as if he has gained his information from the air around
him, or by meditation, or perhaps through cosmic revelation"); B. WOODWARD & C. BERN-
STEIN, supra note 5, at 71 (deep background source would not be identified to anyone;
would never be quoted, even as an anonymous source; and would only serve to confirm
information and add perspective).
Finally, "off the record" refers to information which the reporter cannot publish at all.
T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 188-89; H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 126; W. RIVERS,
supra, at 127; T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 100-01. The purpose of the off the record
conversation is to inform the reporter. T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 189. "
Despite the currency of the vocabulary, however, journalists differ as to the precise defi-
nitions of the code words. Rosenfeld, supra, at 7. One author has quoted the Department
of Justice in a report on the leaks which led to Abscam in 1981 to the effect that:
The meaning of the term [off the record] to some is that particular information
disclosed to reporters may not be used at all. To others, it is that the informa-
tion must be confirmed by other sources, without attribution to them. To still
others, it means that the information may be used on a background basis with-
out direct attribution.
T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 189-90. Sources have different interpretations as well. E.
ABEL, supra note 1, at 56; H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 126; Safire, Off the Record, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 29,,1989, § 6, at 16, col. 1. Some commentators suggest that the meaning of the
codes depends both on customs in the region and on previous understandings between
reporters and their sources. See B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at 47. New officials bring their
own definitions with them. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 56.
40. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 2, 10.
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istic practices of confidentiality. Moreover, the routinization of
confidentiality encourages the assumption that all confidential
press-source relationships share the same characteristics. In fact,
such confidential relationships vary widely, in no small part be-
cause of fundamental differences among sources. Thus, an under-
standing of the phenomenon of confidentiality between sources
and reporters first requires a sense of the different types of
sources.
A. A Typology of Confidential Sources
Confidential news sources can be categorized and distinguished
with respect to their identities and positions, their motivations
for talking to the press, and their reasons for seeking anonymity.
1. Source Identity
Some confidential sources are part of the government's formal
channels for the dissemination of information."1 Many govern-
ment news sources, however, are "leakers," who provide the press
with information on an informal basis.2 Surveys show that large
-percentages of Washington officials selectively disclose informa-
tion to the press.'3
41. Official news sources in the executive branch are centralized, with public informa-
tion staffs at all agencies and the press corps at the White House. PRESS CONNECTION,
supra note 36, at 75. See also infra notes 248-49. Congressional information, because it is
disseminated by the staffs of the individual members, is not nearly as systematized. See
generally PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, S. HESS, THE ULTIMATE INSIDERS: U.S. SENA-
TORS IN THE NATIONAL MEDIA 2, 92-93, 105 (1986).
42. There are various definitions of the term "leak." As one source has put it, "[l]eaks
have a negative connotation and therefore are subject to different definitions depending
on where people sit and their own standards of practice. One person's leak is another's
profile in courage. That is one reason why talking about them with reporters and journal-
ists is complicated." IMPACT, supra note 4, at 169. Elie Abel has recently defined the leak
as the "unsolicited disclosure of sensitive information on condition of anonymity." E.
ABEL, supra note 1, at 2. Although officials and journalists sometimes distinguish between
leakers and confidential sources on the basis of the nature of the information or who initi-
ated the communication, this Article will use the term "leak" to refer to communications
in which the information transmitted is considered confidential and in which the source
seeks anonymity. See IMPACT, supra note 4, at 171.
Thomas Paine may have been responsible for the first significant leak in American his-
tory when he revealed information about a secret arms deal with France in 1778. E. ABEL,
supra note 1, at 11-15. Leaks were already routine in Washington by 1937, when Leo Ros-
ten observed that Washington reporters would have to rely on informal channels of com-
munication with officials in order to obtain the news. L. ROSTEN, THE WASHINGTON CORRE-
SPONDENTS 78 (1937).
43. For example, 42% of the federal officials responding to a survey stated that they
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While anyone within government can leak to the press, empiri-
cal observation shows some patterns in the identity of leakers.
Most leaks do not originate from press offices or other formal
government spokesmen." Nor, with the exception of
"whistleblowing,"' 5 is leaking a common practice in the career or
lower civil service.'0  Rather, it is high-level public offi-
cials-members of the cabinet or close Presidential advi-
sors-who often use the leak as a device to disseminate informa-
tion. 7 Congress as well is often a source of leaks, not only about
legislative business, but about executive branch affairs as well' 8
Leakers provide three kinds of information to the press: public
material which is not widely disseminated; material which some
officials seek to keep confidential; and material whose confidenti-
ality is assured by law, regulation, or oath.'9 Some leaks consist of
information in which the source has little personal stake"0 but
which she has obtained peripherally in the course of her involve-
ment in the world of Washington.' By contrast, other leakers
provide information on subjects of professional concern to them.
2. Motivations for Leaking
News sources are not all simply altruistic actors who seek to
promote the public interest.6 2 Unsurprisingly, there are a multi-
had leaked during their government careers. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 172. As noted in the
study itself, this response may even understate the case. Id.
44. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 17; PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 75.
45. See infra note 59.
46. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 4, 17, 35; IMPACT, supra note 4, at 201; PRESS CONNECTION,
supra note 36, at 75. Hodding Carter has reportedly said that the leaks "that matter" in
Washington are almost always the work of "political players rather than bureaucratic
moles." E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 67.
47. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 4, 17, 35 (on White House leakers); PRESS CONNECTION,
supra note 36, at 76 (most executive branch leakers are political appointees); M. GROSS-
MAN & M. KUMAR, supra note 4, at 159. Although there seems to be some dispute as to
whether journalist James Reston or President Kennedy coined the phrase, it is now popu-
lar to note that "the ship of state is the only vessel to leak from the top." E. ABEL, supra
note 1, at 17; PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 76; A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY 355 (1973).
48. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 17; IMPACT, supra note 4, at 136; PRESS CONNECTION, supra
note 36, at 76; REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 99 (13% of all press contacts are with Con-
gressional staff members).
49. IMPACT, supra note 4, at.170.
50. PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 77.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 92.
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plicity of motives for leaking. One, persuasive typology"s of leaks
identifies the ego leak,5' the goodwill leak,"5 the policy leak,"6 the
animus leak,5" the trial balloon leak, 58 and the whistleblower
53. This typology is developed in PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, and has been used
by other observers of government.press relations as well. See, e.g., E. ABEL, supra note 1,
at 18-21.
54. The ego leaker leaks in order to "satisfy a sense of self-importance." PRESS CONNEC-
TION, supra note 36, at 77. Hess suggests that "ego is the most frequent cause of leaking
[in Washington], although it may not account for the major leaks." Id. See also B. SWAIN,
supra note 36, at 20; cf. D. CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 125 (1959) (sug-
gesting that the primary cause of leaks is "the power struggle" within government-a po-
litical motivation-rather than the motivation of vanity).
55. Goodwill leakers leak with the long-range pragmatic motive of developing good rela-
tionships with the press as "a play for future favor." PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at
77. Martin Linsky's study of how the press affects, federal policymaking indicates that
39.7% of public official respondents who leaked information to the press said that they
did so in order to develop good relationships with reporters. The study also indicates that
this figure may be understated. IMPACT, su)3ra note 4, at 239.
One commentator suggests that such goodwill leaking prompted Reagan budget director
David Stockman's decision to hold a series of candid, off the record conversations with
William Greider of the Washington Post in 1981. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 19 (suggesting
that Stockman's purpose was to develop a connection with an important news organization
and to "prod and influence" the focus of its coverage). See W. GREIDER, THE EDUCATION OF
DAVID STOCKMAN AND OTHER AMERICANS (1982); infra note 406.
56. Hess defines a policy-leak as "a straightforward pitch for or against a proposal."
PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 77. Commonly, aides attempt to use the policy leak
to pressure official decisionmaking on policy matters. See E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 20-21,
25; PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 86; IMPACT, supra note 4, at 186, 192.
Almost 75% of the leakers responding to Linsky's survey indicated that they revealed
information to the press in order to gain attention for an issue or policy option; 52.7% did
so to force action on an issue; and a total of over 60% did so to slow or stop action on an
issue. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 196, 238: Almost 64% leaked in order to consolidate sup-
port from the public or-a constituency outside government. Id. 30.4% sought to inform
other officials of a policy consideration or action and 32.1% sought to send a message to
another branch of government. Id. at 238-39. See also B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at 20
(describing such motivations as explained in Price, How to Become a Reliable Source,
MORE, May 1973, at 11-15 (pseudonymous article)).
57. The animus leak is "used to settle grudges." PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at
77. Its purpose is primarilyto harm another person and undermine her position. See also
E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 20 (recounting the belief of most reporters that prematurd ru-
mors in 1981 about the removal of Secretary of State, Alexander Haig were the work of
hostile forces in the administration); IMPACT, supra note 4,-at 172 (leaks about Ed Meese).
18.5% of the respondents to a survey of federal officials admitted that they had disclosed
information to the press to undermine another's position. Id. at 238. Given the less-than-
honorable nature of the rationale, we may question whether this figure does not in fact
understate the percentage of leakers who served as news sources for this reason.
58. The trial balloon leak "reveal[s] a proposal that is under consideration in order to
assess its assets and liabilities." PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 77. Of course, it is
often impossible to identify whether something is a trial balloon (unless it is explicitly
floated as an option). See G. JUERGENS, NEWS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE 41-42 (1981).
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leak. 9 We can add to that basic typology the reverse effect leak0°
and the record correction leak. s' Leaks can be intended to com-
municate with a variety of constituencies: foreign governments,
59. The whistleblower leak in government is "the last resort of frustrated civil servants
who feel they cannot correct a perceived wrong through regular government channels."
PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 77-78. See Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act
of 1989: A False Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355, 357 (1991) (providing
examples of whistleblowing in the federal government). Whistleblowers often leak infor-
mation because they are outraged by corrupt or wasteful practices which they cannot ame-
liorate through ordinary internal bureaucratic channels. See, e.g., N. HENTOFF, supra note
36, at 227; M. GLAZER & P. GLAZER, THE WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN Gov-
ERNMENT AND INDUSTRY (1989); T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 25. Ernest Fitzgerald, one of
the most famous of the classic whistleblowers, testified before a congressional committee
in 1968 that the development of certain military equipment would cost two billion dollars
more than projected. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 134-35; D. WISE, supra
note 39, at 287. Daniel Ellsberg, the former military officer turned anti-war activist who
leaked the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times, can also be classified as a
whistleblower in view of his public assertions that he acted "out of conscience and a desire
to help the United States." See D. WISE, supra note 39, at 152; Beloff, This Above All, in
QUESTIONING MEDIA ETHICS 77 (B. Rubin ed. 1978); Ellsburg, Secrecy and Security: Dr.
Daniel Ellsberg, in CRISIS IN CONFIDENCE: THE IMPACT OF WATERGATE 65-74 (D.W. Har-
ward ed. 1974).
The term "whistleblower" has also often been used to refer to individuals outside the
government context who blow the whistle on corporate actors and other private entities.
See generally F. ELLISTON, J. KEENAN, P. LOCKHART & J. VAN SCHAIK, WHISTLEBLOWING:
MANAGING DISSENT IN THE WORKPLACE (1985); M. GLAZER & P. GLAZER, supra; A. WESTIN,
WHISTLE BLOWING! LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION (1981). The story of Karen
Silkwood's whistleblowing, see M. GLAZER & P. GLAZER, supra, at 27, has been memorial-
ized in film. Silkwood (ABC Motion Pictures released through 20th Century Fox 1983).
See also infra Section IV.
60. See IMPACT, supra note 4, at 195, describing this as the "most esoteric" of the typol-
ogy. In the reverse effect leak, a leaker "may leak material which on the surface appears to
be damaging to himself or herself, but serves to get some important information out while
minimizing the possibility of being identified as the source." Id.
61. In a record correction leak, an official would leak to set the record straight because
she believes that inaccurate information is circulating in the press. 78.3% of the former
federal officials responding to a survey who admitted that they had leaked information to
the press said that they had done so to counter false or misleading information. Id. at 197,
239. See also E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 36 (describing leaks to counter leaks regarding
Pentagon).
Greed may also be a motivating factor for some leaks, either when the press is willing to
buy the source's information or when publication of the information will have some indi-
rect economic benefit to the source. The available evidence does not indicate a high inci-
dence of payment by responsible news organizations for information. See D. WEAVER & G.
WILHOIT, THE AMERICAN JOURNALIST 129 (1986); W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 131. Never-
theless, news sources have been paid by press organizations, leading to what has been
termed "checkbook journalism." See, e.g., Cose, supra note 3, at 64. Given the insider
trading scandals of the past several years, it is reasonable to conclude that the publication
of certain selected information by the press can have significant monetary benefits to the
source, particularly in the corporate context.
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officials within government,62 the general public, or a smaller af-
fected group. Government sources who admit to leaking most
often claim policy-related motivations, including communicating
with extra-governmental constituencies and directing attention to
policy items.63
The identities and positions of sources can sometimes suggest
their motives for leaking. Staff members, for example, are more
likely to leak for reasons of ego or self-aggrandizement. 4 Those
who have extraneous information which does not directly affect
them may leak in order to establish goodwill with journalists.6 5
Sources who support or oppose particular proposals have incen-
tives to leak for policy reasons, and frustrated civil servants may
see the press as a last resort for the correction of a problem they
cannot ameliorate through regular channels.66 Animus leaks, how-
ever, seem to run the gamut of source descriptions,67 although one
study found that executive branch personnel were more likely
than congressional sources to leak in order to undermine some-
one's position. 8
Of course, while these descriptions are generally useful in cate-
gorizing leaks, the leakers' motives for dissemination are not al-
ways apparent. Sources seldom explain their motives to report-
ers. 6  Moreover, any given leak can have a number of motivations
that are neither exclusive nor contradictory.7" Finally, leaks may
62. Leakers in administrative agencies, for example, may reveal information to journal-
ists in order to bring it to the President's attention without having to go through the
official channels. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 247. See also infra text ac-
companying note 306 (discussing the impact on public understanding of communications
intended to be fully comprehensible only to subgroups).
63. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 197.
64. PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 77.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 144. One possible explanation is that a united front is ex-
pected at the senior, appointive level of the executive branch. In Congress, on the other
hand, legislators do not see themselves as part of a single team and have a tradition of
airing policy disputes in public. Id.
69. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 10.
70. Id. at 21; PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 78; IMPACT, supra note 4, at 192. This
is evident from the fact that while Hess, for example, characterizes the Pentagon Papers
disclosure as a policy leak, it could well be categorized as a whistleblower leak as well. See
PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 77-78; E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 20. Similarly, politi-
cally-motivated leaks can at the same time satisfy desires for self-aggrandizement and
competitiveness or malice.
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not always be the products of rational calculation.71
However broad-brush, the typology of leaking suggests not only
the possible motivations for the practice, but also why it is widely
deemed necessary. Naturally, the reasons for ego leaks are psy-
chological. The other sorts of leaks can be traced in large part to
characteristics of modern government. While it is often useful to
refer in discourse to government as a monolithic entity, it is more
accurate to admit that the state does not speak with one voice.
Governmental structure and decisionmaking are based on the
fragmentation of authority, and both intra and inter-branch rival-
ries characterize the relationships within government.72 Access to
the media is seen by governmental actors as an efficient way of
building support and helping to influence the resolution of intra-
government competitions. 7S Accordingly, leaking increases when
government is most acutely torn by power struggles, controversy,
and crisis.74
3. Leaks versus Plants
Some apparent leaks are in fact "plants"-authorized distribu-
tions of information to the press for which no particular govern-
ment agent wishes to take public responsibility.75 Many White
71. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 192. Hess, for example, characterizes some leaks as "no-
purpose" leaks, arising from the "gregarious nature" of politicians. PRESS CONNECTION,
supra note 36, at 78. Linsky says that the transfer of information in these circumstances is
"a by-product of a personal relationship between the reporter and the leaker .... charac-
terized by ongoing conversation and mutual trust." IMPACT, supra note 4, at 195.
72. See IMPACT, supra note 4, at 11. The legislative branch is split by party affiliations.
Various executive departments, such as the State and Defense departments, have tradi-
tional rivalries and often conflicting interests. See PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at
82-83. The executive consists of a bureaucratic permanent government and a top layer of
political appointees. The White House and Congress are often adversaries, especially when
there are party differences. REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 101. Even within a single admin-
istration in the White House, there will virtually always be disarray and factionalism at
some point with respect to decisionmaking. High officials compete with each other for
influence over the President. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 42. The problem is particularly
acute when decisions are made by committee at the White House and cabinet levels. PRESS
CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 91.
73. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 11.
74. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 2, 28, 30, 63.
75. Abel defines a plant as "a disclosure designed'to advance administration interests
and goals." Id. at 2. A number of apparent leaks in the past decade have subsequently
been revealed as plants. For example, one unnamed source told the Washington Post that
"[tihere [was] no evidence that reporters were told anything we didn't want them to
know" in connection with a Reagan administration debate on U.S. air strikes against Syr-
ian positions in Lebanon. S. KLAIDMAN & T. BEAUCHAMP, THE VIRTUOUS JOURNALIST 199
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House leaks are planted to serve presidential goals.7 Purposes for
such authorized leaks include testing the political waters for a
policy; lying to the press or the public; securing advance publicity
for a news event in order to marshal support; unofficially indicat-
ing displeasure in order to silence opponents; signalling policies to
foreign governments; and attempting to generate friendly press
coverage.
7
7
Since authorized leakers virtually always deny planting infor-
(1987) (quoting Cannon, Justice Probe Fails to Disclose Source of Leaks on Mideast,
Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1983, at Al). See also C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34; at 119
(on the Reagan administration disinformation campaign against Libya, waged by planting
stories in the American press suggesting an imminent American attack); E. ABEL, supra
note 1, at 36-37, 43 (characterizing leaks of disinformation in Libyan incident as a "dubi-
ous gift" to the press); D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 191 (discussing disinformation in
Libyan incident and apparent double standard of Reagan administration in sanctioning
disinformation while directing the FBI to set up special units to discover leaks of govern-
ment information); J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 185-89 (providing examples of presidential
leaks, even of classified documents); D. WISE, supra note 39, at 105-09 (noting that even
classified documents have been leaked with authorization); A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 47,
at 329-57 (discussing efforts by the executive branch to reform the secrecy system).
The term "plants" is also used to refer to situations in which government officials, in-
stead of leaking a story themselves, have a third party do so in order to conceal the actual
source of the information even from journalists. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at
119-20; T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 91, 95-96. For example, the White House staff may
give a third- party a planted question to ask the president at a press conference. C. PRESS
& K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 16, 119.
Naturally, authorized leaks to the press are not solely the province of government. It is
also evident that sources in the private sector-corporate sources, for example-may be
authorized to leak information to the press without public attribution for a variety of rea-
sons, often economic, but sometimes political as well. Some suspect, for example, that
Henry Kravis himself may have leaked information about the terms of KKR's then-secret
purchase offer for RJR Nabisco's stock. See Thomas, Greed, N.Y. Times Book Rev., Mar.
29, 1990, at 5.
76. M. GROSSMAN & M. KUMAR, supra note 4, at 159. For example, Press and VerBurg
report former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph Califano's claims that
White House officials leaked attacks on 'cabinet members with President Carter's tacit
approval. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 118. They also recount the charge
that Lyndon Johnson arranged to have a television journalist reassigned from the White
House by leaking manufactured scoops to him. Id. Johnson has also been charged with
having leaked a Top Secret memorandum which implicated the Kennedy administration
in the overthrow and assassination of President Diem of South Vietnam. See, e.g., D.
WISE, supra note 39, at 117-18, 127-29. Similarly, it is now clear that members of the
Nixon administration were responsible for leaking the information that ultimately led to
the resignation of Justice Abe Fortas from the United States Supreme Court. Epstein, The
American Press: Some Truths About Truths, in ETHICS AND THE PRESS 68 (1975). Author-
ized leaks have also been used in connection with inter-service rivalries within the Penta-
gon. See D. WISE, supra note 39, at 284-85.
77. C. PRESS & K. VERBuRG, supra note 34, at 118-19; J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 188;
D. WISE, supra note 39, at 282.
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mation, many of their cleared disclosures will appear unofficial
and unauthorized. 8 Yet, subsequent events will sometimes fuel
speculations that an apparent leak is in reality a plant. This
might occur, for example, if the information is sensitive and the
administration neither strongly protests its disclosure nor tries to
establish the identity of the source.7 9 However, in many in-
stances-and despite attempts to speculate-neither the press re-
cipient of the information, nor the reading public, will know
whether or not the disclosure is authorized.80 Numerous examples
of contradictory speculations in the press as to the origin and
character of anonymously leaked information demonstrate the
difficulty of distinguishing between plants and unauthorized
disclosures."1
Moreover, in view of the complexity of government today, leaks
may be authorized at many different levels, leading to major defi-
nitional problems. Leaks authorized by members of Congress or
by cabinet departments, for example, may be unauthorized from
78. Thus, for example, while Attorney General Richard Thornburgh instituted investi-
gations designed to identify leakers in the Justice Department, some charged that the
leaks leading to the investigations were in fact planted by Thornburgh to undermine oppo-
sition Democrats. See, e.g., Epstein, Information Leakers Unlikely to be Caught, Miami
Herald, June 3, 1989, at A13, col. 1; McGee & Marcus, Probe of Gray's Office Causes
Uproar, Wash. Post, June 1, 1989, at A20, col. 1; see also E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 30-31
(describing the Washington Post's uncertainty as to the status of a leak from a congres-
sional staffer, subsequently confirmed by a CIA official, that the CIA was financing the
Nicaraguan contras).
79. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 43.
80. Stephen Hess provides excellent examples of leaked stories during the Reagan ad-
ministration in which observers could not determine the motives or identity of the leakers.
PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 78, 82-85. The stories were variously viewed as
planned leaks, or the work of whistleblowers, or distributions by White House dissidents.
Id. at 84-85. See also IMPACT, supra note 4, at 189-93 (describing the same phenomenon of
confusion and speculation in connection with leaked stories about the criminal investiga-
tion of Vice President Agnew in 1973); E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 22 (stories about Alexan-
der Haig).
81. This is, of course, a problem that plagues all leaks, not only those that might be
suspected of being plants. See E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 24-25; IMPACT, supra note 4, at
195.
A number of contradictory motivations can rationally be attributed by readers and ana-
lysts to sources whose identities remain unknown. For example, anyone on either side of
the 1985 Soviet-American arms control summit could have had rational reasons for leaking
a letter from Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan about Soviet arms
control violations. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 22-24. See also infra note 314. Speculations as
to identity and motive can become particularly misleading in view of the fact that many
leaks are not well-orchestrated and do not perform any function particularly well. See
PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 78; infra note 319.
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the point of view of the White House.8 Leaks authorized by the
White House may be contrary to the interests of other executive
agencies. 8 Thus, vantage point does affect the characterization of
disclosures as leaks or plants.
4. Reasons for Anonymity
Why do leakers request anonymity? Some do so programmati-
cally, because they fear that the substantive aims they hope to
accomplish by providing information to the press would be under-
mined if they were identified.84 This could occur in a number of
sitations. For example, a source seeking to float a trial balloon
might fear that his position on a policy may become reified if
publicly advanced under his name. Alternatively, desired policy
effects may be diluted if an appearance of neutrality is under-
mined by disclosure of a source's identity and partisan affilia-
tions. 5 Similarly, anonymity is predictably requested by those
who wish to undermine another's position without taking public
accountability for the harmful act. By contrast, the identity of
some other sources is irrelevant to the substance and effect of the
82. See, e.g., M. GROSSMAN & M. KUMAR, supra note 4, at 159 (noting that those sources
who have little stake .in a particular administration's success may be willing to provide
information that the White House does not wish to have disseminated). Abel tries to solve
this problem by distinguishing between disclosures authorized on high authority and those
not so authorized, but this itself is a manipulable and imprecise distinction. See E. ABEL,
supra note 1, at 43. For example, Henry Kissinger, infamous for his official (but unat-
tributed) leaks to the press during his government tenure, was himself the subject of polit-
ically motivated leaks. Columnist Jack Anderson's Pulitzer Prize-winning report on the
1971 Indo-Pakistani War disclosed secret minutes of a National Security Council subcom-
mittee meeting which showed an administration "tilt" toward Pakistan, despite Kis-
singer's public claims of neutrality. See S. HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER 465-76 (1983); D.
WISE, supra note 39, at 51-52, 300-01. It was only two years later, as a result of Watergate
disclosures, that the source of the minutes was determined to be a Navy stenographer
acting on the orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, unbeknownst to the public and
probably to Jack Anderson as well, it was members of the Joint Chiefs who were attempt-
ing to discredit Kissinger via use of the press. Epstein, supra note 76, at 65-66.
83. Thus, government can play a "double game" when one agency wishes to publicize
something for propaganda reasons while another is concerned that its release might affect
the national security. See E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 48-49 (describing leaks about the
United States' interception of Libyan communications).
84. This focus on the strategic or programmatic use of confidentiality is not meant to
deny the self-protective character of all requests for anonymity. All leakers fear some sort
of personal reprisal if their identities are disclosed. Thus, they all have self-protective mo-
tives for request:ng confidentiality. See infra note 86.
85. For example, while "smearing" the opposition in an election campaign has a long
history in American politics, "to be caught smearing makes virtually certain a backfire
effect that can defeat the candidate." B. FELKNOR, DIRTY POLITICS 129 (1966).
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information they impart, and self-protection is their main reason
for requesting anonymity.86
B. The Ethic of Non-Disclosure
By and large, the articulated ethic on the part of reporters and
media organizations has been to keep promises of confidentiality
when they have been made. 7 Many reporters have braved con-
tempt citations and jail terms by refusing to name their sources
in response to judicial or legislative orders. 8
86. Naturally, there is no bright line rule that will allow us to distinguish between such
strategic and self-protective requests for anonymity. in -all instances.
Self-protective concerns include fear of criminal liability, civil liability in a third-party
lawsuit, economic consequences such as loss of employment, reputational injury, and phys-
ical harm. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691, 693 (1972); H. GOODWIN, supra
note 34, at 118-19 (reporting that some sources for Malcolm Johnson's expos6 of organized
crime in 1948 would have been killed if identified).
The Reagan administration's attempts to pass legislation to prevent leaks, as well as the
array of existing possible sanctions against government leakers, demonstrate the potential
dangers posed for government sources who disclose information to the press without au-
thorization. See, e.g., D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 185-89; P. STOLER, THE WAR AGAINST
THE PRESS: POLITICS, PRESSURE AND INTIMIDATION IN THE 80's 11 (1986); DuVal, The Occa-
sions of Secrecy, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 588-89 (1986). Syndicated columnist Jack Ander-
son has charged that politicians "isolate, intimidate, and hassle [whistleblowers] once they
are detected." Anderson, No Reward for Whistle-blowers, Jan. 14, 1982, quoted in C.
PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 134. Whistleblowing can lead to negative conse-
quences in the private sector as well. See generally A. WESTIN, supra note 59.
Even sources strategically seeking anonymity can fear that their political aims will not
be achieved if they are identified and that they may themselves be exposed to reputational
and economic harm as a result. See infra text accompanying notes 111-22.
87. A relatively recent study indicates that 95% of American journalists do not approve
of the identification of confidential sources. D. WEAVER & G. WILHOIT, supra note 61, at
127-28. The Code of Ethics of the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi,
states that "U]ournalists acknowledge the, newsman's ethic of protecting confidential
sources of information." Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Code of Eth-
ics, Ethics 5 (1973). The code of the Radio-Television News Directors Association
("RTNDA") states: "Broadcast journalists . . . acknowledge the journalist's ethic of pro-
tection of confidential information and sources, and urge unswerving observation of it ex-
cept in instances in which it would clearly and unmistakably defy the public interest." H.
GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 130 (quoting RTNDA code of ethics).
88. This Article will not consider such compelled disclosure situations. Suffice it to say,
however, that since the first amendment does not confer on the press an unqualified privi-
lege to refuse to disclose information obtained confidentially during the newsgathering
process (see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)), members of the press are vulnera-
ble to contempt citations for refusing to respond to judicial or legislative orders seeking
source identities unless a relevant state shield law precludes such inquiries. See, e.g., Mar-
cus, supra note 19, at 859-64.
Despite the imposition of sanctions, however, the history of journalism in this country
provides numerous examples of reporters' refusals to disclose their confidential sources.
Benjamin and James Franklin and John Peter Zenger appear to be the earliest such resist-
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The most common explanation for the ethic of non-disclosure is
that, without guarantees of anonymity, sources would be discour-
aged from disclosing information to the press.8 9 As a consequence,
the public would be deprived of important and newsworthy infor-
mation that would not otherwise come to light.90
This ethic of non-disclosure may also result from institutional
concerns of the press. The confidentiality issue often arises when
the government uses its subpoena power to compel reporters to
disclose their sources.9 Keeping promises of confidentiality in
those circumstances clearly reinforces the press' independence
from government.2
ers. See M. VAN GERPEN, supra note 19, at 5-6; B. FRANKLIN, supra note 35, at 33-34; V.
BURANELLI, THE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER 57 (1957). During the 1800's, records reveal that
five journalists reported to have refused to divulge their sources to Congress or state legis-
latures were jailed for contempt. M. VAN GERPEN, supra note 19, at 6-8, 11; F. MARBUT,
NEWS FROM THE CAPITAL 139-46, 158 (1971); Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (C.C.D.C.
1848) (No. 10,375). See also Bainbridge, Subpoenaing the Press, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1988, at
72 (reporting jailing of Baltimore Sun reporter in 1896 for refusing to disclose his sources
for a report that tied public officials to illegal gambling operations). Twentieth Century
examples are even more numerous. See M. VAN GERPEN, supra note 19, at 8-11, 13-26.
Among others, Paul Mallon of the United Press in 1929 (W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 30-
31; F. MARBUT, supra, at 158-61; D. CATER, supra note 54, at 96); Myron Farber (In re
Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978)); Peter Bridge (M. VAN
GERPEN, supra note 19, at 17); William Farr (In re Farr, 36 Cal, App. 3d 577, 11 Cal. Rptr.
649 (1974)); Earl Caldwell (see Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970),
rev'd sub nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665); and-most recently-Brian Karem (Jailed
Reporter Names Woman Who Aided Him and Is. Freed, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1990, at
A13, col. 1) have all been jailed for failing to divulge confidential sources.
89. This was the central argument used by the press in its attempt in Branzburg to
establish a full-fledged first amendment privilege against compelled disclosure of news-
gathering information, and it carried the minority. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 679-81, 727-36.
See D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 319-21; E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 143-44; B. SWAIN,
supra note 36, at 47.
A related utilitarian justification is that any voluntary disclosures by the press may
make it more difficult to resist compelled disclosure of sources. See, e.g., Zuckerman,
Breaking a Confidence, TIME, Aug. 3, 1987, at 61.
90. Zuckerman, supra note 89, at 61. A more cynically utilitarian argument focuses on
the competitive spirit of reporters themselves. One journalist, for example, has suggested
that he keeps his sources secret in order to "keep [them] from other reporters." B. SWAIN,
supra note 36, at 53 (quoting free-lance writer Richard Reeves). He also suggests that.the
Washington Post may have allowed the inexperienced team of Woodward and Bernstein to
remain in control of the Watergate story in large part because they had a secret source
who would not talk to anyone else. Id.
91. See, e.g., Langley & Levine, supra note 19, at 16 & n.14; M. VAN GERPEN, supra note
19, at 28-31.
92. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The Court thus invites state
and federal authorities . . . to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of
the government.). See also J. OLEN, ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 43 (1988); B. SWAIN, supra note
36, at 52.
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In contrast to these basically utilitarian reasons, the practice of
non-disclosure may also be supported by notions of honor." Just
as "gentlemen" do not betray confidences, others in our culture
obey norms of loyalty and civility that go beyond the dictates of a
mere cost-benefit analysis."" In addition, there appears to be a
quasi-professional ethic among journalists that includes an obli-
gation, as such, not to reveal confidences."a
Finally, there may also be a psychological, ego-related explana-
tion for the ethic of confidentiality. Being privy to others' confi-
dences makes journalists members of the knowledgeable elite, the
"in-group.""" It.may give them a sense that they have control over
93. See D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 321 ("you cannot burnyour sources... [t]hat is a
matter of honor. . . ."); B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at 52 (justifying protection of sources on
the basis of "personal honor"); Zuckerman, supra note 89, at 61 (quoting Marvin Kalb: "If
I gave somebody my word that I would not quote him or identify him, then I would not
quote or identify him, period.").
94. See generally V. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES (1980) (describing the general norms of
loyalty and confidentiality that are part of American culture and the ways in which they
were both tested and affirmed during the McCarthy era); Post, The Social Foundations of
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957 (1989)
(arguing that the tort of.invasion of privacy is premised on social rules of civility and
respect that are part of one's membership and status in the community). This is not to
suggest, of course, that norms of civility cannot themselves be justified by a utilitarian
analysis.
95. See, e.g., M. VAN GERPEN, supra note 19, at 7 ("professional honor" cited by report-
ers in 1871 for refusal to reveal to Senate source of classified treaty). I use the term
"quasi-professional" because of the ambiguous status of journalism as a profession. Tom
Goldstein, formerly of the New York Times, has said that "journalism is not a profession
in the traditional sense of the word." T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 162. Journalists do
not adhere to a single code of ethics (see infra note 291); they are not licensed and do not
submit to a centralized governing or disciplinary body; they are not subject to educational
or other specialized requirements for entry into the occupation; and they see themselves as
independent and quixotic crusaders after truth and justice. Indeed, journalists fear licens-
ing-a traditional litmus test of professional status-because it permits government con-
trol. See id. at 164; J. HULTENG, supra note 6, at 204-07; D. WEAVER & G. WILHOIT, supra
note 61, at 104, 143-45. Yet, journalists engage in a significant amount of self-criticism;
have adopted codes of ethics; have in the past established advisory self-regulatory bodies
like the National News Council; see themselves at least in part as having the socially re-
sponsible mission of representing and informing the public; and are members of a powerful
establishment. Moreover, there are sometimes convenience-based limitations on accredita-
tion ("credentials" or "press passes") for attending events which, when they involve gov-
ernment, can resemble de facto licensing systems. T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 163-65.
The same can be said for governmentally-imposed pooling requirements. Journalists color
themselves as professionals when it is in their self-interest to do so and paint themselves
out of the professional fraternities when this is in their self-interest. In this sense, they
occupy a hybrid or ambiguous position.
96. See, e.g., T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 131-32; T. CROUSE, THE Boys ON THE Bus 5
(1973) (describing "the methedrine buzz that comes from knowing stories that the public
could not know for hours and secrets the public will never know"); H. GOODWIN, supra
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events. 7 Specifically, it may foster a sense of power to recognize
that, armed with inside knowledge, they can participate in an ex-
clusive dialogue with an elite group of readers and policy-makers
who themselves control and shape events."' It also may give re-
porters the psychologically satisfying sense that they are reliable
and trustworthy people."'
What is salient about these traditional bases for the ethic of
non-disclosure, however, is that none of the justifications hinges
on the needs, fears, and expectations of the sources themselves. 100
note 34, at 115-16 (quoting Ray White, former editor of the Washington Journalism Re-
view and Lyle Denniston, Baltimore Sun reporter); J. HULTENG, supra note 6, at 84 (mark
of status in the press corps to belong to coterie of insiders); S. LiCHTER, S. ROTHMAN & L.
LICHTER, THE MEDIA ELITE 113 (1986) [hereinafter MEDIA ELITE] (noting that journalists
may focus on competition and conflict between powerful people not only because of orga-
nizational factors, but also because "their own inner needs are gratified by the sense of
involvement with powerful forces and the contest for high status"); B. SWAIN, supra note
36, at 15-16; Blasi, supra note 19, at 241-42; see also notes 263, 287-88 and accompanying
text.
97. Indeed, Joseph Kraft criticized what he took to be a "new narcissism" in journalism,
"consist[ing] in the belief that because we describe events, we make them happen." J.
KRAFT, THE IMPERIAL MEDIA 39-40, quoted in MEDIA ELITE, supra note 96, at 123.
98. MEDIA ELITE, supra note 96, at 113, 123-24; B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at 13-15. The
appeal of being privy to the inner circles of power is amply demonstrated by the fact that
many reporters have offered advice to presidents and been their confidants. See Linsky,
Practicing Responsible Journalism: Press Impact, in RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISM 142 (D. El-
liott ed. 1986) [hereinafter Practicing Responsible Journalism] and sources cited therein.
99. The psychological satisfaction in keeping one's word and being perceived as reliable
by a group is for many people part of a sense of adulthood and responsibility. This percep-
tion has power in the lives of ordinary citizens, who believe in being "team players" and
not "telling tales out of school." These and other closely related norms exist throughout
our culture, permeating such sub-cultures as criminals and youth gangs. See, e.g., J.
MOORE, HOMEBOYS 86, 217 n.3 (1978) (characterizing strong barrio loyalties as intensified
by gang tradition and noting that "snitches" are ostracized and marked for death). People
have suffered punishment rather than "ratting" on their friends, while status as a "snitch"
is itself enough to lead to excommunication from the group. It is said that organized crime
has a tradition of individuals "taking the fall" for others, in exchange for financial and
personal loyalty by the organization. To be a "stand up guy" in this context is necessary
for self-respect and for the respect of the community. Of course, this element of personal
justification dovetails with the honor-based rationale explored above. See supra notes 93-
95 and accompanying text. It is also striking that in the context of counter-cultural groups,
the ego-gratification of refusing to divulge information is presumably influenced by the
group's general hostility to the government (or the mainstream social group) requesting
disclosure. Nevertheless, while that same dynamic is obviously not operative with regard
to press-source relations, the institutional discomfort of the press with government may
make it an apt analogy. See infra Section III.A. on the role of the press.
100. Thus, reporter shield laws have -been interpreted to confer a privilege against dis-
closure on the reporter rather than the source. See, e.g., Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165, 170,
465 A.2d 413, 416 (1983); Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 724, 294 A.2d 149, 156
(1972), aff'd per curiam, 226 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973);
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C. The Occasions of Voluntary Disclosure
Since the ethic of non-disclosure is not fundamentally premised
on the interests of sources, the rule of anonymity has at times
been honored in the breach. Some journalists have disclosed their
sources pursuant to court order.' 0' Others have voluntarily and
directly divulged their sources and failed to abide by confidential-
ity norms. 102 Still others have used various methods to identify
Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 151, 123 A.2d 473, 480 (1956); Note, The Pro-
tection of Confidential News Sources: Enhancing the Utility of Ohio's Shield Law, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1051 (1981). Courts have held that sources cannot waive the privilege
in order to compel the testimony of reporters. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630
F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); Palandjian v. Pahlavi, 103
F.R.D. 410, 413 (D.D.C. 1984): The constitutional reporters' privilege sought for journalists
in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), was also oblivious to the interests of the
sources themselves. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 726 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also
infra note 154.
101. One commentator has charged that "untold numbers" of journalists have disclosed
their sources pursuant to court order, but that it is impossible to specify the numbers
because such incidents are not widely publicized. H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 117. See
also Langley & Levine, supra note 16, at 21. Nevertheless, there are some examples of
journalists and news organizations providing the identities of sources pursuant to sub-
poena. See, e.g., In re Wayne, 4 Dist. Ct. 475, 478 (Hawaii 1914); M.L. STEIN, SHAPING THE
NEWS 143 (1974); M. VAN GERPEN, supra note 19, at 27.
102. See Minnesota Note, supra note 16, at 1566; Smyser, supra note 33, at 17-18.
While voluntary revelations of source identities are difficult to document, some significant
segments of the journalistic community have admitted to circumstances in which they
would favor such disclosure. In a 1982 study undertaken for the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, for example, 62% of the responding publishers, editors, and staff
members approved of breaching confidentiality in "unusual circumstances," such as the
discovery that the source had lied to the reporter. P. MEYER, ETHICAL JOURNALISM 209
(1987) (also showing that 12% favored breaching confidentiality if the "editor and re-
porter agree that the harm done by keeping it is greater than the harm caused by breaking
it"). See also Rosenfeld, supra note 39, at 9-10 (describing recent ASNE survey with small
sample of respondents); Langley & Levine, supra note 16, at 22 (quoting Bob Woodward
for the view that death or the discovery that the source of a story on crime is involved in
the crime himself are two additional circumstances in which disclosure .would be
warranted).
The following examples are illustrative of circumstances in which reporters or news or-
ganizations have voluntarily disclosed the identities of their sources. Bob Woodward dis-
closed in his book on the CIA that William Casey had served as one of his confidential
sources. B. WOODWARD, VEIL: THE SECRET WARS OF THE CIA 14 (1987); Langley & Levine,
supra note 16, at 21. In the same year, Newsweek reported that Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North had been the magazine's anonymous source for its October, 1985, cover story on the
Achille Lauro hijacking. See Walcott, You Can Run But You Can't Hide, NEWSWEEK, Oct.
21, 1985, at 22-32; Newsweek Says North was a Source of Leaks, N.Y. Times, July 20,
1987, at A6, col. 3. In his testimony before the Senate, North had justified his and the
Reagan administration's lack of candor with Congress in the Iran/Contra affair by claim-
ing that failure to disclose was the only responsible course in view of the tendency of
members of Congress to leak sensitive information to the press. North referred in particu-
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lar to leaks which permitted the press to report on the United States' interception in 1985
of an Egyptian plane carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers. See Zuckerman, supra note 89,
at 61. In the wake of Newsweek's revelation, Time stated: "It was hardly a secret in Wash-
ington that North had provided information on many stories to a variety of news organiza-
tions, including TIME." Id. See also infra notes 301 and 402-03.
Similarly, during the Carter administration, a reporter divulged that press secretary
Jody Powell had confidentially communicated damaging. and false information about Sen-
ator Charles Percy to him. See Minnesota Note, supra note 16, at 1566 n.76 (citing
Smyser, supra note 33, at 17-18). In addition, UPI revealed Jody Powell as the source of a
briefing on President Carter's diplomatic mission to Jerusalem in March, 1979. M. GROSS-
MAN & M. KUMAR, supra note 4, at 160.
During the Nixon administration, the Washington Post disclosed that Secretary of State
Kissinger had suggested to pool.reporters, in a deep background conversation, that Rich-
ard Nixon might cancel his planned .trip to Moscow in 1971. Editor Ben Bradlee ordered
Kissinger to be named in the story because he apparently thought that Kissinger's state-
ments were tantamount to an administration policy pronouncement. B. SWAIN, supra note
36, at 49. See also D. WIsE, supra note 39, at 301-02 (quoting Bradlee on disclosure of
Kissinger's identity: "I'm sick and tired of diplomacy by backgrounder.").
David Wise revealed in 1973 that Herb Klein held a background briefing for reporters
during the Pentagon Papers controversy in 1971 in which he stated that the Nixon admin-
istration was more worried about setting a precedent for future leaks than about the na-
tional security impact of publication of the papers. Id. at 151.
In 1972, the author of a Life magazine expos6 (of Democratic Senator Joseph Tydings's
1970 attempt to use his influence to benefit a corporation in which he held stock) admit-
ted to David Wise that Charles Colson, Special Counsel to President Nixon, had assisted
him in obtaining the story. Id. at 11-12. While Tydings had charged that Life had been
used by the Republican administration to ensure his defeat in the coming election, Presi-
dent Nixon's press secretary completely denied any White House involvement at the time.
Id. at 12.
In a different type of situation, former New York Times reporter Sidney Zion disclosed
on a radio talk show in 1971 that Daniel Ellsberg was the source of the Pentagon Papers.
T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 156. Admittedly, reports of that incident indicate that
Ellsberg's identity was a poorly kept secret by that time anyway. Id. at 157.
In an analogy to the disclosure of source identities discussed here, it has been reported
that journalists do not always abide by the off the record rules of their governmental
sources. See C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 131. For example, Newsweek jour-
nalists who covered both presidential campaigns in the 1984 election year-on the basis of
an understanding that their observations would be off the record until after the elec-
tion-issued a special election issue containing a report of their coverage entitled "Exclu-
sive: The Untold Story of Campaign '84." Id. Milton Coleman, a Washington Post re-
porter, revealed first to another reporter and- then in a first-person article that
Presidential candidate Jesse Jackson had referred to Jews as "Hymies" and to New York
as "Hymietown" during a conversation in 1984 in which Coleman thought that Jackson
asked for his comments to be on background. See, e.g., D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 347-
51; T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 187-88; Coleman, 18 Words, Seven Weeks Later,
Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1984, at C8. As noted at supra note 55, William. Greider wrote a maga-
zine article in 1981 (and later a book) based on a series of extremely candid off the record
interviews with David Stockman, the Reagan administration's Budget Director. Stockman
claimed that he and Greider had a misunderstanding as to the terms of disclosure. See
infra note 406; W. GREIDER, supra note 55. Daniel Schorr reported on CBS in late 1974
that President Ford had warned "associates" that investigations of the CIA might uncover
evidence of the agency's involvement in assassinations. T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 196.
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sources indirectly."" In the past decade, examples of voluntary
The candid statements by Ford were made at a briefing lunch for New York Times' staff
which Schorr did not attend. The New York Times did not itself carry the story because,
when it checked with Ford's press secretary, it was told that the President's comments had
been off the record. Id. at 188-96. In yet another famous breach of confidentiality during
the Vietnam era, then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk was publicly identified as having
responded to a journalist's question at a background briefing by asking him "whose side"
he was on. Greenfield, Whose Side Are We On?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 3, 1990, at 76. In terms
of local revelations, journalists disclosed off the record admissions of an extra-marital rela-
tionship by San Antonio Mayor Henry Cisneros in 1988. Maraniss, The Tumult of Mayor
Cisneros, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1988, at C1. These examples surely support journalist
James Deakin's view that off the record information "seldom stays off the record very
long." J. DEAKIN. supra note 36, at 70-71.
103. Indirect revelations are often explicit enough to be widely understood. Reporters
use a number of techniques for identifying sources indirectly. One such method is to nar-
row the field of possible sources by identifying those who were not sources. See Langley &
Levine, supra note 16, at 22 (noting that by denying the rumor during the 1988 presiden-
tial campaign that candidate Richard Gephardt was the source of a videotape which
demonstrated rival Joseph Biden's plagiarism of a campaign speech, the New York Times
"narrowed the field of its sources" and "ultimately contributed to the reluctant admission
by the head of the Dukakis campaign that he had been the source. ... ).
In addition, the way in which a story is written may disclose possible sources to "dis-
cerning" readers. See, e.g., D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 321-22 (providing example); T.
WICKER, supra note 34, at 80-81 (describing how the august Arthur Krock of the New
York Times discerned that references to "friends of the President" in a story written by
Wicker during the Kennedy administration referred to Kennedy himself). Careful, profes-
sional readers can also often detect the identities of major unnamed sources in expos6s
because of the relatively gentle treatment of those sources. T. WICKER, supra note 34, at
135 (discussing major sources for THE FINAL DAYS and THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST). But
see J.W. DEAN, III, LOST HONOR 30-31 (1982) (recalling that the attempt to identify Deep
Throat "became an Establishment parlor game") and supra notes 78 and 81 for examples
of contradictory speculations as to source identities.
Moreover, the identifying information used to refer to a source may itself become associ-
ated with that particular source over time. T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 82 (noting that
the phrase "highest authority" became a well-known indirect reference to the President
during the Kennedy administration). Or the reference to a job title may be specific enough
in the circumstances that knowledgeable persons can at least narrow the field of possibili-
ties. The cognoscenti are then often able to read between the lines of the story to specu-
late on the identity of the source. (This is, of course, most likely in connection with official
government sources and highly placed individuals.)
Reporters can also give very broad hints of their sources' identities. For example, while
Roger Mudd did not specifically name Alexander Haig as the source of background infor-
mation in a 1981 NBC news story, he did reportedly say that the source "has a brother
who is a Jesuit priest; . . . once worked for Richard Nixon; . . . used to be a four-star
general; and . . . recently said at the White House, 'I am in control here.'" H. GOODWIN,
supra note 34, at 128. See generally Wallach, I'll Give It to You on Background, 5 WASH-
INGTON Q. 53 (Spring 1982) (on "between the lines" revelations). These sorts of hints and
references were used by reporters to effectively disclose Henry Kissinger's identity in sto-
ries based on background briefings with him. J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 69-70 (reporting
references such as "the senior official who spoke with a German accent"); Wallach, supra,
at 53.
Another sort of indirect revelation occurs when reporters, who themselves feel bound by
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revelations of source identities have led to nationwide coverage
and a journalistic controversy as to the ethical obligations of re-
porters to their sources.104
D. The New Trend of Source Retaliation
Internal journalistic debate about ethics has not been the only
result of press breaches of promises of confidentiality, however.
While most anonymous sources whose identities have been di-
vulged by the press have not sought legal redress, a few-like
Daniel Cohen' 3  and Joseph Fries'-have brought breach of
contract actions against the offending news organizations.107 Al-
the background rules of a briefing, give their notes to other reporters who were not there
and do not consider themselves bound to maintain source confidentiality. See, e.g., M.
GROSSMAN & M. KUMAR, supra note 4, at 160-61; T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 80-81; D.
WISE, supra note 39, at 289-90. As Tom Wicker has noted, there has been some contro-
versy among journalists as to whether reporters who did not attend background briefings
were bound by their rules on attribution. T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 81. Wicker con-
cludes that reporters are not bound by rules to which they have not personally agreed, and
that the disclosure of notes of a background briefing to a reporter who was not present is
appropriate if the source of the information is merely identified rather than quoted. Id.
104. The attribution of information gained on background has led to criticism and con-
troversy in the press. See, e.g., D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 348-51 (recounting the contro-
versy over Milton Coleman's revelation of Jesse Jackson's anti-Semitic remarks during the
1984 presidential race); Wallach, supra note 103, at 53. Similarly, the Cohen decisions, see
supra note 12, have received widespread national media. attention. See, e.g., Marcus &
Felsenthal, Contract Status is Denied for Vow of Confidentiality by Reporters, Wall St.
J., July 23, 1990, at B5, col. 1; Jones, Newspaper Wins Appeal on Lawsuit, N.Y. Times,
July 21, 1990, § 1, at 6, col. 4; Court Rules in Favor of Newspapers, Chicago Tribune, July
20, 1990, at 2 (zone C); Newspapers are Liable in Confidentiality Breach, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 6, 1989, at A15, col. 1; Scardino, Court Ruling: When the Press Breaks a Promise,
N.Y. Times, July 31, 1988, § 4, at 7, col. 1; Sitomer, Is Reporter's Word a Contract?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 1, 1988, at 17; Oberdorfer, supra note 11, at 8; Zuckerman,
Breaking the Code of Confidentiality, TIME, Aug. 1, 1988, at 61. National publicity also
attended Newsweek's revelation of Oliver North's status as a secret source. See, e.g., Zuck-
erman, supra note 89, at 61; Leaks, Lies and Other Excuses, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1987, at
A24, col. 1.
A post-Cohen empirical study on the issue of confidentiality showed a split in the jour-
nalistic community, with 13 of the 31 responding newspapers and two of the five respond-
ing television stations taking the position that editors could not force source disclosures,
and 10 newspapers and two television stations stating that they could properly do so. Cau-
dle, A Chill on Newsgathering, 7 COMM. L. 6, 9 (Spring 1989).,
105. See supra note 12.
106. See Fries v. NBC, No. 456687 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1982) (breach of contract and inten-
tional misrepresentation claims by police officer against broadcast reporter who, in order
to gain access to a private Police Officers Association meeting, identified the plaintiff to
other police officers as her source for a story involving an internal police department dis-
pute that was to be discussed at the meeting); see also infra text accompanying note 111.
107. In addition to Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 199, and Fries, see supra note 106, re-
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though several courts have allowed such contract claims to with-
stand summary disposition,108 Cohen is the first news source to
search has disclosed nine cases in which subjects of coverage have sued the press for dis-
closure of their identities or activities..All but three of these cases introduce a breach of
contract theory in addition to traditional tort claims. See Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publica-
tions, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Minn. 1990) (tort and breach of contract claims against
magazine by victim of sexual abuse who argued that although her name was not used in
article, description sufficiently identified her in contravention of agreement for anonym-
ity); Huskey v. National Broadcasting Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (tort and
breach of contract action based on network program on prison conditions which contained
footage, taped without consent, of plaintiff inmate in exercise cage); Cullen v. Grove Press,
Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (breach of privacy and defamation action by correc-
tional officers against distributor of documentary on. conditions in institutions for the
criminally insane which depicted inmate strip searches and was commercially distributed,
contrary to filmmaker's assurances); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979) (defamation and breach of contract action by
psychiatrist against writer whose novel depicted nude encounter session with person recog-
nizable as plaintiff, despite agreement that author would not disclose events at group ther-
apy workshop); Stevenson v. Nottingham, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1585 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1978), aff'd, 371 So. 2d 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (invasion of privacy suit in which
plaintiff claimed that newspaper identified her in story about drug treatment program in
which she was participant, despite agreement not to do so); Doe v. American Broadcasting
Co., 152 A.D.2d 482, 543 N.Y.S.2d 455 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 74 N.Y.2d 945, 549
N.E.2d 480, 550 N.Y.S.2d 278, (1989) (breach of contract and tort claims by rape victims
whose facial features were recognizable in segments of program on rape despite agreement
that their identities would be protected); Virelli v. Goodson-Todman Enters., Ltd., 142
A.D.2d 479, 536 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1989) [hereinafter Virelli I] (invasion of privacy, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress and negligence claims by plaintiffs portrayed in arti-
cle on drug abuse despite interview agreement that identities would be protected), appeal
after remand, 159 A.D.2d 23, 558 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1990) [hereinafter Virelli H] (tortious
breach of confidence claims on facts of Virelli I); Santiago v. WNJU Broadcasting Corp.,
No. 88 Civ. 7118 (JFK) (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (breach of contract and tort action against broad-
caster for failure to abide by agreement to disguise appearance of broadcast interviewee in
program on domestic violence); Garfinkle v. CBS, Inc., Index No. 10804/88 N.Y. Supreme
Court, Kings County (filed Jan. 15, 1985) (breach of contract, breach of warranty, and tort
action against broadcaster for disclosure of identity of broadcast interviewee who dis-
cussed the death threats against him subsequent to disarming an attacker).
In an analogous context, convicted murderer Jeffery MacDonald sued journalist Joe Mc-
Ginniss for breach of contract in connection with McGinniss' book, Fatal Vision, claiming
that in writing a book which painted MacDonald as guilty of murder, McGinniss had
breached his original agreement to write the story from MacDonald's point of view. See J.
MALCOLM, THE JOURNALIST AND THE MURDERER 6-7 (1990).
108. The claims survived pre-trial dismissal in Doe v. ABC, 152 A.D.2d at 482, 543
N.Y.S.2d at 455 (denial of broadcaster's motion for summary judgment affirmed), Huskey
632 F. Supp. at 1282 (defendant's motion to dismiss denied), and Fries v. NBC No. 456687
(Super. Ct. Cal. 1982) (defendant's motion to dismiss denied). See Minnesota Note, supra
note 16, at 1555 n.14; Carrizosa, Reporter on Trial in Suit for Release of Source's Name,
Los Angeles Daily J., Mar. 14, 1983, at 1, 2, col. 2. The cognizability of contract claims'was
also implicitly recognized in Ruzicka, although the plaintiff there did not meet the height-
ened standards of proof imposed by the court for source contract suits.
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have obtained a jury verdict for breach of contract.10 9
Cohen and Fries each illustrate one of the categories of the ty-
pology of classical news leaks. 110 Police officer Joseph Fries was a
whistleblower, attempting to publicize what he saw as his depart-
ment hierarchy's inadequate response to alleged improprieties
committed by a superior officer."1 Like other whistleblowers, he
109. See Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 200. (Although the plaintiff psychiatrist in Bindrim
did obtain a jury verdict on his breach of contract claim, he was the model for a character
in plaintiff's fictional account and therefore cannot be characterized as a classic news
source.) Cohen was originally awarded $700,000 in compensatory and punitive damages at
the trial level. While the intermediate appellate court affirmed the jury's verdict as to
$200,000 in damages for his contract claim, it reversed the punitive damages award and
the misrepresentation verdict. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 251-52. The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed the reversal of the misrepresentation claim and also reversed the 'contract
judgment. Cohen IV; 457 N.W.2d at 200.
Of the other contract cases cited in supra note 107, the following appear to have been
settled: MacDonald, (J. MALCOLM, supra note 107, at 56; Chineson, Bad Business in the
Book Business, Legal Times, May 21, 1990, at*70), Santiago and Garfinkle (telephone
conversation with CBS Litigation Counsel S. Lowy), Doe, Huskey, and Fries (see M.
FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAw 589 (3d ed. 1987)). The plaintiff in Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at
1300-01; was found not to have met her burden of proving the terms of her confidentiality
agreement and the existence of a breach. In Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 82, 155 Cal. Rptr.
at 41, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to strike the plaintiff's jury
verdict on the contract count.
Although the courts did not rule on contract claims in Stevenson, Virelli I, or Virelli II,
they did affirm the dismissals of the plaintiffs' tort claims. In Cullen, the plaintiffs' mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction was also dismissed on what appeared to be first amend-
ment grounds, but the court's analysis is unclear. On the one hand, Cullen suggests, with-
out elaborating, that plaintiffs' claims 'of an agreement to limit the content and
distribution of the film "would not provide a basis for relief, provided the film is within
the protection of the First Amendment." Cullen, 276 F. Supp. at 731. On the other, the
court explicitly noted that its decision does not "constitute an adjudication of rights of
. . . state officials suing for breach of contract, if any, with respect to conditions for exhi-
bition of the film." Id.
110. See supra Section I.A. This distinguishes Cohen and Fries from the other plaintiffs
in contract actions against the press. As the descriptions of their claims indicate, supra
note 107, those plaintiffs were the direct subjects of news stories; they generally revealed
private and embarassing information about themselves, and they were not intentionally
identified by the press because of their status as sources. In all of the cases but Cullen, the
plaintiffs were also private actors rather than government officials or political players.
111. Because the court imposed a fault standard of proof on the plaintiff and the first
trial ended in a hung jury, with a subsequent settlement at the beginning of the second
trial, the litigation does not provide an authoritative statement of precisely what hap-
pened. Nevertheless, contemporaneous press reports suggest the following scenario: Fries
was apparently part of a group of police officers who disapproved of the Santa Clara police
chief's leniency in suspending the assistant police chief for. only three days in response to
allegations that the assistant chief had harassed and suggested suicide to an emotionally
unstable former officer. See Carrizosa, supra note 108, at 1; Cox, Reporter Sued for Dis-
closing Source, Los Angeles Daily J., Mar. 14, 1983, at 2, col. 2. Fries believed that the
assistant chief should have been fired and the incident made public. He apparently leaked
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was subjected to ostracism by his peers and forced to leave the
department after the reporter to whom he had leaked his story
disclosed his identity to fellow police officers.
By contrast, Daniel Cohen's disclosure of information to the
press was a politically motivated plant. Cohen, a public relations
specialist and former elected county official, was a politically ac-
tive Republican with close, although unofficial, ties to the Repub-
lican candidate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial election."12
As part of an orchestrated effort by Republican supporters and
campaign officials shortly before the election, when polls indi-,
cated that the Republican slate was far behind the Democrats,"'
Cohen disclosed to four media organizations that the Democratic
candidate for Lieutenant Governor had an arrest record." 4 He re-
quested confidentiality from the reporters so that the information
would hurt the Democratic campaign without reflecting badly on
information to the press because he was afraid that the Police Officers' Association would
not take a sufficiently firm stand on the issue. Carrizosa, supra note 108, at 1. See also
Source Confidentiality: A Matter of Contract?, BROADCASTING, Aug. 25, 1980, at 106. (It
should be noted that the defendant broadcaster in Fries disputed the extent of the alleged
promise of confidentiality. See id.; Source Confidentiality Suit Ends in Deadlock, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 2, 1984, at 9 [hereinafter Source Confidentiality Suit].)
112. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 200, 201 n.3.
113. Brief for Appellant at 5, Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248 (No. C8-88-2631, CO-88-2672);
Oberdorfer, supra note 11, at 8, Trial Transcript at 747, Cohen (No. 79-8806).
114. Marlene Johnson, the Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor, had been
arrested in 1969 for unlawful assembly in connection with a civil rights protest and had
been convicted in 1970 of a petty theft involving six dollars worth of sewing supplies. The
arrest for unlawful assembly had been dropped and the conviction for theft vacated in
1971. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 200-01. The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that Cohen
was apparently unaware of the substance of Johnson's criminal record because the court
records he had been given did not contain the underlying facts of the charges. Id. at 201
n.2; Trial Transcript at 144, 168, Cohen (No. 79-8806).
Cohen did not provide any substantive information prior to the reporters' agreements
not to disclose his identity. He simply proposed the following:
I have some documents which may or may not relate to a candidate in the up-
coming election, and if you will give me a promise of confidentiality, that is that
I will be treated as an anonymous source, that my name will not appear in any
material in connection with this, and you will also agree that you're not going to
pursue with me a question of who my source is, then I'll furnish you with the
documents.
Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 200; Trial Transcript at 155, Cohen (No. 79-8806).
The information about Johnson's criminal record had apparently been discovered in
public records by a member of the Republican campaign after rumors suggested impropri-
ety in her record. The decision to have Cohen reveal the information to the press was
made at a meeting of influential Republicans and campaign insiders. See Cohen I1, 445
N.W.2d at 252; Trial Transcript at 142-43, 147, Cohen (No. 79-8806).
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the Republicans.'1 5
Despite the objections of the reporters who had granted Cohen
confidentiality, '1 I the editorial staffs of the defendant newspapers
determined that it would be inappropriate to conceal the identity
of the source of the news" 7 and ran stories identifying Cohen." '
The newspaper stories included claims by the Democratic camp
that the news had been leaked by the Republican campaign as "a
last-minute smear campaign."" 9 With the identification of Cohen
and his relationship to the Republican campaign, the stories were
no longer simple revelations of misdeeds in the Democratic candi-
date's past. They became part of a controversy concerning unat-
tributed "smear tactics" in political campaigns that was later to
assume national prominence in our most recent Presidential con-
test.'20 But the editors' decision to disclose Cohen's identity did
115. See Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 200; Trial Transcript at 150, 378, Cohen (No. 79-
8806).
116. Of the two objecting reporters, one decided to remove her by-line from the story as
a protest against the newspaper's decision to reveal Cohen's identity. Cohen IV, 457
N.W.2d at 201.
117. Some of the editors believed that if they did not run the story, they could be per-
ceived as suppressing information damaging to the Democratic campaign, which the news-
paper had endorsed. Id.; Trial Transcript at 1310-11, Cohen (No. 79-8806). At the same
time, they considered it unsatisfactory to describe their source as a Whitney supporter, a
Whitney campaign member, or a prominent Republican because they thought that such
veiled references "would be misleading and cast suspicion on others." Cohen IV, 457
N.W.2d at 201. The editors thought that veiled references would be particularly mislead-
ing, given that the Whitney campaign had issued denials.of any involvement in Cohen's
actions. Trial Transcript at 1150-52, 1310-13, Cohen (No. 79-8806). See Brief for Respon-
dents Northwest Publications, Inc. at 7, Cohen V, cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 578 (1990) (No.
90-634).
118. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 201-02. It should be noted here that the other two news
organizations approached by Cohen did not disclose his identity. Id. at 201 n.1.
119. Id. at 202.
120. I refer to the widely publicized incident in which John Sasso, director of Michael
Dukakis's campaign staff, leaked a videotape' damaging to then-candidate Joseph Biden.
See, e.g., Broder & Edsall, Dukakis Aides Quit Over Biden Tape, Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1987,
at Al; Taylor, Democrats Differ on Harm to Dukakis Campaign, Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1987,
at A18; see also Morgenthau, DirtbaUl Politics, NEWSWEEK, June 19, 1989, at 32 (on back-
lash to memorandum by communications director of the Republican National Committee
which suggested that newly-elected Speaker of the House Thomas Foley was a homosex-
ual); Borger, Anatomy of a Smear, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 19, 1989, at 40 (same);
Squires, When Confidentiality Itself is Source of Contention, JOURNALISM ETHICS REP.
1985-86, at 7 (recounting the leak to the Chicago Tribune, by political enemies of Mayor
Harold Washington, of an illegally-produced tape of the mayor's unflattering remarks
about a political ally); and supra note 85, and infra notes 121, 375, on the disapproving
public response to negative campaigning and "smear" campaigns.
Admittedly, "smear" campaigns and "dirty politics" are far from new in the history of
American elections. See generally B. FELKNOR, supra note 85; see Comment, Misrepresen-
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not merely affect the editorial pages of newspapers."' Cohen was
fired from his job the day after the public revelation of his name
as the newspapers' source.122
Daniel Cohen and Joseph Fries' contract suits to obtain redress
for their injuries squarely raise the issue of how courts should
treat media decisions to breach confidentiality agreements, espe-
cially given the wide range of contexts in which the agreements
occur.
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS By
NEWS SOURCES
Contract actions by sources for breach of promises of confiden-
tiality have led to judicial and scholarly disagreement. Currently,
we can discern three approaches to sources' contract claims. One
approach-the freedom of contract model-focuses unreflectively
on the private interest of sources and mechanically applies con-
tract law to enforce promises of confidentiality. Another obvious
and familiar approach-the first amendment model-focuses pri-
marily on press interests by either invoking the first amendment
as a ban on contract actions or by importing first amendment-
based privileges from the defamation area to serve as limiting
principles in contract suits. The third existing approach-the
tation in Political Advertising: The Role of Legal Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J. 853, 853-58
*(1987). Some such campaigns disseminate outright falsehood, distortion, or innuendo. As
the enormous recent publicity about the problems with negative campaigning makes clear,
there seems to be a consensus that such untruths disseminated by political opponents are
"dirty" and undesirable in the political arena. In. other situations, the unflattering claims
about opponents may themselves be true. They have, nevertheless, led to criticism when
they have been anonymously made by political enemies of the candidate, particularly
when the original revelation is not particularly earth-shaking. Historical examples of anon-
ymous tips analogous to Cohen's include the revelation by political opponents during the
1972 election that Thomas Eagleton had a history of psychiatric treatment, see R. DINKIN,
supra note 2, at 190-91, and Democrat Lyndon Johnson's leaks to friendly Republicans of
unflattering information collected through FBI surveillance about his opponents within
the Democratic party, see H. BRAY, THE PILLARS OF THE POST 109 (1980). Similarly, The
New York Times' documentary evidence which served to expose the corrupt Tweed Ring
in the late 19th Century was apparently given to the newspaper by an agent of Samuel
Tilden, himself a member of Tammany Hall, who Boss Tweed refused to endorse for Pres-
ident. See J. ALTSCHULL, AGENTS OF POWER: THE ROLE OF THE NEWS MEDIA IN HUMAN
AFFAIRS 76-77 (1984).
121. See Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 202. Editorial commentary in issues of the defendant
newspapers focused on Cohen's "sleazy" tactics and depicted him in a cartoon with a gar-
bage can labeled "last minute campaign smears.". Id.
122. Id.
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promissory estoppel model-seeks to mediate between public and
private interests. On the one hand, it denies the appropriateness
of pure contract as a rubric for confidentiality actions by sources.
On the other, it leaves open the possibility of promissory estoppel
claims which require the balancing of sources' interests with the
first amendment concerns of the press.
A. Freedom of Contract Model
Some claim that voluntary agreements of confidentiality be-
tween the press and its sources should be enforced without a view
to their substance, in keeping with the facilitative function of
contract law.12 In this view, the press, like any other contracting
party, should simply be bound by its promises. 124 Proponents of
the freedom of contract approach in this context suggest that the
neutral application of private contract law to enforce promises of
confidentiality by the press does not involve the level of state ac-
tion that would trigger first amendment scrutiny.1 25 This ap-
123. The fundamental proposition of contract law since the 19th Century has been the
freedom of contract between private parties. 1 E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.7, at 24-
25 (1990). See also G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 40 (1974); P. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 408 (1979); Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Re-
lation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769,
820-27 (1985).
124. This freedom of contract model describes the decisions of the trial and intermedi-
ate appellate courts in Cohen and the dissenting opinions in the decision of the Minnesota
Supreme Court. These judges would thus all support the jury's finding of a- breach of
contract in Cohen.
This Article will not discuss the highly contested philosophical question of why promises
should be deemed binding. While some contend that contract enforcement is based on the
"promise principle"-namely, the moral obligation entailed by promises-see, e.g., C.
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 16-17 (1981)-others
claim more relational, see, e.g., I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980), or economic
efficiency bases for contract, see, e.g. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79-85 (3d ed.
1986).
125. For example, the trial court declined to grant the defendants summary judgment
on first amendment grounds, asserting that the contract verdict presented "no claim of
constitutional dimension." Cohen 1, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1464. See also Cohen II,
15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2290-91 (denying defendants' first amendment claims in mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
In affirming this point, the majority of the intermediate appellate court agreed that the
first amendment was irrelevant because the threshold requirement of state action had not
been met. Cohen Ill, 445 N.W.2d at 254-56. Because the private law of contract "do[es]
not sanction any particular speech," and because "an award of contract damages ... does
not sanction the words or conduct themselves, but rather the failure to honor a promise,"
the court found the contract judgment to constitute neutral, not speech-suppressive, pri-
vate action. Id. at 256.
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proach is neither adequate in its denial of state action nor faithful
to the body of contract law which it purports to apply.126 Worse,
it displays a marked hostility toward the press and its public
role.1"7
In a similar vein, the dissents to the Minnesota Supreme Court's reversal of the judg-
ment contended that the first amendment "has nothing to do with the case." Cohen IV,
457 N.W.2d at 207 (Kelley, J., dissenting).,
In a related argument suggesting the inapplicability of the Constitution, Daniel Cohen's
brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court argues that the press defendants
waived any first amendment privilege to disclose his identity by having "knowingly and
voluntarily" promised not to do so. Brief for Petitioner at 20-22, Cohen V, cert. granted,
111 S. Ct. 578 (1990) (No. 90-634).
This Article will not specifically deal with the waiver argument, however, because it
simply restates the decisional issue, rather than resolving it. It does not answer the ques-
tion of whether a state, by enforcing a body of law, can constitutionally condition report-
ers' newsgathering activities on the loss of first amendment rights. See Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding unconstitutional a state decision which forced a choice be-
tween receiving governmental benefits or following religious precepts). See generally Sulli-
van, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). Indeed, some would sug-
gest that the public interest in informed debate would militate against allowing voluntary
waivers of first amendment rights. See id. at 1479 (citing to authorities who suggest that
structural values in well-informed public deliberation limit the extent to which govern-
ment can condition its employees' rights to divulge information). Whether or not we are
persuaded by societal arguments for the inalienability of constitutional rights, however, it
is clear that waiver is a legal conclusion, rather than an unmediated individual action
which displaces judicial inquiry. In sum, while the conduct of the press may be pertinent
to first amendment analysis, invocation of waiver principles cannot simply foreclose con-
stitutional review. See Brief for Respondents Northwest Publications, Inc. at 46-49, Cohen
V., cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 578 (1990) (No. 90-634).
Moreover, the waiver argument is problematic even on its own doctrinal terms. There is
little doubt that constitutional rights-including first amendment rights-will not easily
be deemed waived. See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) ("[t]here is a presump-
tion against waiver of constitutional rights"). Courts will not find waiver without clear and
compelling evidence that constitutional rights were abandoned voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967) (noting
Court's unwillingness to find waiver unless "clear and compelling"); Ruzicka v. Conde
Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Minn. 1990) (arguing that this waiver stan-
dard, developed by the Court in the due process context in Fuentes v. Shevin, 497 U.S. 67
(1972) and D.H. Overmyer v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174 (1972), is fully applicable to the pur-
ported waiver of first amendment rights). Without exploring the obvious definitional com-
plexities entailed by this standard, I would question the appropriateness of assuming that
blanket waivers of first amendment rights are voluntarily triggered by simple promises of
confidentiality, regardless of circumstances subsequent to the time of promising.
126. For other commentators who have considered and rejected a traditional contract
approach in press-source disclosure cases, see FED. COMM. Comment, supra note 19, and
COMM./ENT. Note, supra note 19.
127. Such a devaluation of the press' interests is especially clear in the language of the
opinions of the dissenting Minnesota Supreme Court justices in Cohen. Justice Yetka's
dissent complained of the irresponsibility and sensationalism of the press, Cohen IV, 457
N.W.2d at 206 (Yetka, J., dissenting), bemoaned the majority's action in "carv[ing] out yet
another special privilege . . . denied other citizens," id. at 205 (Yetka, J., dissenting), and
1991] CONFIDENTIAL PRESS-SOURCE RELATIONS 647
Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,12 S the Supreme Court
has consistently scrutinized common law defamation and privacy
rules under the first amendment. 129 Although the action in New
York Times was a civil action between private parties, the Court
nevertheless found the test of state action to be "not the form in
which state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
whether such power has in fact been exercised."130 Admittedly,
the Court expressed this unambiguous assumption of state action
in the context of tort claims, in which courts enforcing the com-
mon law would be adjudicating state-created rights and duties."3 '
Those who would characterize contract law as simply the enforce-
ment of private orderings rather than state-created duties might
then suggest that tort and contract actions do not entail an equal
level of state involvement. 13 2
The problem with this distinction is that it is faithful neither to
contract nor to tort law. As Professor Tribe has put it, "In an era
in which contract and tort merge . . . this distinction is hardly
satisfactory.' 3 As will be discussed below, positive governmental
choices infuse the law of contract: in the rules concerning forma-
tion and remedies, in gap-filling rules, and in rules which require
substantive decisions as to the acceptability of certain sorts of
promises. 34 Similarly, many modern scholars see tort law less as
characterized the decision as signaling "that if you are wealthy and powerful enough, the
law simply does not apply to you," id. at 206 (Yetka, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice
Kelley accused the press defendants of "perfidy," punishment for which they were at-
tempting to avoid "by trying to crawl under the aegis of the First Amendment." Id. at 207
(Kelley, J., dissenting). Justice Kelley also explicitly denied the press' role as guardians of
the public's right to know, claiming rather that those guardians are legislatures and courts
rather than "the executives of the commercial media." Id. at 207 n.1.
128. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
129. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1711 (2d ed. 1988). See, e.g., Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (intentional infliction of emotional distress);
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (defamation); Bose Corp. v.
Consumer's Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984)
(product disparagement); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (invasion
of privacy); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (invasion of privacy under New York
Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974)
(false light invasion of privacy).
130. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265.
131. See L. TRIBE, supra note 129, at 1713.
132. Id. at 1714.
133. Id.
134. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 141-44; see also Braucher, Contract Versus
Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 699
(1990).
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the external imposition of social rules about conduct than as a
scheme of initial risk allocation designed to facilitate future nego-
tiation between parties."' Accordingly, the simplistic distinction
between private and public in the operation of contract, as op-
posed to tort law, is illusory. 13 6
Neither is it workable to distinguish the New York Times line
of precedent-as the intermediate appellate court in Cohen at-
tempted to do-by distinguishing the "neutral" application of
contract law from defamation law, which "inherently limits the
content of speech.' 137 The focus on form rather than substance
simply ignores the fact that promises of confidentiality by the
press are not contracts for the sale of goods or services, but
rather, agreements for the suppression of speech. Whether or not
courts should ultimately find such agreements enforceable, it is at
least clear as a threshhold matter that an agreement to suppress
speech is not speech-neutral, and that its enforcement suppresses
speech just as much as the enforcement of defamation law.
Even if there were no state action triggering first amendment
scrutiny, the freedom of contract approach represents a crude and
inaccurate characterization of contract law. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts defines a contract as "a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy ... "1
Although classical contract doctrine is premised on the assump-
tion that "[i]n general, parties may contract as they wish,"'3 9
there are recognized instances in which "the interest in freedom
of contract is outweighed by some overriding interest of soci-
ety.' 14 0 Even traditional contract doctrine has thus recognized sit-
uations in which public or social interests place limitations on the
freedom of contracting individuals.' 4 ' Accordingly, not all volun-
135. L. TRIBE, supra note 129, at 1714.
136. See also Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Minn.
1990) (finding state action "because, for the purposes of state action, there is no meaning-
ful difference between the contract action brought here and an action for defamation").
137. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 255.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). Even though the definition ap-
pears circular, it at least implicitly assumes that there are some sorts of promises which
will not be enforceable as contracts.
139. Id., ch. 8, introductory note.
140. Id.
141. In terms of the bargaining process, for example, the requirement of consideration
precludes the enforcement of agreements to give gifts. E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 123, §
2.5, at 46-48. Doctrines of mistake, frustration, unconscionability, duress, and undue influ-
ence, for example, also limit the enforcement of private agreements. Id. §§ 4.19, 4.28; Mac-
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tary promises are enforced as contracts without substantive in-
quiry into their social worth.""2 Moreover, the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel allows parties to be bound in situations which, for
Neil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 730 (1974); Note,,Reviving
the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940,
941 (1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152-53 (1981). Some view these doc-
trines as "self-consciously public supplements to a dominantly private contract doctrine,
by policing the limits of acceptable bargain in the name of social norms of fairness." Dal-
ton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 9"97, 1001 (1985).
Even in arm's length transactions, parties are bound to act with one another "in good faith
and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing." RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF
CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1981). Misrepresentations may make a contract voidable. See id. §
164. In terms of substantive considerations, the doctrine of illegal agreements and other
contracts against public policy serves to deny enforcement to agreements seen by courts to
be inconsistent with public policy. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 123, § 5.1, at 325-30;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981); see also infra note 142. These, among
other doctrines, indicate that "a great deal of promise breaking is tolerated and expected"
and that "beneath the covers we are firmly committed to the desirability of promises being
broken, not just occasionally but quite regularly." Macneil, supra, at 729.
It is of course beyond the scope of this Article to discuss all the nuances of contract law
that would be implicated by source actions against the press. Rather, I simply seek to
demonstrate the unobjectionable proposition that not all promises are enforced as con-
tracts and, indeed, that contract law does not per se preclude the type of contextual analy-
sis suggested later in this Article.
142. For example, as noted in supra note 141, illegal bargains and contracts contrary to
public policy are not enforced. See Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence:
A Study in Modern Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 117 n.5 (1988), and authorities
cited therein. The various public policies which limit the enforcement of agreements have
been classed by commentators as including morality principles, economic liberty interests,
interests in electoral and judicial integrity, and fiduciary responsibilities. Id. See, e.g., E.A.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 123, § 5.2, at 331-32; 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§
1373-1517 (1962). Thus, for example, many states have abolished the cause of action for
breach of promise to marry. See Coombs, Agency and Partnership: A Study of Breach of
Promise Plaintiffs, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 5 (1989). Contracts to promote gambling are
deemed unenforceable. See, e.g., Kyne v. Kyne, 16 Cal. 2d 436, 438, 106 P.2d 620, 621
(1940), cited in Kostritsky, supra, at 117 n.5. Traditional views of contract doctrine sug-
gest that promises governing family relations are also unenforceable. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 189-91 (1981); Balfour v. Balfour, 2 K.B. 571 (1919). Agreements to
vote in a particular way are characterized as contrary to public policy because they are
deemed to corrupt the electoral process. See, e.g., Livingston v. Page, 74 Vt. 356, 52 A. 965
(1902) (promise by candidate to pay for support by newspaper said to be unenforceable
because contrary to public policy); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
Restrictive covenants, restraints on the alienation of property, and anticompetitive agree-
ments have also been found unenforceable as undermining principles of wealth maximiza-
tion and economic liberty. E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 123, § 5.2, at 331-32; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186-88 (1981) (promises in restraint of trade). The public
policy in favor of the exercise of fiduciary responsibilities has rendered unenforceable
agreements of corporate directors which limit their discretion to vote or otherwise act in
their best judgment as representatives of the shareholders. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 123, § 5.2, at 332 n.14; 6A A. CORBIN, supra, § 1454.
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various formal reasons, might fail to satisfy the classical elements
of contract.""
Thus, whether contract law is characterized as primarily
facilitative of private bargains with some narrow exceptions, or as
a body of public law, it is undeniable that not all voluntary
promises are enforced as contracts while some obligations are en-
forced even if they do not formally qualify as such."4'
143. See, e.g., E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 123, § 2.19, at 89; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Prolifera-
tion of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52 (1981); Metzger & Phillips, The Emer-
gence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV.
472, 486 (1983). Whether promissory estoppel is seen as a general method of legitimizing
the promisee's reliance interest, see, e.g., Metzger & Phillips, supra, or simply as a judicial
method of circumventing formal contract rules to give effect to the parties' real intentions
to enter into legally binding relationships, see, e.g., Barnett & Becker, Beyond Reliance:
Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV.
443 (1987), it is at least an extension of the traditional contract doctrine.
144. There is currently a debate among contract scholars as to whether contract law is
primarily a regime facilitative of private autonomy or simply another instance of public
law. Beginning with the Realists, the characterization of contract law as primarily facilita-
tive of private bargains has come under attack. Morris Cohen, for example, characterized
contract as "a subsidiary branch of public law, . . . a body of rules according to which the
sovereign power of the state will be exercised as between the parties to a more or less
voluntary transaction." Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 586 (1933).
See also Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806 (1941); Llewellyn,
What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 729 (1931). Recogni-
tion of the policy choices made in the enforcement of contracts has led some post-Realist
writers to suggest that collectivist and paternalistic notions and considerations of substan-
tive fairness undermine the purportedly purely private character of contract law. See, e.g.,
Braucher, supra note 134, at 701-02; Dalton, supra note 141, at 1010; Feinman, Critical
Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 831-32 (1983); Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1717-22 (1976); Metzger &
Phillips, supra note 143. The strongest proponents of this critical approach contend that
the treatment of the public aspects of contract as simply exceptions to the private and
facilitative character of the great bulk of contract doctrine is nothing more than an illegiti-
mate attempt to mask the fundamentally public character of all contract law. See Dalton,
supra note 141, at 1013-14.
By contrast, other scholars embrace the private and voluntaristic description of contract
law. See, e.g., C. FRIED, supra note 124; Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 269 (1986); Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under
the Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895
(1987). Some of them suggest that even doctrines which appear to reflect substantive so-
cial policy concerns are consistent with a model of autonomy and private ordering. See,
e.g., Kostritsky, supra note 142.
This Article does not seek to enter the fray on this particular issue. It is sufficient to
note that sophisticated scholars of neither school would deny the fact that all of contract
law is not simply the enforcement of the parties' pleasure. Whether or not the reason for
the exclusion of certain promises from enforcement is economic efficiency or some other
value eclipsing the pure bargain, the fact is that the crude notion of freedom of contract
does have limits.
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Admittedly, contracts of confidentiality have been enforced in
circumstances involving explicit promises of confidentiality
outside the press context. Most private actions involving such ex-
plicit promises of confidentiality arise in the contexts of protect-
ing proprietary information""3  and government secrecy. 14 6 In
those situations, the application of contract law appears to be
based on the desirability of enforcing. a public norm whose au-
thority has been established in other, non-contractual areas.
While it has been stated in dicta that "the contract of private
parties to retain in confidence matter which should be kept in
confidence will be enforced by injunction and compensated in
damages "147 -suggesting that all such explicit promises will be
enforced in the usual course-the nature of the agreements at is-
sue and their relational character indicate the courts' assumption
as to their social value. Specifically, the cases enforcing govern-
ment secrecy agreements appear to rest on the fundamental inter-
est in national security protected by secrecy contracts. 14 8 Simi-
145. See, e.g., 2 M. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 13.01[l] (1989) (on confidentiality
agreements to protect commercial secrets).
Another context in which explicit promises of confidentiality arise is the litigation set-
tlement agreement, which often includes secrecy terms. Although none of the cases in this
area have imposed contract damages for the breach of the confidentiality provision of a
settlement agreement, they have, in dicta, assumed that such contracts between private
parties would constitute binding obligations. Kent v. Baker, 815 F.2d 1395 (11th Cir.
1987); Watie v. Fredericks of Hollywood Stores, Inc., 1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1089 (D. Kan.
Jan. 27, 1989) and Tomson v. Stephan, 696 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Kan.), reh'g denied, 699 F.
Supp. 860 (1988), all assuming the availability of a contract cause of action for breach of a
settlement agreement.
This discussion does not address "gag order" litigation or the imposition of sanctions for
governmental release of confidential information in its possession.
146. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (enforcing CIA se-
crecy agreement requiring prepublication administrative review); United States v.
Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) (same); Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (same).
147. Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (citations
omitted).
148. In Snepp, for example, the plaintiff had signed a secrecy agreement when he ac-
cepted employment with the CIA which precluded him from revealing classified informa-
tion or publishing any information without prepublication clearance from the agency.
Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508. After terminating his association with the CIA, he published an
expos6 which, while it did not in fact disclose classified information, was published with-
out CIA review. The Supreme Court, concluding that Snepp's secrecy agreement was not
an unenforceable prior restraint on protected speech, held that he had breached his fiduci-
ary duty to the CIA and impressed the proceeds of his breach with a constructive trust. Id.
at 510. The interest protected by the Court in Snepp was not the enforcement of confiden-
tiality contracts per se, but rather the compelling government interest "in protecting both
the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confi-
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larly, agreements, not to disclose confidential business
dentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service." Id. at
509 n.3. These compelling interests would have justified speech restrictions even in.the
absence of a secrecy agreement. Id. The CIA director had a statutory obligation to protect
intelligence sources and methods and the secrecy agreement was deemed to be an "entirely
appropriate" method of satisfying that directive. Id. Even though the government did not
contend that Snepp's book actually contained classified information, his publication "ex-
posed the classified information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclo-
sure." Id. at 511. The central significance of national security to the enforcement of the
contract is also evidenced by-the Court's acknowledgement in Snepp that CIA employees
would have the right to publish unclassified material. Id. See Sullivan, supra note 125, at
1503 (arguing that the result in Snepp was justified, if at all, by the compelling interest in
national security and not because the confidentiality agreement was deemed not to pres-
sure expressive rights); see also Snepp, 444 U.S. at 521 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1313, 1317. Thus, even when dealing with CIA security agreements,
courts continue to recognize the first amendment interests implicated in the contracts.
See, e.g., McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1141 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cited in Note, The
Constitutionality of Expanding Prepublication Review of Government Employees'
Speech, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 962, 1006 n.266 (1984). Judge Frank Easterbrook has argued that
Snepp should not be seen primarily as a national security case, but rather as a case involv-
ing property in information, in which Snepp waived his first amendment disclosure rights
by contract. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 11 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 339-52 (1981). Easterbrook's purpose,
however, is to show that cases in areas other than intellectual property involve intellectual
property issues about incentives for the production of new information. He is certainly not
suggesting that contracts of confidentiality such as that involved in Snepp should be en-
forced simply because they are contracts. For approaches contrary to Easterbrook's, see,
e.g., R. DwORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 395-97 (1985) and sources cited in Sullivan,
supra note 125, at 1479.
Moreover, the national security contract cases involve employment relationships which,
as will be discussed below, impose higher duties than those under ordinary contract princi-
ples. See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 518-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing contract as a
duty "imposed in aid of the basic duty to maintain confidentiality"). Indeed, courts have
countenanced a particularly reduced speech interest for government employees (at least
where the speech at issue does not concern the employee qua citizen). See Fischl, Labor,
Management, and the First Amendment: Whose Rights Are These, Anyway?, 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 729 (1989); Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom
of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government
Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690, 700-04 (1984).
In addition, the security contract cases are subject to the general criticism that they
failed adequately to address the particular vulnerability to censorship of government em-
ployee speech; the social benefits of leaking government information; and the overbreadth
of the CIA agreements at issue in light of the government's tendency to overclassify confi-
dential information. See Medow, The First Amendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v.
United States-Are There Alternatives to Government Censorship?, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
775 (1982). In view of the predominantly critical scholarly reaction to Snepp, courts
should resist the temptation to extend the case beyond its specific facts. See, e.g.; Anawalt,
A Critical Appraisal of Snepp v..United States-Are There Alternatives to Government
Censorship?, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 697 (1981); Comment, Government Information
Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 108, 144-45 (1976); Note, Enforcement
of CIA Secrecy Agreements: A Constitutional Analysis, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 455
(1980); Comment, Snepp v. United States: The CIA Secrecy Agreement and the First
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information-which also generally involve parties in some sort of
special, fiduciary relationship' 49-also promote the socially desir-
able goals of facilitating business, promoting commerical morality
and inducing investment in the production of socially desirable
information. °50
Accordingly, although explicit promises of confidentiality have
in the past been enforced by courts outside the press context,
those cases hardly require automatic enforcement of all press
promises to news sources. 151 Moreocer, courts have never pro-
Amendment, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 662 (1981); Note, United. States v. Marchetti and Alfred
A. Knopf Inc. v. Colby: Secrecy 2; First Amendment 0, 3 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 1073 (1976).
149. The most common agreements of this type involve contracts of confidentiality be-,
tween employers and employees. 2 M..JAGER, supra note 145, at § 13.01[1], 13-2. As Jager
points out, agreements to protect trade secrets "can also arise in situations where a trade
secret is disclosed to a third party such as a vendor, supplier, investor or promoter; or
submitted for consideration to potential licensees or manufacturers." Id.
150. See M. JAGER, supra note 145, §§ 1.0-1.04. Yet, although enforcement of trade se-
cret and other confidentiality agreements serves those laudatory functions, it also inter-
feres with competition and the mobility of labor. Therefore, when courts are faced with
such agreements, they need to balance the interest in proprietary information and the
interest in employee mobility, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186-88 (1981), or
achieve the same result by a narrow characterization of the scope of the confidentiality
agreement or the trade secret.
The courts' approach to restrictive covenants in employment contracts-generally
known as non-competition covenants-is instructive in that regard. There, the courts ex-
plicitly balance the interests set out above and impose a reasonableness limitation on the
scope of the agreement restraining competition. This is due to their general distaste for
agreements in restraint of trade and competition. See, e.g., Mantek Div. of NCH Corp. v.
Share Corp., 780 F.2d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 1986); Grant v. Carotek, Inc., 737 F.2d 410 (4th
Cir. 1984) (requiring that non-competition clause be "strictly construed" to determine rea-
sonableness of restraint); American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 705 F.2d 219 (7th
Cir. 1983) (enforcing a covenant not to compete only to extent necessary to protect the
employer's "legitimate Iusiness interest"); American Inst. of Chem. Eng'rs v. Reber-Friel
Co., 682 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1982) (requiring non-competition covenants to be "rigorously
examined and narrowly enforced"); 2 E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 123, § 5.3, at 16-27. In
any event, the fact that many trade secret cases involve employees who, as servants or
agents, are classic examples of individuals in a traditionally confidential relationship im-
posing its own extra-contractual fiduciary duties, makes it difficult to distinguish the ex-
tent to which liability is imposed for the breach of the explicit promise of confidentiality
as a contractual matter.
151. Nor is automatic enforcement in the press context dictated by the cases in other
areas in which implied promises of confidentiality have been enforced in confidential rela-
tionships. With respect to the latter, breach of implied contract is only one of a number of
legal doctrines used to justify liability. See Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging
Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1437-48 (1982) [hereinafter Columbia Note] and cases cited
therein. The particular basis of liability in some of these cases is not clear. See, e.g., Mac-
Donald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (1982) (in action against
psychiatrist for disclosing confidential information about patient to patient's wife, recov-
ery based on tort duty "springing from but extraneous to" physician-patient contract);
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tected confidentiality at all costs, even in admittedly confidential
relationships. '52 Thus, the fundamental problem with the freedom
Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 208-13, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 673-77 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (in action
against psychiatrist for disclosing confidential information about patient in book, strong
public policy in favor of plaintiff found in state licensing and disciplinary statutes, Hippo-
cratic Oath, professional code of ethics, fiduciary nature of relationship and implied cove-
nant of secrecy in contract between the parties: "[wihat label we affix this wrong is unim-
portant"); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 587-88, 367 P.2d 284, 289-90
(1961) (while sources of public policy discussed imply duty in tort, principal reliance on
breach of implied contract). Some courts explicitly admit that the particular legal theory
chosen is merely a formality: "For the purposes of what we shall say it will be assumed
that, for so palpable a wrong, the law provides a remedy." Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441,
442, 162 P. 572, 572 (1917), quoted in MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d at 483, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 802-
03. Others are even more explicitly instrumental. See, e.g., MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d at 486,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 804 (in which the court stated that a mere contract duty would be insuffi-
ciently protective of plaintiff, given the limitations on contract damages). This Article will
only discuss these cases to the extent that courts hinge their resolution on contract
principles.
Confidentiality has been implied in the context of professional relationships. The most
commonly litigated professional relationship in this connection is that between physician
and patient and, more specifically, the psychiatric relationship. See Columbia Note, supra,
at 1429-34. While there are few claims of breach of attorney-client confidentiality outside
the disciplinary proceeding context, courts have recognized in dicta the possibility of such
damages actions. See id. at 1433 n.26. Legally enforceable obligations of confidentiality
have also long been recognized in the context of the fiduciary relationship between princi-
pals and agents. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 13, 387, 395, 396 (1957). Cer-
tain other relationships of trust (such as the banker-depositor relationship and that be-
tween public school officials and students) have also led courts to imply enforceable
obligations of confidentiality. See Blair v. Union Free School Dist. No. 6, 67 Misc. 2d 248,
324 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Dist. Ct. 1971); Peterson, 83 Idaho at 578, 367 P.2d at 284.
Even in these cases, however, courts have grounded their background assumptions of
confidentiality on society's interest in promoting the relationships at issue. See, e.g.,
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv. 350, 363-70 (1989) (describing and
criticizing the traditional justifications for protecting the lawyer-client relationship). These
are generally relationships that are characterized by an imbalance of power, knowledge,
and access to knowledge. See K.L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 173 (1989). People seek ad-
vice and counsel from various sorts of professionals, for example, because they themselves
do not have the knowledge, expertise, or capacity to solve their problems. They are also
consequently unable to monitor, evaluate, or police the activities of the professionals. One
party's exclusive access to knowledge fosters trust and vulnerability on the part of the
other party. By acknowledging a high level of duty on the part of professionals, courts in
effect adopt rules that seek to balance such inequalities of power and knowledge.
152. A certain level of disclosure of confidential information has been permitted by
courts: when keeping secrets would cause harm to others, to promote public safety, to
disclose fraud or crime, to protect oneself, in the interest of a third party, and if disclo-
sures were in the public interest. See Columbia Note, supra note 151, at 1464-68 and cases
cited therein. The scope of these exceptions is admittedly unclear and variable in the
cases, however. See, e.g., Doe, 93 Misc. 2d at 214, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 677 (rejecting defendant
psychiatrist's public interest defense for disclosure of private and embarassing personal
information, but not reaching issue of whether "important scientific discovery" would out-
weigh patient's privilege); Columbia Note, supra note 151, at 1464-65.
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of contract approach is that the existence of an agreement of con-
fidentiality between a reporter and a source does not address
whether that agreement should be treated as an enforceable
contract.
Indeed, as a matter of policy, it is far from clear that such
agreements should unthinkingly be enforced. The underlying pol-
icy promoted by permitting contract actions in the press context
is a policy favoring the protection of sources.,' Yet such a policy
has not been adopted as a constitutional matter in the context of
government compelled disclosure. 5 " And, courts in jurisdictions
which have passed reporter shield laws have explicitly interpreted
the privilege to be the reporter's rather than the source's. 55 Thus,
given the way in which courts have analyzed and applied the re-
porter's privilege, it is a weak support for claims by sources.
Moreover, the relationship-based justifications for enforcement of
confidentiality in other contexts do not suggest a parallel conclu-
sion for the area of press relations.'56 In traditional professional
and other fiduciary relationships, for example, confidentiality is
enforced in large part because the professional or fiduciary has
the opportunity and holds the position of power, information, and
expertise that create the potential for abuse of the client.' 57 There
is, however, a broad range of relationships between reporters and
sources.' 58 In many of them, it is the reporter, rather than the
source, who is at an informational disadvantage and in a position
153. As to the policy of promoting the dissemination of information, see discussion of
the chilling effect at infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
154. Indeed, the Court in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972), explicitly
refused to find a first amendment privilege for journalistic non-disclosure in grand jury
proceedings. See supra note 24. Even those Justices who would have established a re-
porter's constitutional privilege against compelled disclosure in Branzburg disavowed
"concern[] with the parochial, personal concerns of particular newsmen or informants....
[S]ociety's interest [in the reporter-informer relationship] is not in the welfare of the in-
formant per se, but rather in creating conditions in which information possessed by news
sources can reach public attention." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 726 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
Even most courts allowing a qualified first amendment privilege under a narrow reading of
Branzburg have applied a balancing test in civil cases and sometimes required source dis-
closure. See Marcus, supra note 19, at 850-59.
155. See supra note 100; see also Lipps v. State, 254 Ind. 141, 258 N.E.2d 622 (1970);
Shindler v. State, 166 Ind. App. 258, 335 N.E.2d 638 (1975); Lightman v. State, 15 Md.
App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, aff'd, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951
(1973); Marcus, supra note 19, at 846. This is so because the shield laws are not seen as
protecting sources per se, but rather, the reporters' newsgathering processes.
156. See supra note 151.
157. Id.
158. See infra Section III.C.
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of relative powerlessness. Accordingly, the very argument for pro-
fessional and fiduciary duties of confidentiality becomes an argu-
ment for not enforcing confidentiality agreements in at least some
reporter-source relationships. "
B. First Amendment Model
1. First Amendment Immunity
By stark contrast to adherents of the freedom of contract
model, some suggest that the first amendment should be inter-
preted as a complete barrier to contract causes of action for
breaches of journalists' promises to confidential sources. 1 0 Even
if the Supreme Court's decision upholding a confidentiality con-
tract between the CIA and a former agent in Snepp v. United
States6 were thought insufficient to cast suspicion on this posi-
tion, the Court's consistent recognition of tort actions against the
press"'62 demonstrates that the first amendment does not immu-
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 262-68 (Crippen, J., dissenting in part). Al-
though no other court in this area has elaborated the reasoning behind this approach, the
court in Cullen v. Grove Press, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727, 731 (1967), somewhat unclearly
suggested, in dicta, that breach-of contract claims would be inconsistent with the first
amendment. For a more detailed discussion see supra notes 107 and 109. The newspaper
defendants in Cohen broadly argued at both the trial and the appellate levels that the first
amendment should serve as a complete bar to Cohen's state law claims because a contrary
result would stifle truthful and newsworthy speech. See Cohen 1, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1460 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1987), Cohen 11, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2288, 2290-91 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. 1988), Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248, 254-58 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), Cohen IV, 457
N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990). Other commentators on the issue have also taken this posi-
tion. See, e.g., Jones, Ruling Could Alter Use of Newspapers' Sources, N.Y. Times, Sept.
10, 1989, § 1, at 22, col. 5.
161. 444 U.S. 507 (1980). See supra note 148.
162. Thus, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and subsequent defa-
mation cases have established that, although the first amendment requires standards of
liability protective of the press in suits brought by public figures, it does not shield the
press completely from application of defamation law. Similarly, while the Court has ex-
tended such first amendment-based protections to the press in other actions which effec-
tively raise reputational interests, it has shown no inclination to preclude such actions. See
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) ("false light" invasion
of privacy). Indeed, just as the first amendment limits a state's power to impose tort liabil-
ity for libel, so might the constitutional right to privacy, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), bar any state effort to exempt the press entirely from liability for inva-
sions of privacy.
Cases outside the area of reputational injuries have been subject to even fewer constitu-
tional limits. Despite the first amendment, the Court has upheld various statutes which
provide sanctions for the unauthorized dissemination of information. The copyright laws,
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nize the press from lawsuits simply because the claims relate to
expressive behavior. 63
There is no principled reason to conclude that, although indi-
viduals can sue the press for defamation, invasion of privacy,
publicity, and similar torts, they must be precluded from access
to courts for redress of all breaches of confidentiality promises by
reporters. It is quite unlikely that the Supreme Court would in-
terpret its first amendment jurisprudence to require a bar to all
contract causes of action against the press for breaching promises
of confidentiality to sources."" The Supreme Court's decisions in-
sulating the press from liability for the publication of truthful,
newsworthy information in certain circumstances do not suggest a
different conclusion. The Court has never held that there is an
absolute privilege to publish all true information, regardless of
what other interests are implicated. 65
for example, treat expression as property and limit the circumstances in which it can be
used without consent. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (1988); see also Harper & Row Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (copyright action against magazine
for publication of portions of unpublished presidential memoirs not barred by first amend-
ment.) Similarly, in the "right of publicity" context, the Court has held that the first
amendment did not immunize a defendant broadcaster from liability for a state law claim
that it infringed an entertainer's right to control the publicity given to his act by videotap-
ing his entire performance without his consent and then airing it in its entirety in the
station's news program. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
163. Moreover, the press, in its commercial capacity, has also been subject to laws of
general application, including unfair competition, trespass, breach of privacy and various
federal statutes, such as the antitrust laws. In Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103
(1937), for example, the Court held that the first amendment did not bar the application
of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, which protects employees' attempts to
organize and bargain collectively, to the Associated Press. See also Citizen Publishing Co.
v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (no immunity from application of the Sherman Act);
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (no immunity from appli-
cation of Fair Labor Standards Act); cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936) (taxation).
164. This would be so unless, of course, the kind of damages we associate with tort are
seen as somehow more worthy of legal protection than those associated with contract.
None of the Court's first amendment jurisprudence indicates a principled basis for such a
distinction, however.
165. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) (holding that newspaper's publi-
cation of rape victim's name in violation of state confidentiality statute did not give rise to
liability in private action by victim when government inadvertently reported name in an
incident report available in public press room); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97 (1979) (reversing newspaper indictment for publishing name of juvenile criminal
defendant despite statute prohibiting publication without judicial approval because iden-
tity lawfully obtained); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978)
(concluding that first amendment barred criminal punishment of newspaper for publica-
tion of information about proceedings. of state judicial review commission despite statute
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2. Defamation Privilege in Contract Actions
A more limited first amendment approach to source-press con-
rendering proceedings confidential); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S.
308 (1977) (holding unconsititutional a state court's pretrial order enjoining press from
publishing identity of juvenile defendant accused of murder because detention hearing was
open to press and public); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (finding
unconstitutional the imposition of liability on the press in an invasion of privacy action for
broadcasting the name of a rape victim when victim's identity obtained from court
records).
First, the. Court in these cases has consistently noted the narrowness of its holdings and
has explicitly declined to decide "whether truthful publications may ever be subjecteck :o
civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. k.
491. See also Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2613 ("Our holding today is limited. We do not
hold that truthful publication is automatically constitutionally protected . . ... "); id. at
2608 ("Our cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate question."); Edelman,
Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1990)
(criticizing the Court's approach in Florida Star for failing to give adequate weight to the
plaintiff's privacy interest).
Second, most of the cases express the rationale that the information published was not
unlawfully obtained by the press (Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2609-11; Smith, 443 U.S. at
103-04; Oklahoma Publishing, 430 U.S. at 311) and focus on the publicly available nature
of the information reported (see Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2610; Oklahoma Publishing,
430 U.S. at 311; Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 491-95). One can also see in the cases the
theme that when the information is reported by the government, or in governmental pro-
ceedings, sanctions for publication become "anomalous." Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2610-
11. This is not only because the government in those situations has other, more limited
means of guarding against dissemmination, id. at 2611, but because of the importance of
the press' role in reporting on and subjecting governmental proceedings to public scrutiny.
See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 491-92; see also Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2608,
2611 (citing Cox and suggesting that even if that role is not directly implicated when no
adversarial proceedings have begun, the article at issue involved the investigation of a
violent crime, itself a matter of "paramount public import"); Landmark Communications,
435 U.S. at 839 (noting that publication of information "clearly served those interests in
public scrutiny and discussion of governmental affairs which the First Amendment was
adopted to protect").
Third, truth has never been a complete defense to sanctions against the press for its
expressive activity in other contexts. The press clearly does not have the right to publish
schedules of troop movements in wartime, see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 604 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring), or to violate secrecy agreements by disclosure of
classified information, even if the published material is concededly true, see supra note
148. Despite the Court's expressed distaste for prior restraints, it has, in an analogous
situation, upheld disclosure of information to the press conditioned upon the press' agree-
ment not to publish it. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984), for example,
the Court unanimously rejected a newspaper's claim that a "gag order" was unconstitu-
tional under the first amendment. The newspaper was a defendant in a defamation action.
The state court, after ordering the plaintiff to disclose certain information in discovery,
entered a protective order barring the defendant newspaper from publishing the informa-
tion. The Supreme Court noted that the newspaper had no constitutional right of access to
the information; that it had only received the information as a result of the court's discov-
ery order; that it could disseminate the information if it were obtained through means
outside of the judicial process; and that the rule under which the gag order was issued
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tract actions involves the adoption by analogy of some variant of
the "actual malice" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van 16 in an effort to balance first amendment interests with in-
terests in the protection of sources' promissory expectations.
16 7
furthered a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. If
the first amendment is not undermined by situations in which the government itself can
effectively condition the release of information to the press on the press' non-disclosure of
the information, then it seems quite unlikely that all private agreements to keep informa-
tion confidential would ipso facto be held unconstitutional under the first amendment.
See also Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 569; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394
(1979) (closure to press of pretrial suppression hearing justified by defendant's sixth
amendment rights); Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578; Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376
(1990), holding that a state could not constitutionally impose criminal sanctions on a
grand jury witness for revealing his own grand jury testimony after the expiration of the
grand jury's term, is not to the contrary.
Neither does the absolutist rhetoric about editorial independence in Miami Herald v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a state right of reply statute) lead
to the conclusion that editorial decisions to breach promises of confidentiality to sources
are immune from state sanction as part of an inviolate editorial process. In holding invio-
late the editorial process by which newspapers would decide what matters to include in
their pages, the Court did not deal with an explicit undertaking later reneged by the press.
Moreover, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 167-68 (1979), demonstrated that the editorial
process is not privileged from scrutiny by a defamation plaintiff, andRed Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), showed that the state can constitutionally impose
restrictions on the content of broadcast speech as a condition for obtaining a state-granted
broadcast license. See B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF PRESS V. PUBLIC ACCESS 233-35 (1976)
(questioning the extent to which even the Court in Miami Herald meant to enunciate a
principle of total inviolability of the editorial process in the access situation).
166. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
The "actual malice" standard requires public officials and public figure plaintiffs in defa-
mation actions to prove that the defendant publishers made defamatory statements with
knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. New
York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The terms "reckless disregard" and "actual malice" will
be used interchangeably in the following section.
167. The court in Fries v. NBC, No. 456,687 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1982), suggested that the
California tort law privilege of communications to people with a common interest would
serve as a limit on the recovery of damages in -the plaintiffs contract claim. See supra
notes 106 and 109. In order to recover, the plaintiff would have to show that the defendant
had breached its agreement with "wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences" to
the plaintiff. Source Confidentiality Suit, supra note 111, at 9; Carrisoza, supra note 108,
at 1.
The application of some form of the actual malice standard has also been suggested in
the literature. See Winfield, Standing A Privilege on its Head, 7 COMM. LAW. 3, 4 (1989);
Minnesota Note, supra note 16, at 1573-74 ("As in the area of defamation, courts should
graft a constitutional standard onto common-law contract rules for cases in which confi-
dential sources sue the media."). The balancing approach suggested in the Minnesota
Note, supra note 16, consists of a two-pronged analysis under which plaintiffs would be
required first, to prove by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of a confidentiality
agreement; and second, to show that the media breached that agreement "with reckless
disregard for the source's interests in seeing the promise of confidentiality honored." Id. at
1579-82. The second prong would require a factfinder to "find that the media defendant
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Such an imported tort standard would focus exclusively on the
actions and state of mind of the press defendant.
The importation of the reckless disregard standard from the
defamation area is neither workable nor constitutionally re-
quired.'68 First, the translation of the reckless disregard standard
from the context of public figure defamation suits to that of con-
tract actions by sources necessarily makes it both meaningless
and overbroad. By contrast to the defamation context, the disclo-
sures at issue in contract actions by sources consist of true infor-
mation. This requires the reckless disregard standard to be
phrased not in terms of the press' knowledge of the substantive
character of the information, but in terms of reckless disregard as
to the -effects of the disclosure. Yet, what does it mean to ask
whether the press showed reckless disregard of the consequences
of disclosure? Given that confidentiality is always requested self-
protectively and that reporters inevitably know of some poten-
tially harmful effect to the source of being identified, it is diffi-
cult to discern how voluntary disclosures by the press would not
virtually always rise to the level of reckless disregard. 69 Conse-
published the information in violation of the confidentiality agreement without giving due
deference to the source's rights." Id. at 1581. Application of the proposed recklessness
standard would require consideration of "the extent of a media defendant's knowledge of
the reasons why a source requested confidentiality, the defendant's reason for publishing
the specific information, and the newsworthiness of that information." Id. For an analo-
gous tort-based approach, see COMM./ENT. Note, supra note 19 (suggesting a tort model
akin to the British breach of confidence tort .in which courts would have to balance
source's need for confidentiality with press' need to inform public).
Finally, although no explicit claims for breach of contract were made in Virelli 1, 142
A.D.2d 479, 536 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1989), or Virelli H, 159 A.D.2d 23, 558 N.Y.S.2d 314 (,1990),
see supra note 107, the plaintiffs' various tort claims were dismissed because they did not
satisfy the heightened fault standard of gross irresponsibility adopted by New York State
in connection with defamation actions by private persons concerning speech about matters
of legitimate public concern. In Virelli I, the court held that the plaintiff's negligence
claim warranted dismissal because its origin in an alleged breach of an agreement of confi-
dentiality did not suffice to distinguish it from the defamation and invasion of privacy
claims as to which New York had adopted a heightened fault standard. Virelli 1, 142 A.D.
2d at 487, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 576, supra note 107. The court's application of the gross irre-
sponsibility standard-rather than an actual malice burden-in the breach of confidence
context suggests that it might adopt defamation law's status-based fault distinctions for
breach of contract actions in the confidentiality context.
168. This Article will not address the formal and technical suggestion of the court's
dictum in Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1300 n.12 (D.
Minn. 1990), that the imposition of a fault requirement in contract actions would be inap-
propriate. See supra notes 107-08.
169. The Minnesota Note admits, for example, that "[slo long as a journalist knows why
the source seeks confidentiality, and understands the likely harm to the source from
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quently, the reckless disregard requirement would not perform its
intended press-protective function.17
Second, while the interest in reputation is assumed always to
have some value to be balanced against the interest in robust
public debate,"7 not every source's expectation of confidentiality
is prima facie valuable.' Moreover, the Supreme Court has not
interpreted the first amendment as imposing a heightened fault
standard even in all situations in the defamation context. Indeed,
breach, a court is likely to impose liability for such a breach." Minnesota Note, supra note
16, at 1582-83 (footnotes omitted). It is difficult to imagine any situation in which the
journalist would not at least rationally suspect that some harm could come to the source
from disclosure; after all, why else would the source seek anonynmity? To the extent that
the Minnesota Note is implicitly distinguishing between great and small harms to the
source, that calculus is simply too difficult to make.
170. While the Minnesota Note suggests that an assessment of recklessness would not
only require the determination of the motivations of the press, but would also weigh them
against the "utility" of the disclosure, the examples used throughout the piece indicate
that such standardless weighing and balancing would have extremely press-restrictive
results.
'Moreover, the New York Times actual malice standard has come under increasing at-
tack, even in the defamation context. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767-72 (1985) (White, J. concurring); R. BEZANSON, G.
CRANBERG, J. SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 104-05 (1987); Bar-
rett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 847 (1986);
Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
809 (1986); Halpern, Of Libel, Language and Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at
Twenty-Five, 68 No. CAR. L. REV. 273 (1990); Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A.
Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. -REV. 772, 829, 832 (1985); Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault
Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in its Proper Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988). The
standard has been criticized as an inadequate compromise which provides insufficient pro-
tection both for the press and for the defamed individual because it exacerbates the chil-
ling effect on the press of long and costly judicial proceedings without redressing the ac-
tual injury experienced by many victims of defamation. If, in fact, the New York Times
approach is analytically flawed and often arbitrary, why should it be extended into yet
another domain?
171. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169 (1979), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986) ("the
Court has reiterated its conviction ...that the individual's interest in his reputation is
a basic concern"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49 (1974), reh'g
denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). By contrast, the Supreme Court, in a different context, has
recently indicated its ambivalence about the value of confidentiality. In rejecting a univer-
sity's claim of special privilege against disclosure of confidential peer review materials to
the EEOC, the Court dismissed the university's chilling effects argument with the follow-
ing language: "we are not so ready as petitioner seems to be to assume the worst about
those in the academic community. . . .Not all academics will hestitate to stand up and be
counted when they evaluate their peers." University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct.
577, 588 (1990). The Court's characterization of those who seek anonymity in the tenure
review process is highly suggestive of unstated assumptions about the dubious legitimacy
of anonymity in that context.
172. See infra Sections III.B and IV.
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since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,'17 the Court has recognized va-
riable levels of state interest in the protection of reputation. 17'
Even if the interest in confidentiality at issue in contract actions
by sources were presumed to have some baseline social value,
there is no reason to suppose that such a state interest in confi-
dentiality would have to remain constant across all promises of
anonymity to all sources. 7 Thus, it begs the question to propose
a balancing approach analogous to the one used in the tort con-
text on the basis of an assumption of equivalent legitimacy in the
interests to be balanced.
Third, while the defamation context presents a relatively sim-
ple conflict between interests in reputation and interests in mini-
mizing press self-censorship and the attendant chill on robust
public debate, the specter of a chilling effect at least theoretically
weights both sides of the balance in confidentiality cases. In other
words, some degree of self-censorship is a danger for either rule
regarding enforcement in contract actions. On the one hand, non-
enforcement of promises of confidentiality may discourage
sources from sharing information with the press, thereby limiting
information available to the public. On the other hand, the possi-
bility of extensive damage awards in contract actions may lead
reporters to minimize their reliance on confidential sources and to
forego stories based on unattributed information. 76  Conse-
173. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
174. In Gertz, the Court established that the state had a higher interest in- protecting
the reputational interests of private persons who, unlike their public figure counterparts,
do not voluntarily choose to expose themselves to public scrutiny and do not have access
to the means to rebut defamatory statements about them. Id. at 342-47. To put it differ-
ently, the invariable first amendment interest of protecting free and open public discourse
was more easily outweighed by the state's interest in protecting private rather than public
figures' reputations.
175. Indeed, the Court's methodology in Gertz-of contextually assigning variable
weight to the state interest-would suggest otherwise. The distinction made there between
private and public persons is also unpersuasive when translated to the context of confiden-
tiality. Public figures are accorded lessened protection because they have voluntarily
thrust themselves into the public realm and assumed the risk of public scrutiny, and be-
cause they are presumed to have access to the press to rebut charges against them. Id.
Because all confidential sources-even otherwise public figures-seek to contract to be
private in their confidential relationships with the press, the rationales used to justify the
distinction between public and private figures in the defamation context are inapposite.
Therefore, the defamation standards need not logically require the public figure contract
plaintiff to meet a higher burden.
176. See, e.g., Langley & Levine, supra note 16, at 24; Jones, Decision Seen Cutting
Anonymous Source Use, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1984, at 12; Cohen Ill, 445 N.W.2d 248,
263 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (Crippen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Reports
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quently, this type of press self-censorship might equally impover-
ish public debate. Thus, the inquiry into self-censorship in the
confidentiality context is more complex and less clearly outcome-
determinative than in the defamation area.
In any event, the possibility and extent of chilling ef-
fects-whether on sources or reporters-are less certain and pre-
dictable in the confidentiality context than in the defamation
cases, thereby again casting doubt on the appropriateness of the
defamation analogy.'77 The concern about a chilling effect on the
press in the defamation context arose from the Supreme Court's
suggest that such a chilling effect was in fact operative when, shortly after the original
decision in Cohen, one of the defendant newspapers withdrew all 640,000 copies of its
Sunday magazine from warehouses around the state prior to delivery. The magazine con-
tained a story naming a source who claimed that she had been promised anonymity and
threatened a lawsuit if she were identified. Editors could not determine whether the free-
lance writer of the piece had in fact granted the source anonymity. Radolf, Anonymous
Sources: Newspaper Issues New Guidelines After Losing Court Case, Editor & Publisher,
Aug. 27, 1988, at 17.
Those who express concern about the chilling effect of contract liability on the press
also suggest that the possibility of financially onerous liability is exacerbated because of
the expansiveness of contract theory and the consequent probability of numerous frivolous
lawsuits. The appellate brief for Cowles Media Company in Cohen III, for example, sets
out a series of six hypothetical situations in which questions of fact might arise for unpre-
dictable juries if the contract cause of action were permitted. Brief for Appellant at 23-24,
Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (No. 80-88-2672). Those hypotheticals
raise the questions not only of contract suits claiming that the journalist did not ade-
quately protect a source's identity because knowledgeable readers were able to deduce it
from a description, and contract suits about the precise-promise made to sources and the
particular terms of the promises, but also the possibility that, once permitted, contract
actions could be brought for such infractions as the imbalance of a story promised to be
fair, or the timing of a publication.
177. Despite the numerous affidavits by journalists claiming that confidential sources
would be deterred from talking to the press if reporters were compelled to divulge their
identities pursuant to subpoena, the Supreme Court, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
693-94 (1972), found the predictions of such chilling effects to be inconclusive and specula-
tive. See also Beaver, The Newsman's Code, The Claim of Privilege & Everyman's Right
To Evidence, 47 OR. L. REV. 243, 251-52 (1968) (reporting lack of evidence of chill prior to
Branzburg). While Branzburg has been criticized for this proposition, and while self-cen-
sorship is difficult to measure, there is some empirical evidence that reporter shield laws
do not play a large role in sources' decisions to talk to the press, see Note, News-Source
Privilege in Libel Cases: A Critical Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 349, 364 n.89 (1982), and
that compelled disclosure poisons the reporter-source "atmosphere" rather than drying up
sources completely, Blasi, supra note 19, at 284.
These empirical studies, since they address source self-censorship in the subpoena con-
text, may not be fully predictive of the chilling effect on sources of voluntary disclosures
by the press. That is because some of the studies conclude that "sources continue to di-
vulge information on a confidential basis only because the reporter has impliedly or explic-
ity demonstrated a willingness to face incarceration rather than violate a source's trust."
Osborn, supra note 34, at 77.
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recognition of the inevitability of false speech in free debate. 178 At
least in terms of the number and likelihood of claims, there is a
significant difference between the risk of liability for injuries to
the world at large on the basis of inevitable occurrences and dam-
ages assessed for a deliberate breach of a specific understanding
with a particular person. Thus, the promissory nature of the rela-
tionship between reporters and sources limits the risk of a chilling
effect on the press.
Moreover, anecdotal data from some journalists and editors in-
dicate that confidentiality is presently provided too easily and
that sources will often agree to speak on the record when
pressed. 179 Just as those sources might not be discouraged from
communicating with the press despite the absence of possible
contractual remedies for exposure, so too the predicted chilling
effect on journalists of enforcing promises of confidentiality may
be equally overstated. Particularly because there are economic in-
centives for the press to rely on confidential sources in providing
the news, we cannot predict the extent of the chill. 8 ' It may be
that the only real effect of permitting damage recoveries in source
contract suits would be to cause journalists to use confidential
sources more carefully-with more specific understandings of the
sources' motives, the terms of the confidentiality agreement, and
the reporters' own authority, as well as more explicit disclosures
to the sources as to what they can expect.' 8 '
Finally, the first amendment does not simply preclude any
rules that would have a self-censorship effect on the press. Cer-
tain sorts of expression can constitutionally be chilled alto-
178. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch Co., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
179. See, e.g., E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 143 (quoting Newsday editor to the effect
that 60% of his sources would agree to disclosure if he were at risk of going to jail); B.
SWAIN, supra note 36, at 50-51; Poll Finds Editors Split on Naming of Sources, Editor &
Publisher, Sept. 27, 1980, at 22 (respondents believed that on average, 56% of sources
would speak on the record if pressed hard enough); Johnston, The Anonymous-Source
Syndrome, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 54, 57-58 (Nov./Dec. 1987).
180. See infra notes 251-65, 285, 289-90 and accompanying text (addressing how compe-
tition between news organs and institutional needs and conventions of newsgathering lead
to reliance on confidential news sources).
181. Theorists of the law and economics school might note that, given certain assump-
tions about sources' unwillingness to leave the market, journalists might respond to a rule
enforcing promises of confidentiality by seeking to contract out of potential liability rather
than simply by becoming timid and afraid to report the news. One can envision some kind
of form contract specifying these issues, like informed consent forms or Miranda warnings.
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gether' 82 and other sorts of speech merit differential degrees of
protection from the chilling effect. 8 ' Since courts may well find
that promises of confidentiality should be "chilled" in certain cir-
cumstances, it is inappropriate to apply heightened fault stan-
dards designed to reduce the chilling effect on political speech
across the board to all promises of confidentiality by journalists
to sources.""'
This is not to say, of course, that the first amendment is irrele-
vant to press breaches of promises of confidentiality. Although
the actual malice standard established in the defamation area is
not itself appropriate for simple transplantation, both social pol-
icy and the first amendment may require a limitation on the ordi-
nary standard of contract liability in actions brought by sources
whose identities have been inadvertently disclosed. In other
words, unless contract is to be read as fundamentally distinct
from tort, the first amendment's preclusion of strict liability in
the defamation context might well constrain traditional contract
liability when the disclosure by the press is inadvertent or
accidental.18 5
C. The Promissory Estoppel Model
The third existing approach to press-source suits, consisting of
a two-step analysis, is reflected in the opinion of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.' In the first step
of its analysis (and by direct contrast to the proponents of the
freedom of contract model), the court concluded that promises of
confidentiality to sources by the press should not be enforced as
182. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973)
(obscenity) and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).(speech inciting imminent
lawless action).
183. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59
(1985) (defamatory speech about private figure on matter of private concern); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-91 (1969) (broadcast content regulation);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978)
(commercial speech).
184. See infra Section III.B. and Section IV.
185. Under traditional contract law, liability may be imposed in the event of a breach
even if the promisor took all reasonable precautions to avoid it. 3 E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 123, § 12.8, at 190 (describing contract as a strict liability cause of action). Thus,
contract law could lead to liability even for inadvertent disclosures resulting from techni-
cal failures or from other unforseeable circumstances against which reasonable precautions
would not guard.
186. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990).
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contracts for two reasons. First, it found that they were not in-
tended to be legally binding. 187 Second, it saw contract law as an
"ill fit" in the press-source context, imposing "an unwarranted
legal rigidity on a special ethical relationship." '
In the second step, the court purported to apply a promissory
estoppel analysis to determine whether the promise at issue
should nevertheless be enforced. The promissory estoppel analy-
sis, in requiring the factfinder to decide whether "injustice"
would result from a refusal to enforce a promise, involves a bal-
ancing of the free speech interests of the press with the state in-
terest in protecting promises of anonymity. 8" Thus, the court
considered first amendment interests as part of its common law
determination of whether justice would be served by enforcement
of the promise. While the court in Cohen did not foreclose the
possibility that promissory estoppel might render enforceable
some promises of anonymity to sources, 190 it concluded that "the
law best leaves the parties . . . to their trust in each other" when
promises of anonymity both arise "in the classic first amendment
context of the quintessential public debate" of elections and are
given to "a political source involved in a political campaign."191
The court's contract analysis assumes its conclusion and is
highly mechanical. The court clearly recognized that the decision
to enforce particular promises was a substantive one based on
policy considerations. 9" Yet, instead of explicitly explaining the
value choice involved in choosing not to enforce press promises, 9 '
187. Id. at 203. By holding that promises of confidentiality are not contracts as a doctri-
nal matter, the court obviously avoided the question of state action and the first
amendment.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 204-05.
190. Id. at 205 ("There may be instances where a confidential source would be entitled
to a remedy such as promissory estoppel, when the state's interest in enforcing the prom-
ise to the source outweighs First Amendment considerations, but this is not such a case.").
191. Id.
192. Unlike the proponents of the freedom of contract approach, the court here recog-
nized that the law did not consider every promise binding and cited exclusions based on
public policy grounds. Id. at 203. Even the choice of language in its references to contract
law as "ill fit" and "inappropriate" in the context of the press' promises to sources indi-
cates the court's implicit recognition that the application of contract law involved policy-
based choices on the part of courts. Id.
193. As Morris Cohen aptly observed:
In enforcing contracts, the government does not merely allow two individuals to
do what they have found pleasant in their eyes. Enforcement, in fact, puts the
machinery of the law in the service of one party against the other. When that is
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the Minnesota Supreme Court disingenuously sought to mask its
substantive decision about press promises and reporter-source re-
lationships under the guise of a doctrinal determination of
intent. 194
As the court recognized, however, the parties to the confidenti-
ality agreement "unquestionably" intended that their promises be
kept. 195 While the court asserted that "each party . . . assume[d]
the risk of what might happen, protected only by the good faith
of the other party,""' it provided no evidence that this assump-
tion was in fact the likely expectation of the parties, given their
social and professional context. One could just as easily speculate
that, in light of both the traditional ethic of journalistic non-dis-
closure and the examples of reporters who have endured jail
terms rather than divulge their sources, the expectation of the
parties was that anonymity would be maintained. In view of that
assumption, it is unlikely that either party contemplated disclo-
sure and a subsequent lawsuit. 97 In addition, the possibility' of an
appeal to the courts might well have been contemplated by the
source, even if not the reporter. If that were the case, courts
would necessarily choose to affirm one party's intent rather than
the other's by choosing not to enforce the promise."9 '
Moreover, as a general norm of contract law, parties need not
in fact consider or intend the legal consequences of the actions by
which they manifest their assent in order to be bound.199 In addi-
worthwhile and how that should be done are important questions of public
policy.
Cohen, supra note 144, at 562. This is no less true when the decision is not to enforce a set
of promises.
194. Thus, the court artificially distinguished its promissory estoppel analysis from its
contract determination, noting that "[u]nder the contract analysis ... the focus was more
on whether a binding promise was intended and breached, and not so much on the con-
tents of the promise or the nature of the information exchanged for the promise." Cohen
IV, 457 N.W.2d at 204.
195. Id. at 202.
196. Id. at 203.
197. Indeed, one of the traditional criticisms of the attempt to hinge contract law on the
subjective intent of the parties is that it is impossible for courts to divine subjective intent.
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 144, at 575-78. That is particularly the case when the courts
attempt to determine the intent of parties who did not anticipate an issue at the time of
promising. Id. at 576-77 ("most litigation arises in this field precisely because of the ad-
vent of conditions that the two parties did not foresee when they entered into the
transaction").
198. See Dalton, supra note 141, at 1107 (making this argument in an analysis of judi-
cial approaches to the enforcement of cohabitation agreements); Braucher, supra note 134.
199. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 123, § 3.6, at 113-16.
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tion parties who seek not to be legally bound to their- promises
traditionally have to manifest quite clearly their intentions not to
be bound.200 In any event, while the idea of subjective intent is
still used to justify the notion of contractual obligation, the objec-
tive theory of contract interpretation has dominated contract
rhetoric since the mid-19th Century.20 In interpreting intent to
be bound under an objective approach, courts must base their de-
cisions on what the parties should have reasonably intended,
under circumstances as the courts see them." 2 In turn, that at-
tempt to discern the intentions of the hypothetical reasonable
person must necessarily rest on policy-based judgments on the
part of the court that particular expectations are reasonable and
that a particular set of promises should or should not be
enforced.203
The fact that the court in Cohen attempted to disguise its pol-
icy determination by shoehorning it into the apparently doctrinal
rubric of the parties' intent is not the only problem with the
court's argument for the inappropriateness of contract. The cen-
tral difficulty is that, even on a policy analysis, the court did not
explicitly explain why promises in the context of the reporter-
source relationship should not be considered binding. After all,
explicit promises of confidentiality have in the past been enforced
by courts as contracts0 ' and contracts to maintain confidentiality
have even been implied on the basis of confidential relation-
200. See, e.g., id. § 3.7, at 116; 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 34 (1963); J. MUR-
RAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 20, at 30-32 (2d rev. ed. 1974); 1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE
-ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 21 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 21 (1981) ("Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding
is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of intention that a promise
shall not affect legal relations may prevent the. formation of a contract."). Indeed, scholars
suggest that courts refuse to honor even explicit manifestations of intentions not to be
bound in certain cirucmstances. See, e.g., Holmes, .The Freedom Not to Contract, 60 TUL.
L. REV. 751, 755 (1986).
201. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, supra note 123, at 35-44; Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law
of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 945 (1967); see also Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200
F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912).
202. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 141, at 1055-56; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 2(1), 2 comment b (1981).
203. The reasonable person inquiry in this context might be said to involve two ques-
tions: (1) whether a reasonable source would believe that a reporter was promising not to
reveal her identity under any circumstances; and (2) whether a reasonable person would
believe that the reporter is bound by such a promise. Both questions require courts to
adopt substantive, policy-based criteria of reasonableness against which they can test the
parties' expectations.
204. See supra notes 145-47, 149, 150 and accompanying text.
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ships. 205 And simply characterizing a relationship as "ethical" 2°e
does not a fortiori mean that its obligations cannot-and should
not-be enforced by contract law.
In fact, what lies behind the court's decision not to treat confi-
dentiality promises in these circumstances as binding is, in the
first place, an adoption of a particularly limited and commercial
vision of contract.2 0 7 Having limited the realm of contract to the
market, and having adverted to the unenforceability of promises
in the family context, the court then sub silentio relegated the
reporter-source relationship to the allegedly unregulated realm of
the family."0 8 In making that distinction, it raised two problems.
First, courts have, in fact, contemplated the possibility of con-
tracts in personal and intimate relationships.09 Second, the Co-
hen court did not provide an explanation of why the relationship
between reporters and their sources should be seen as entailing
merely "ethical" obligations and thus as more family-like than
commercial. 1 0
205. See supra note 151. I am not, of course, suggesting that all such agreements should
be viewed as binding contracts as a matter 'of policy. See id., in which I argue that tradi-
tional jusitifications for enforcing confidentiality in other relationships do not easily fit the
varied relationships between reporters and sources. Nevertheless, the Cohen court dis-
missed contract for all these relationships without providing an adequate distinguishing
analysis.
206. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 203. Indeed, the distinction assumed by the court be-
tween ethical and legal obligations raises a host of jurisprudential issues which it is beyond
the scope of this Article to address further.
207. This is evidenced by the court's characterization of the parties' intentions: "They
are not thinking in terms of offers and acceptances in any commercial or business sense."
Id.
208. It chose to characterize the relationship between reporters and sources as involving.
"an 'I'll-scratch-your-back-if-you'll-scratch-mine' accommodation," in which "[elach party
. . . assumes the risks of what might happen, protected only by the good faith of the other
party." Id.
209. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976)
(in which the California Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had properly stated a
cause of action in express contract for breach of an oral cohabitation agreement). While
the majority in the early English case of Balfour v. Balfour, 2 K.B. 571 (1919), established
a presumption that agreements between spouses for support should normally not be
deemed enforceable contracts, a concurrence admitted that "[i]t may be, and I do not for a
moment say that it is not, possible for such a contract as is alleged in the present case be
made between husband and wife. The question is whether such a contract was made." Id.
at 574.
210. Indeed, even accepting the court's assumption'of an antinomy between market and
family in classic contract law, press-source relationships do not fit neatly into the dichot-
omy. The relationships partake both of the realm of community, trust and vulnerability
and of the realm of self-interested dealing and manipulation. See infra Section III.C.
Moreover, the assumption of a clear antinomy between market and family in the law,
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The court's promissory estoppel analysis, while less wooden
than its approach to the contract question, is flawed as well.211 It
simply does not deliver what it promises. The court properly ad-
mitted that the promissory estoppel analysis requires a complex
balancing of factors.2 12 It discussed the "moral ambiguity" of the
transaction in which promises of confidentiality are extracted; it
noted that both sides of the dispute in Cohen "proclaim their
own purity of intentions while condemning the other side for
'dirty tricks' ,,;13 and observed that "deniability, depending on
the circumstances, may or may not deserve legal protection. 2 1 4
Yet, having observed the complexities of the relationship between
sources and reporters and having admitted the necessity of bal-
ancing, the court neatly sidestepped the obligations it had
deemed necessary.. It neither balanced nor provided criteria for
doing so.
Instead, refusing overtly to choose any particular vision of the
meaning and significance of the facts in the Cohen case, the court
took refuge in a categorical rule, based on a talismanic invocation
of the notion that the first amendment protects speech about
public figures in political campaigns. When faced with the com-
plexity of the task required, and the fact that it would involve a
series of explicit value choices to decide when deniability by
sources is desirable, the Cohen court threw up its hands. But it
did not explain why the political nature of the speech at issue
forecloses any inquiry into the other circumstances of promise
and breach. And it provided no guidance at all on how to consider
the issue in circumstances not involving the campaign context at
issue in Cohen itself.
while apparently persuasive to the Cohen court, has been strongly challenged. See, e.g.,
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1497 (1983); see also Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV.
563 (1983) (noting counter-principles within private law categories). It also ignores the
suggested inconclusiveness and indeterminacy of the arguments used to support non-en-
forcement of promises in the intimate context. See Dalton, supra note 141, at 1099-1100.
211. For a skeptical view of the enterprise of promissory estoppel analysis in general,
see Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REV. 678 (1984) (dis-
puting the determinacy of judicial methods of applying promissory estoppel doctrine).
212. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 204-05. The court asked (without answering), for exam-
ple, whether the source's identity was newsworthy and whether characterizations short of
outright identification would have served the press' asserted reasons for disclosure. Id. at
205.
213. Id. at 204.
214. Id.
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III. THE HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF PRESS-SOURCE
CONFIDENTIALITY
The existing categorical approaches to the problem of press
promises of confidentiality are doctrinally unpersuasive: they do
not establish either that all such promises should be enforced or
that none should be. Similarly, those approaches which suggest
that some, although not all, promises of confidentiality should be
enforced do not provide a principled methodology for making the
distinction. Both doctrine and jurisprudence require that a reso-
lution of the issue be historically grounded, as well as highly con-
text and fact-sensitive.2 15 This, in turn, requires a description of
the social reality against which promises of confidentiality are
made by the press. That reality consists not only of a range of
dynamics in particular relationships between reporters and
sources, but also of a highly ambiguous institutional relationship
between the press and government.
A. Journalism, Government and the Myth of the Indepen-
dent Press
The modern press is said to serve various functions critical to a
democracy, including informing the public, checking government
abuse, and requiring accountability of those whose functions af-
fect the public interest.21 These functions require and assume
215. The doctrine of contracts against public policy, for example, requires fact-sensitive
and value-laden determinations of social policies. The doctrine of promissory estoppel re-
quires the complex balancing of interests to determine whether it would be in the interests
of justice to enforce particular promises. See supra Section II.A.
More. fundamentally, as the Realists have shown us, legal rules are chosen against a
backdrop of social reality, not in vacuo, and are constituted by that reality. See generally
W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); K. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). The choice of legal rules has consequences for the relationships
of those to whom they apply. Thus, when they are chosen without a nuanced and sophisti-
cated understanding of the social reality they are to regulate, they alter balances of power
in unanticipated ways and fail in their intended functions.
216. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726-27 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716-17 (1971) (Black, J.) ("The press
was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people . ...
And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press-is the duty to prevent any part
of the government from deceiving the people . . . ."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219
(1966) ("[Tlhe press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses
of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping
officials elected by the people responsible to all the people I . . ."';'Garrison v. Louisiana,
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the press to be neutral, independent, critical, and powerful.2 1
The romantic image of. an adversarial press serving the public
"without fear *or favor" 18 has come to dominate much modern
discourse about journalism.21 9
The press is, of course, an increasingly powerful and in many
ways independent and critical check on government.22 Both
scholars and government officials believe that the media's selec-
tion and presentation of information have a profound effect on
setting the agenda for and defining the scope of public debate on
political, economic, and social matters.221 The media have re-
379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("speech concerning public affairs . . . is the essence of self-
government."); see also Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527-42, 632, 647; Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634
(1975). 'Journalists themselves share in the perception that they "monitor[) . . . those in
positions of power." T. WiCKER, supra note 34, at 186. See also C. PRESS & K. VERBURG,
supra note 34, at 17. Some historians contend that, having internalized libertarian tenets
of radical Whig ideology, even colonial printers declared their role as checks on govern-
ment. See, e.g., J. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN
JOURNALISM 7 (1988); L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 273 (1985).
Scholars have identified several justifications for the first amendment, ranging from
self-government to individual self-realization. See, e.g., C. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-69 (1989) (self-realization); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970) (range of values); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CON-
STITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1960) (self-governance). The checking value of the
first amendment is a corollary and supplement to the instrumentally political justifica-
tions for freedom of speech and the press. See Blasi, supra.
217. See, e.g., IMPACT, supra note 4, at 19; D. CALLAGHAN, W. GREEN, B. JENNINGS & M.
LINSKY, CONGRESS AND THE MEDIA: THE ETHICAL CONNECTION 35-36 (1985) [hereinafter
ETHICAL CONNECTION] (discussing principle of journalistic autonomy).
218. The reference is to the New York Times' declaration of its mission in the late 19th
Century. See H. SALISBURY, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR x (1980); J. ALTSCHULL, supra note
120, at 54.
219. See IMPACT, supra note 4, at 18-20. Indeed, there are those who criticize the press
for being too antagonistic and hostile to government. Id. at 15 (quoting Moynihan and
O'Neill).
220. It was, after all, the revelations of two young reporters which focused the nation's
attention on the Nixon administration's conduct, kept pressure on government investiga-
tors, and ultimately led to the resignation of an American President. B. WOODWARD & C.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 5. See also P. STOLER, supra note 86, at 2; H. BRAY, supra note 120,
at 134-36.
221. See, e.g., R. ENTMAN, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CITIZENS 8-9, 36 (1989); D. CATER, supra
note 54, at 7; S. KLAIDMAN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 75, at 180; W. RIVERS, supra note
39, at 10, 213 (describing Washington news correspondents as "a shadow government"). In
addition to its impact on public debate, a relatively recent empirical study suggests that
the press also has a significant impact on policymakers themselves-mostly in terms of the
policymaking process but also sometimes on substantive policy choices as well. IMPACT,
supra note 4, at 112-18; Practicing Responsible Journalism, supra note 98, at 145-46.
There has been some debate within the social science community as to the level and
nature of the press' power and influence on public attitudes. See C. PRESS & K. VERBURG,
1991] CONFIDENTIAL PRESS-SOURCE RELATIONS 673
placed the influence and many of the functions of traditional po-
litical parties and now serve as the central link between the pub-
lic and its representatives.2 22 Yet, history discloses a far more
cooperative than adversarial role for the American press with re-
spect to the government and power elites.22 In fact, the press has
historically enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with government of-
ficials and others on whom it reports.2 2
Most newspapers after the American Revolution 225 were expli-
supra note 34, at 61-66 and studies discussed therein; P. CLARKE & S. EVANS, COVERING
CAMPAIGNS 6-9 (1983); J. LICHTENBERG, DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 9 (1990); S. IYEN-
GAR & D. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION AND AMERICAN OPINION 54-62 (1987);
McCombs & Shaw, The Agenda-Setting Function of the Mass Media, 36 PUB. OPINION Q.
176 (1972). While some early researchers after World War I suggested that the ability.of
the media to influence people's beliefs was virtually absolute, others concluded that such
influence was very selective, affecting only those who had few predispositions on the rele-
vant issue. C. PRESS &K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 61-62. Modern studies too differ in
their foci and conclusions, some suggesting that the media may have long-term effects on
public opinion; others claiming that they only reinforce existing public beliefs; and still
others concentrating on the media's success in agenda-setting. Id. at 63-66. See also R.
ENTMAN, supra, at 75-88.
Despite some disagreements within the social science community as to the precise ef-
fects and extent of media influence, two things are.clear. First, the media, along with the
politicians they cover, do play a significant role in screening events and focusing the pub-
lic's attention on issues they select to cover. At.the very least, "media messages signifi-
cantly influence what the public and the elites think, by affecting what they perceive and
think about." Id. at 75. Second, the sources of news-politicians and government offi-
cials-themselves believe that media coverage is a profoundly important part of the politi-
cal and governmental process. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 66; R. ENTMAN,
supra, at 86, 126-28; IMPACT, supra note 4, at 84-86; Jennings, Media Coverage of Congres-
sional Elections: An Ethical Perspective, in CAMPAIGNS IN THE NEWS 183, 184 (J.P.
Vermeer ed. 1987); Practicing Responsible Journalism, supra note 98, at 140-41. See also
O'Neill, Media Power and the Dangers of Mass Information, in NIEMAN REPORTS 32
(Summer 1985) (quoting Reagan aide Michael Deaver as saying that the presidential staff
".would be crazy" not to recognize media influence and construct news events to fit net-
work news programming).
222. R. DINKIN, supra note 2, at 159-61; IMPACT, supra note 4, at 10, 12, 14-20.
223. See, e.g., E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 98-99; IMPACT, supra note 4, at 206-11; J.
DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 81-82.
224. See, e.g., R. ENTMAN, supra note 221, at 115; D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 300; J.
HULTENG, supra note 6, at 84; M. SCHRAM, supra note 2, at 54; J. ALTSCHULL, supra note
120, at 294; J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 81-82; W. GREIDER, supra note 55, at xvii; W.
RIVERS, supra note 39, at 18; M. GROSSMAN & M. KuMAR, supra note 4, at 1, 13-16; RE-
PORTERS, supra note 36, at 126; D. WISE, supra note 39, at 310; Langley & Levine, supra
note 16, at 14.
The following account of the history of American journalism is obviously a broad-brush
attempt to identify major trends. It is not intended as a characterization of the develop-
mental stages in every newspaper across the country.
225. During the early colonial period, the few American newspapers tended to be timid
and riot offensive to government officials. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA:
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citly political party organs, serving as instruments of either the
Federalist or the Anti-Federalist parties.2 26 The abusiveness and
AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE MASS MEDIA 24-26 (6th ed. 1988); F. HUDSON, JOURNAL-
ISM IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1690-1872, at 51, 769 (1873). Despite the end of official
licensing, virtually all publishers prior to the establishment of James Franklin's New Eng-
land Courant in 1721 had succumbed to official pressure to print "by authority." M. EM-
ERY & E. EMERY, supra, at 28-29. Whether for reasons of ideology or economics, colonial
printers proclaimed impartiality and independence from factions as their creed. See, e.g.,
J. SMITH, supra note 216, at 7, 129 (crediting impartiality to radical Whig principles);
Botein, Printers and the American Revolution, in THE PRESS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 19-20 (B. Bailyn & J. Hench eds. 1981) (suggesting that impartiality was required by
printers' needs to please all their customers in an underdeveloped market).
Despite the articulated ideal of impartiality and the generally timid nature of the press,
some early papers did express dissent against political and religious authority. See, e.g., M.
EMERY & E. EMERY, supra, at 26-33, 38-44; F. HUDSON, supra, at 51; J. SMITH, supra note
216, at 7, 95-100, 124, 162; Mayton, From a Legacy of Suppression to the Metaphor of the
Fourth Estate, 39 STAN. L. REV. 139, 142 (1986) (early press "was robust and flourishing, a
frequent and trenchant critic of public matters and public officials"). As discontent with
British and colonial policies mounted in the colonies, it became impossible for the press of
the day to remain impartial. Botein, supra, at 32-40; J. SMITH, supra note 216, at 37-8.
Many newspapers began actively to reflect the political positions of the American rebels.
M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra, at 48-63. The result was that during the late colonial period,
the American newspaper became a highly editorial product, tendentious in its reporting,
and obviously partisan in its politics. Anti-British newpapers were central in promoting
the War of Independence. See, e.g., P. STOLER, supra note 86, at 26; W. BLEYER, MAIN
CURRENTS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 79-82 (1927).
Although some local and mercantile matter was apparently available in newspapers of
the 18th and early 19th Centuries, those organs mostly expressed opinions on political
issues and gave capsule summaries of foreign news gathered from other, usually English,
newspaper sources. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra, at 65-66; M. SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE
NEWS 14-15 (1978). The early American newspapers were one-person operations, had no
need for newsgathering practices, and represented a forum for the views of their editorial
contributors. Any newsgathering that was required was undertaken by free-lance writers.
See W. BLEYER, supra, at 74-75.
226. These newspapers were financed by, political parties or candidates. See, e.g., J. ALT-
SCHULL, supra note 120, at 68-71; F. HUDSON, supra note 225, at 142-43, 232-34; J. LEE,
HISTORY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 101-06, 115-17 (1923); F. MARBUT, supra note 88, at 40;
M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 15. This is not to say that all newspapers were political;
some papers were basically commercial in nature. Id. Nor is it to say that the political
party papers were invariably loyal. However, those editors who chose to criticize their po-
litical masters appear to have been subject to onerous sanctions. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG,
supra note 34, at 36-37 (describing the prosecution under the Alien and Sedition Act of
Charles Holt, editor of a Federalist newspaper, for his criticisms of the Federalist Presi-
dent John Adams).
Moreover, party sponsorship was a significant economic benefit, if not a necessity, to
newspapers at the time. For example, The Gazette of the United States, the Federalist
party newspaper established by Alexander Hamilton, received all government printing
contracts during the administration of George Washington. See C. PRESS & K. VERBURG,
supra note 34, at 36 (citing J.E. POLLARD, THE PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESS 8 (1947)). The
existence of such an economic benefit surely tempered criticism of party policies by party
newspapers. It was not until the presidency of Abraham Lincoln that the administration
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political partisanship of the party press during this period has
been extensively documented.227 The organizational structure,228
type of content, and economic base 22  of these newspapers made
them overtly dependent on their political masters.
The modern concept of an independent commercial press was
born in the 1830's, with the establishment of the inexpensive,
mass-appeal "penny press."2 ' By relying on street sales and ad-
vertising for their economic base,2 3' the penny papers established
the precondition for their claims of political independence. 232 Yet,
while the ethic of political independence signified a major change
from the preceding journalistic era, it in fact meant little more
than that newspapers were independently funded and no longer
functioned as official spokesmen of the political parties.213  De-
spite claims of political independence, the penny papers of the
1830's and their successors later in the 19th Century tended to
eschewed an official news organ and that the practice of awarding such contracts to ad-
ministration newspapers was eliminated by the establishment of the Government Printing
Office. Id. at 37. See also W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 22-24; D. CATER, supra note 54, at
76.
227. See C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 36-37; M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra
note 225, at 79-82; J. SMITH, supra note 216, at 38; M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 16; J.
LEE, supra note 226, at 101-02, 143-44. See also Sloan, The Early Party Press: The News-
paper's Role in American Politics, 1788-1812, 9 JOURNALISM HIST. 18 (1982) (on the ideol-
ogy of partisanship of the press of the period). So deep-rooted was the partisanship of the
party editors during this period, and so intemperate their speech, that their battles some-
times spilled over from the editorial pages onto the dueling field. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG,
supra note 34, at 36; M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 16.
228. Newspapers at the time were still small operations, with the editors also serving as
reporters, managers, and printers. M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 16.
229. Newspapers prior to 1830 were expensive, sold primarily by subscription, and read
only by the mercantile and political elite. Id. at 15. Thus, the economic beneficence of
their parties was critical to their success.
230. The penny press of the 1830's has been said to have marked a "revolution in Amer-
ican journalism." Id. at 14. See also J. LEE, supra note 226, at 205.
231. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 115-20; M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at
17-19.
232. See M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 18, 21-22. These papers neither needed the
economic support of political parties nor desired the potential audience fragmentation
which might result from too partisan a political stance. Id. at 21.
233. Some newspapers took political independence to mean that they could simply ig-
nore political editorializing. For others, independence meant that they felt free to switch
party affiliations in election endorsements. Many prominent Republican editors, for exam-
ple, became "mugwumps" by switching their party endorsements in the presidential races
of the late 19th Century. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 176, 181. Yet others
resisted the call of independence and continued to function as party papers during and
after the period of the penny press. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 37; M.
SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 91.
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praise officials who provided them with exclusive information,
evidencing the implicit symbiosis in their relations with
government.23 '
The 19th Century press became increasingly dependent on go-
vernment, politicians, and other sources of news as a result of ec-
onomic, institutional, and philosophical factors. The papers of the
penny press characterized their mission as the provision of news
rather than political commentary.235 They sought to reflect the
activities and interests of a growing urban, middle-class society236
by focusing on factual reporting, particularly of local news and
human interest stories.237 The emphasis on news diminished the
papers' editorial role, enhanced competition for the delivery of
timely matter, created a need for newsgathering operations,3 '
and necessarily led to reliance on news sources. When newspaper
stories became defined as consisting of facts and quotations from
those knowledgeable about them,23 9 sources became central to the
234. F. MARBUT, supra note 88, at 42 (discussing the 1835 New York Herald).
235. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 119-20; M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at
14, 24-25. Their modern concept of news reflected not only commercial and political mat-
ter, but also myriad other events in social life. M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 22, 26-30.
236. M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 22-23, 30-31, 49-50. Schudson has forcefully cha-
racterized these newspapers as the outgrowth of a newly developing market economy and
entrepreneurial middle class in the mid-19th Century. Although they claimed to speak for
"the common man," they instead represented the views and interests of an increasingly
successful and urbanized middle class.
237. Id. at 14, 26-30. While the penny papers were the precursors of modern objective
journalism in their focus on factual reporting, they differed from the articulated ideals of
the modern objective press by seeking sensationalistic coverage at the expense of truth.
Newspapers in the 19th Century thought nothing of fabricating stories, faking or staging
events, and reporting impressionistically. See M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at
119; T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 209; N. CRAWFORD, THE ETHICS OF JOURNALISM 39-43
(1924); McDonald, Is Objectivity Possible?, in ETHICS AND THE PRESS 80-81 (J. Merrill &
D. Barney eds. 1975). Some credit the subsequent rise of fact-oriented and impartial re-
porting to the establishment of the cooperative Associated Press wire service, which had to
cater to newspapers of widely differing viewpoints. D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 135.
238. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 119; M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 23,
25-26. By 1860, 55% of news items. were gathered by reporters. M. EMERY & E. EMERY,
supra note 225, at 132. See generally W. BLEYER, supra note 225, at 154-251. It was with
the rise of the penny press that journalists as we know them-salaried employees of a
newspaper organization-began to characterize the world of newspaper publishing. M.
SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 23-24. Although there were not many reporters on the staffs
of the early penny publications, the period from 1830 to 1890 saw a phenomenal growth in
the ranks of the salaried journalist. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 212-14.
Coverage of the Civil War, for example, required hundreds of correspondents. Id. at 213.
By the 1890's, daily newspaplers had developed large, sophisticated, and specialized edito-
rial staffs. Id. at 212-14.
239. See REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 17; Sigal, Sources Make the News, in READING
676
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activity of reporting.
The rhetoric of political independence and a focus on news be-
came commonplace in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, as
the press grew and became increasingly profitable and respect-
able.240 Numerous newspapers engaged in crusading journalism
which exposed municipal corruption and what the papers saw as
government abuse.24' Yet, due to the low wages paid to reporters
by newspapers, many journalists in the late 19th Century sought
.outside employment with news sources and necessarily compro-
mised their independence." 2 Moreover, many newspapers of the
THE NEWS, supra note 2, at 9, 15-16. This suggestion is supported by the observation that
"the technique of going directly to a public figure as a news source did not become a part
of political journalism until the 1860s." P. CLARKE & S. EVANS, supra note 221, at 19-20
(citation omitted).
240. Some claim that increasing commercialization and standardization led to the drop-
ping of political affiliations "in an effort to create a bland patina." Blanchard, Press Criti-
cism and National Reform Movements: The Progressive Era and the New Deal, 5 JOUR-
NALISM HIST. 33, 35 (1978). The 19th Century signaled a tremendous growth in the number
of newspapers and their profitability. J. ALTSCHULL, supra note 120, at 65; G. JUERGENS,
supra note 58, at 5-6; M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 65-68. Yet the newspapers of the
time were not all of one stripe, at least in style. There developed a fundamental dichotomy
between the respectable and the sensationalist press in the 1880's and 1890's, with the
successors of the old penny press adopting a model of fair and accurate reporting and the
new "yellow" sheets focusing on entertainment and shrill, sensationalistic reporting of
events. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 213, 227, 231-34; M. SCHUDSON, supra
note 225, at 89-90, 95, 112-14, 118-20. The respectable press, exemplified by the New York
Times after 1896, appealed to the educated middle class. M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at
90; M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 274. The yellow sheets, which made up
approximately one-third of metropolitan dailies by 1900, were geared to the uneducated
middle and working classes. The dual character of the press of the time led to a "moral"
war waged against the yellow sheets by the respectable newspapers. M. SCHUDSON, supra
note 225, at 99, 101, 112-14; M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 238-41. The dicho-
tomy in the late 19th Century press continued into the 20th, with the sensationalistic
tabloids of "jazz journalism" pitted against the respectable press in the 1920's. M. EMERY
& E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 323-24.
241. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 233-34; IMPACT, supra note 4, at 6; J.
ALTSCHULL, supra note 120, at 76-77 (on the New York Times' campaign against Boss
Tweed in 1870).
242. Blanchard, supra note 240, at 33, 34, 36 (reporting the position of George Seldes, a
press critic of the 1930's, who believed that press reports prior to the stock market crash of
1929 were unduly optimistic because many Wall Street reporters were on the payrolls of
business and banking interests). See also Smythe, The Reporter, 1880-1900: Working Con-
ditions and Their Influence on the News, 7 JOURNALISM HIST. 1, 6 (Spring 1980) (describ-
ing the economic reasons which caused reporters of the period to be gentle to certain poli-
tical figures, noting that "reporters ... supplemented their incomes by dropping names
into stories ... and by assisting favored politicians who might return the favor at a later
date"). Smythe characterizes reporting between 1880 and 1900 as "more a way station on
the highway to politics, business, literature or editorial work than a profession itself." Id.
at 8.
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period were the "personal fiefdoms" of their publishers and edi-
tors, who often used their news columns as platforms for their
own political views, ambitions, and connections.243 Indeed, consis-
tent with their role as owners of large and profitable business in-
stitutions, publishers of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries
were by and large conservative in their political endorsements
and their coverage of non-mainstream politics.2 "
By the 20th Century, changes in government, institutional
characteristics of the press, journalistic conventions, and repor-
torial ambitions served to further reinforce the news media's de-
pendence on government and news sources. More specifically,
these various factors overwhelmingly led the press to report the
government's official line on events until the end of the Cold
War.
The 20th Century saw a tremendous growth in the size and
complexity of the federal government.2 ' 5 This growth was accom-
panied by an explosion in government public relations staffs;4 6
the adoption of a classification system and the growth of the iso-
lated national security establishment; 47 the centralization of ac-
cess to government information;24 s the systematization of govern-
243. D. HALLIN, THE UNCENSORED WAR, THE MEDIA AND VIETNAM 7 (1986); J. ALTSCHULL,
supra note 120, at 52.
244. The New York Times, for example, has been characterized as the worst of many
newspapers which unfairly covered the Sacco and Vanzetti case in 1920. M. EMERY & E.
EMERY, supra note 225, at 303. While papers of the period denounced and exposed corrup-
tion, they did not otherwise question the status quo. Id. at 308. The 1930's saw supporters
of the New Deal criticizing the press (and its "press lord" publishers) for their opposition
to liberal reforms. Id. at 351. Only one-third of the nation's daily newspapers supported
Roosevelt in the 1932 and 1936 elections. Id. at 353. Indeed, a small majority of daily
newspapers which made endorsements in presidential races has historically supported Re-
publican candidates. Id. at 572. See also D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 324.
245. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 1-2.
246. See D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 146; J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 52-53; PRESS
CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 1-3; W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 34-35 (reporting the phe-
nomenal increase in the number of federal press agents beginning with the Eisenhower
administration); E.E. CORNWELL, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OF PUBLIC OPINION 208-52
(1965); D. CATER, supra note 54, at 5. Some estimated that the government had in its
employ 19,000 publicity agents by 1977. J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 52-53.
247. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 4; J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 50, 183, 189-90; A. SCHLES-
INGER, supra note 47, at 331-76; Katz, Government Information Leaks and the First
Amendment, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 108, 112-13, 117-19 (1976). Max Weber has suggested that
secrecy is an outgrowth of bureaucracy. MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 233-34 (H.H.
Gerth & C.W. Mills eds. 1946) [hereinafter ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY] ("Every bureaucracy
seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge
and intentions secret.").
248. Government tightly controls access to certain key types of information, such as
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ment "news management"; "9 and the growth of the "imperial
presidency. '"5" The government's control of access to information
and its centralized, aggressive publicity efforts made it both ne-
cessary and convenient for the press to rely on official sources in
its reporting of news, particularly with repect to the executive
branch.
Along with changes in government, conventions of modern
newsgathering and dissemination undermined the press' ability to
remain consistently independent and critical of government.
First, the press' reliance on official government information and
sources was institutionalized by the full-fledged adoption of a
credo of "objective" reporting251 and a new image of journalistic
sobriety and respectability in the 20th Century.2 2 The articulated
military, intelligence, and diplomatic matters. D. WISE, supra note 39, at 27-29. Analo-
gously, access to White House sources is controlled and information favorable to the presi-
dent is centralized in the White House press office, thereby making it difficult for journal-
ists on the White House beat to obtain any but official information. Practicing
Responsible Journalism, supra note 98, at 132; REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 60; T.
WICKER, supra note 34, at 77.
249. The term was apparently coined by James Reston in 1955 during congresssional
testimony on government information. M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 170. See also
PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 27-28; J. ALTSCHULL, supra note 120, at 70-71 (defin-
ing "news management" as a form of "social control" involving attempt to tailor a benefi-
cial image of reality); W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 35. As Michael Schudson has put it,
"management of information has been an organized, funded, and staffed function of gov-
ernment for just sixty years." M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 163. See D. CATER, supra
note 54, at 21. Of all the parts of government, the White House has the best opportunity
for managing the news and controlling the flow of information. IMPACT, supra note 4, at
132-33. See also Winfield, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Efforts to Influence the News During
His First Term Press Conferences, 11 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 189 (1981).
250. M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 163; J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 125-30. See
generally A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 47 (describing presidential supremacy in foreign and
domestic affairs).
251. See G. JUERGENS, supra note 58, at 6; M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 3-11, 121-
22, 151-59 (describing the norm of objectivity as the post-World War I reaction to skepti-
cism and loss of faith in the pure character of facts); F. MARBUT, supra note 88, at 236;
McDonald, supra note 237, at 81. The trend toward objectivity can be observed as early as
1865, but it was not until the 1930's that 80% of the news stories could be characterized as
objective. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 217. Some commentators suggest an
economic motivation behind the move to reportorial objectivity, in that objective reporting
would appeal to a wider audience of readers with differing political views. See, e.g., E.
LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 72; supra note 237.
252. While reporters in the 1880's and 1890's received popular acclaim, they viewed
themselves, and were viewed, as raffish, colorful, cynical, and individualistic; they were not
members of the social elite. See P. CLARKE & S. EVANS, supra note 221, at 2; G. JUERGENS,
supra note 58, at 9-10; E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 72-73 (discussing objectivity as pro-
moting repectability); M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 68-70, 86-7, 112-14, 153; Green-
field, Ethics: For Wimps Only?, in JOURNALISM ETHICS: WHY CHANGE? 49 (D. Ramsey, D.
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ideal of objectivity led to a journalistic self-perception of inde-
pendence.2 5 Yet, ironically, the press' embrace of objective jour-
nalism and its rejection of an interpretive or explanatory ap-
proach to news writing led reporters to act as mere mouthpieces
of government.25 4 This was due to the fact that objective journal-
Shaps & E. Bassett eds. 1986) ("No journalist in training can ever forget that image out of
'The Front Page,' where misrepresentation and lying and generally having a high old time,
was sort of looked on as a kind of attractive self-image. It's the roguish image of the out-
law."); Schmuhl, Introduction: The Road to Responsibility, in THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
JOURNALISM 1-3 (R. Schmul ed. 1984); Weaver, The New Journalism and the Old, in ETH-
ICS AND THE PRESS 97-98 (1975) (characterizing journalism as a low prestige profession
until the 1960's).
In contrast to their predecessors, journalists today are generally highly-educated, ur-
bane, very well paid, and often famous. See D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 142-43; H. GOOD-
WIN, supra note 34, at 285; MEDIA ELITE, supra note 96, at 21-28; REPORTERS, supra note
36, at 82-87. They are no longer part of the "pariah caste" with which Max Weber identi-
fied them in 1918. See REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 116; Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 247, at 96.
253. See, e.g., D. HALLIN, supra note 243, at 7; ETHICAL CONNECTION, supra note 217, at
12; see also M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 134-59 (suggesting that the belief in objectiv-
ity and its attendant independence developed, ironically, because of the press' dawning
realization-in light of the growth of public relations and government propaganda during
and after World War I-that facts could be manufactured and that values were arbitrary).
The increasing importance of reporters, a consequence of objective journalism, changed
the character of some of the earlier newspapers which had been little more than extensions
of their high-profile editors and publishers. G. JUERGENS, supra note 58, at 9.
254. To the extent that objectivity requires journalists to simply "mirror reality"-and
particularly the reality as staged by government actors-it often stands in conflict with
the journalistic goal of holding government accountable. R. ENTMAN, supra note 221, at 40;
T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 3, 5-7, 36-37 ("[o]bjective journalism preserved . . . the offi-
cial record" and almost always favored establishment positions). Eric Sevareid charged, for
example, that most journalists during the McCarthy era simply and "objectively" reported
the Senator's charges, thus legitimating them, because their reportorial philosophy of ob-
jectivity did not permit any contextualization, interpretation, or assessment. See D. CATER,
supra note 54, at 73, 106-07 (quoting Sevareid); see also R. ENTMAN, supra note 221, at 37-
38 (1989) ("[o]bjectivity .... facilitates the manipulation of news slant"); D. BRODER,
supra note 34, at 137-39; ETHICAL CONNECTION, supra note 217, at 12; E. LAMBETH, supra
note 34, at 73; M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 167-68; McDonald, supra note 237, at 81;
Weaver, supra note 252, at 96.
Critics of "objective" journalism have by now established a consensus in the journalistic
community that reporters "are not simply neutral conduits of information and facts" and
that the work of journalism "is an unavoidably active, selective, and interpretive process."
ETHICAL CONNECTION, supra note 217, at 35. See generally READING THE NEWS, supra note
2; infra notes 307-12 and accompanying text. A recognition of.the perils of "objective"
reporting led to the development of what some have called "interpretive reporting" in the
mid-1950's. D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 135-39. Interpretive reporting required journal-
ists not only to recount simple facts, but also to explain their meaning or place them in
context. Id. at 139. Despite the growth of such interpretive approaches to journalism, how-
ever, the Cold War press was still relatively uncritical of government. See infra notes 264-
65 and accompanying text.
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ism required journalists to relate not their own experiences or un-
derstanding of events, but the perceptions of authoritative par-
ticipants. 255 News stories thus effectively reflected reality through
the eyes of powerful news sources. 256 Due at least in part to the
strictures of objective style, most coverage of government until
the 1970's was drawn from official government press releases, offi-
cial proceedings, and news conferences.257
Second, technological and competitive characteristics of mass
communication enabled government officials and other sources of
news to package events in a manner most suited to the media.258
255. Sigal, supra note 239, at 12, 15.
256. See, e.g., Introduction, in READING THE NEWS, supra note 2, at 8.
257. See, e.g., E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 55; N. CRAWFORD, supra note 237, at 77-78; H.
GANS,-supra note 1, at 280; D. HALLIN, supra note 243, at 71-74; L. SIGAL, supra note 37, at
104-11 (on journalistic reliance on routine channels of government information); Weaver,
supra note 252, at 90 (characterizing American journalism as traditionally "close to, de-
pendent upon, and cooperative with, official sources").
Capitol Hill, where the relationship between reporters and legislators has been described
as "cliquish," "cozy," "comfortable," and elitist, is a good example of "clubbiness" and
intimacy between the press and government. D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 214-19. Accord-
ing to Broder, this clubbiness, with its attendant promotion of the status quo, affected the
coverage of Congress and minimized reporting on issues such as institutional reform. Id. at
216.
In even more intimate arrangements with government, several hundred journalists
worked with the Central Intelligence Agency from World War II until 1976, when George
Bush, then director of the CIA, announced that the agency would no longer enter into
contractual arrangements with United States journalists. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra
note 34, at 284-85. See also J. HULTENG, supra note 6, at 30-31; H. BRAY, supra note 120,
at 140-41; H. GOODWIN, supra note-34, at 248.
Voluntary censorship of news is an old tradition in American newspapers. See N. CRAW-
FORD, supra note 237, at 95-97. The post-World War II period, for example, contains some
striking examples of newspaper publishers voluntarily agreeing to suppress news for na-
tional security reasons. The New York Times elected to suppress the details of a story on
preparations for President Kennedy's CIA-backed Bay of Pigs invasion in a move later
characterized as "a colossal mistake" by Kennedy himself. D. BRODER, supra note 34, at
159; J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 174-79; T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 236-38; D. WISE,
supra note 39, at 176; Weaver, supra note 252, at 96-97. The New York Times also with-
held publication of the existence of Soviet missile bases in Cuba in 1962, pursuant to a
request by Kennedy. T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 235. The New York Times, of course,
displayed a more skeptical attitude toward government claims of national security when it
published the Pentagon Papers in .1971. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971). Yet, despite that action, the paper nevertheless subsequently held up
Seymour Hersh's expos6 of the CIA's cover-up of the expensive, useless, and embarassing
Glomar Explorer operation to salvage an old Soviet submarine. T. WICKER, supra note 34,
at 213-23; H. BRAY, supra note 120, at 147-48.
258. Social scientists and media watchers thus suggest that conventions of modern
newsgathering and dissemination themselves undermine the ability of the press to be truly
independent. See E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 66-68; 0. GANDY, BEYOND AGENDA SET-
TING: INFORMATION SUBSIDIES AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (1982); H. GANS, supra note 1, at 281-
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The competitive pressures to obtain scoops, the "dailiness" and
event-orientation of journalism, the stringent time deadlines, and
the convention of oral research made prepackaged news and au-
thoritative sources convenient and efficient for the press.2 59
Third, competitive and careerist motivations 'of reporters rein-
forced their reliance on powerful sources. News sources are the
gatekeepers for the very commodity on which reporters rely for
their career advancement. And they are gatekeepers who can
choose among fiercely competitive journalists in the dissemina-
tion of their information.160  Since journalistic careers can at the
very least be stalled by a reduction in information flow, it is very
risky for reporters to antagonize important government offi-
cials."' 1 Moreover, much political reporting in the late 20th Cen-
82 (explaining that powerful elites in society are the most common sources of news be-
cause they are the most efficient sources of news); L. SIGAL, supra note 37, at 190; Sigal,
supra note 239, at 15-25 (on the reliance upon authoritative sources); see also R. ENTMAN,
supra note 221, at 19-21, 115; PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 48-51; J. McGINNISS,
THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 (1969); Brown, Bybee, supra note 36, at 46. Since
broadcast news tends to be short, simplified, personalized, acontextual, and event-ori-
ented, news sources are able to package their information in ways most useable by the
broadcast news form. See R. ENTMAN, supr'a note 221, at 49-53, 59-60 (explaining news
selections on the basis of such institutional biases and the ways in which officials can
manipulate them); E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 65-68 (describing organizational con-
straints on reporting). When politicians time their actions in order to coincide with the
needs of the press and plan events for the purpose of having them reproduced, we have
the creation of what Daniel Boorstin has called "pseudo-events." See D. BOORSTIN, supra
note 2, at 21, 30; M. SCHuDSoN, supra note 225, at 170-71; see also J. HULTENG, supra note
6, at 88-89; C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 113-16; W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at
18-19; T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 168-80 (on competition, dailiness, dilettantism, and
event-orientation as limitations on press power); McDonald, supra note 237, at 78.
259. See J. HULTENG, supra note 6, at 86-87 (on the press' tendency to rely on official
sources); REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 14-23; H. GANS, supra note 1, at 116-17, 121-28,
280; Sigal, supra note 239, at 22; supra note 258.
260. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 66-67 ("They can pick and choose whom
to favor, playing one journalist off against others."); T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 129.
An ironic complement to the competitiveness of journalists is that they often exhibit
what press critic Timothy Crouse has termed "pack journalism," the tendency of reporters
assigned to the same story to focus on the same issues and reach identical interpretive
conclusions. See T. CROUSE, supra note 96, at 7 (coining the term to characterize the be-
havior of reporters covering the 1972 presidential candidates); see also W. RIVERS, supra
note 39, at 222 (discussing Ben Bagdikian's use of the herd metaphor for political report-
ing); REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 130-31. Pack journalism can be as useful as journalistic
competitiveness for public officials and-candidates who wish to manage the news. E. LAM-
BETH, supra note 34, at 108; H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 287-91.
261. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 66-67; P. STOLER, supra note 86, at 127
(characterizing Washington reporters as "captives of their sources" because of their need
for access); B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at 27; T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 129, 134-35; D.
WISE, supra note 39, at 242, 310. Press and VerBurg suggest that the timidity of the estab-
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tury is organized on the "beat" basis, with reporters having par-
ticular sectors of responsibility over relatively long periods of
time.262 Journalists who cover the power elite, particularly on
such a long-term basis, run the risk of being co-opted by their
sources and adopting their views.263
Finally, the Cold War press' uncritical reliance on government
was based on a certain naivete.26' This is not to say that the press
was entirely unaware of governmental attempts to control the
news flow. Rather, it indicates a naive belief that the government,
although it might sometimes suppress or "manage" the news
available to the public at large, would nevertheless stop short of
lying to the press itself.263
A more explicitly competitive, critical, and adversarial stance
toward government developed in the late 1960's and early
lished Washington press is demonstrated by the fact that the Watergate scandal was un-
covered by a pair of young, unknown reporters who presumably had little to lose. C. PRESS
& K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 66-67. See also B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at 15 (on the
"debilitative allurements" of intimacy with the powerful which had not yet attacked
Woodward and Bernstein).
262. See REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 47; H. GANS, supra note 1, at 131-38.
263. See, e.g., H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 114-17; B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at 15-16
(quoting Molly Ivins of the Texas Observer on the dangers of becoming a "power
groupie"); T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 42, 131-32 .(characterizing as "the deadliest en-
emy" of the Washington reporter the "desire to be recognized, to have access where others
are denied, to be on the inside, a part of things, to belong to the world of power and
influence and decision, no matter how peripherally"); J. HULTENG, supra note 6, at 84-85;
E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 107; REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 65; B. SWAIN, supra note
36, at 30-32; Sigal, supra note 239, at 28-29. Historically, some prominent journalists have
become such close friends with presidents and other officials that they have advised them
on policy and even written speeches for them. See, e.g., Id. at 352-56. The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that national reporters themselves have become part of the media
elite and are in many ways members of the privileged class in modern society. Id. at 32.
See also R. ENTMAN, supra note 221, at 18. Thus, despite the romantic allure of muckrak-
ing and investigative journalism, see E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 116, the fact is that
journalists today are members of the establishment. See REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 118
("one elite reports on another elite"); T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 182 (characterizing the
American press as a part of the free enterprise Establishment); supra note 252.
264. This naivete was consistent with the existence of much bi-partisan support for ad-
ministration policy and a broad consensus on foreign policy in the decades from Truman
through Kennedy. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 29; D. HALLIN, supra note 243, at 8-9.
265. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 40 (on journalistic trust of the government prior to the
1960's); H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 248-49 (noting the difference for journalists be-
tween cooperating with government to suppress news from the public and themselves be-
ing lied to by government); M. SCHuDsoN, supra note 225, at 172-73. It was a revelation of
sorts to the press about its own role when Arthur Sylvester, a defense spokesperson during
the Kennedy and Johnson, administrations, explicitly articulated, in connection with the
Cuban missile crisis, the government's "inherent right ... to lie" in 1962. See M. SCHUD-
SON, supra note 225, at 171-72; D. WISE, supra note 39, at 39.
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1970's26e when the exposure of systematic government disinforma-
tion campaigns and the scandal of Watergate eroded confidence
in government.2 67 The norm of objectivity in reporting was criti-
266. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 29; IMPACT, supra note 4, at 41-46; H. BRAY, supra note
120, at 113-14. Press critics of the early 1970's characterized the growth of an "adversary
culture" hostile to the government. D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 140-41. See also M.
SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 163. This adversarialism affected the establishment' press
and gave rise to an alternative, underground press as well. D. BRODER, supra note 34, at
14-41; M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 481-83.
Attempts to ferret out wrongdoing-which necessarily pitted journalists against those in
government who did not wish their activites exposed-naturally existed prior to the late
20th Century. Benjamin Franklin's brother James printed "without authority" and en-
gaged in "crusade" journalism. W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 119. So did many of the yel-
low sheets of the 1890's. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 250-60. The "muckrak-
ers" of the first decade of the 20th Century-so named by Theodore
Roosevelt-systematically used magazines to expose corruption. W. RIVERS, supra note 39,
at 119-20; M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 260-64, 486-87; D. BRODER, supra
note 34, at 139. Newspapers during the New Deal exposed abuses in public welfare pro-
grams and their successors during World War II turned their criticism to wartime
profiteers and their Washington allies. Id. at 139. All of these crusading reporters were the
precursors of today's investigative journalists. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at
486-87.
267. An early example of the exposure of such government disinformation concerned
the now-famous U-2 incident in 1960. There, the government's claim that it was not using
the secret U-2 plane to spy on the Soviet Union's strategic missiles was publicly proved
false when the Soviets captured both a downed U-2 and its pilot. M. EMERY & E. EMERY,
supra note 225, at 422; J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 155-56; H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at
248; D. WISE, supra note 39, at 33-35. Unlike the U-2 affair, in which the Eisenhower
administration was quickly forced to admit that it had lied, the CIA's support of coups in
Guatemala and Indonesia in the 1950's was covered up until much later. See id. at 36; J.
DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 162.
James Deakin has called the Eisenhower years the "Age of Innocence" for the media, a
period in which even the revelation of the U-2 incident would be interpreted as simply a
"hasty improvisation," rather than an "element[] in a grand mosaic of lies." Id. The Age of
Innocence drew to a close after Eisenhower and Kennedy, when governmental lies to the
press came to be perceived as systematic. See generally J. ORMAN, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY
AND DECEPTION: BEYOND THE POWER TO PERSUADE (1980) (describing presidential secrecy
and deception from the Kennedy through Ford administrations). There are a number of
striking examples of government disinformation and non-disclosure arising out of the Viet-
nam War, for example. Unbeknownst to the public, the United States, chiefly through the
CIA, supported the coup against South Vietnamese President Diem in 1963. D. WISE,
supra note 39, at 40-41; S. HERSH,.supra note 82, at 128, 424-25 (describing "knowledge
and acquiescence of the 'American Embassy and White House" in the coup). Reporters
and the public only discovered in late 1967 and early 1968 that Lyndon JohnSon did not
disclose significant evidence, of which he was aware, that reports of North Vietnamese
torpedo attacks on American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964 might well have been
erroneous. Instead, he used the alleged attacks to justify air strikes against North Vietnam
and to trigger the carte blanche of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. See D. HALLIN, supra note
243, at 15-22; P. STOLER, supra note 86, at 58-60; T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 152; D.
WISE, supra note 39, at. 43-46, 345. Until the information was leaked to the New York
Times, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger used the press to falsely deny America's "se-
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cized as a simple legitimation of power, privilege, and the status
quo.268 Some claim that, in addition to external events, the rise in,
status and prestige of the media also empowered the press to em-.
brace an adversarial role.2 69 This increased level of distrust led to
a rise in investigative reporting1 0 and an asserted reduction in
cret war" in Cambodia. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 509, 515-16; S. HERSH,
supra note 82, at 54, 191; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 47, at 356-57; T. WICKER, supra note
34, at 200-01. Many have claimed that the size and effectiveness of enemy forces were
underreported by military officials during the. war in order to present a picture of the
conflict more favorable to the American military. See, e.g., T. WICKER,.supra note 34, at
161-62; D. MINOR, THE INFORMATION WAR 42-55, 70-74 (1970) (generally discussing statisti-
cal manipulation during the Vietnam War).
Government non-disclosures, cover-ups, and disinformation campaigns did not stop with
the Vietnam War. Watergate-as well as the more recent Iran/Contra affair-represent
subsequent examples of illegal activities and cover-ups reaching to the highest levels in
government. And with respect to disinformation, it was later disclosed that the Reagan
administration had used the press in 1986 to publicize false stories of an imminent Ameri-
can attack on Libya as part of a disinformation campaign to keep Muammar Ghadafi
guessing as to American intentions. See D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 191-92.
The discovery of such governmental lies and omissions naturally led to cynicism on the
part of reporters. The Johnson administration was popularly characterized as having a
"credibility gap." D. WISE, supra note 39, at 22-23. Toward the end of the Johnson presi-
dency, for example, the following joke made the journalistic rounds:
Do you know how to tell when Lyndon Johnson is not telling the truth? Well,
when he goes like this-finger beside his nose-he's telling the truth. When he
goes like this-pulling his ear-he's telling the truth. And when he goes like
this-stroking his chin-he's telling the truth. But when he starts moving his
lips, he's not telling the truth.
W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 40-41. See also id. at 229-31 (quoting reporters on their
heightened skepticism subsequent to Vietnam and Watergate); P. STOLER, supra note 86,
at 65; T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 15-17, 60-62; D. WISE, supra note 39, at 175. Some of
these cynical and skeptical attitudes on the part of the press were due in part to a realiza-
tion by journalists that "the press had 'tended to cooperate in its own deception." T.
WICKER, supra note 34, at 61.
This is not to say that American history prior to the Eisenhower administration was
devoid of government lies or misleading statements. Commentators suggest two differences
between the past and the present in this connection: (1) that the 'amount of government
misinformation grew significantly after World War II, making deception systematic and
regular; and (2) that large numbers of people became aware of such government deception
only since the 1960's. See D. WISE, supra note 39, at 24-30, 342-43 (quoting Max Frankel).
268. J. ALTSCHULL, supra note 120, at 126-29; M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 160-63.
269. See MEDIA ELITE, supra note 96, at 27-28. Nevertheless, as noted by the authors of
The Media Elite, it is difficult to draw a single conclusion from the enhanced status of-the
media. Id. While one could surmise that journalists' elite status has diminished the need
for deference to government, one could also reach the opposite, conclusion, based on the
observations that they now have more to lose and are less likely to identify, with the views
of non-elites.
270. See M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 486; M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225,
at 189-91.
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reliance on government's official releases.171 Still, the government
continued to use the press to spread false and misleading infor-
mation 272  The systemic and institutional factors which led the
271. Despite such a reduction in uncritical reliance on official press releases and sources,
mainstream and official sources are still used by news organizations for practical consider-
ations such as cost, ease, and convenience. R. ENTMAN, supra note 221, at 18-19; C. PRESS
& K. VERBURO, supra note 34, at 77; D. HALLIN, supra note 243, at 71-75; T. WICKER,
supra note 34, at 17, 72, 174-80; Brown, Bybee, supra note 36, at 51 (finding that use of
routine channels was high in national newspaper stories on government (63.3%), politics
(57.3%), and the economy (73.9%)). Reporters in the "outer ring" of news organizations in
Washington have limited access to newsmakers and have to rely on official information.
REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 27-28. Similarly, even within the inner ring, White House
correspondents (more than others) have to rely on government public information officials
because the White House is a controlled environment with limited access to sources and
scheduled events. Id. at 60. In addition, newspapers in small cities and towns are less
likely to be independent or investigative. T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 22. Many regional
and local newspapers reprint or rely substantially on the press releases issued by members
of Congress for their districts. Id. at 221-22. See also D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 234-36;
ETHICAL CONNECTION, supra note 217, at 17-18 (characterizing relationships between legis-
lators and state and local press as "very cozy"); L. CANNON, REPORTING: AN INSIDE VIEW
(1977); Cook, Show Horses in House Elections, in CAMPAIGNS IN THE NEWS 175-76 (J.P.
Vermeer ed. 1987). But see Brown, Bybee, supra note 36, at 51 (stating that local newspa-
pers were less dependent on routine channels in areas of politics and health than were
national outlets).
272. Although, as indicated above, many disinformation campaigns and informational
lapses by government were subsequently uncovered, it took the press a long time to recog-
nize that it had been misled. See R. ENTMAN, supra note 221, at 4 (challenging press cover-
age of the Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan administrations as "too little, too obscure, too
late"); D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 167 (noting that most reporters ignored Watergate at
the beginning and that White House press corps "served as a conduit for . . , a systematic
set of official lies about the case"); M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 511; M.
HERTSGAARD, supra note 3, at 302-16 (on press passivity regarding the Iran/Contra affair);
E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 108 (blaming pack journalism for delays in recognizing the
meanings of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and Watergate); T. WICKER, supra note 34, at
60-61 (blaming timidity of most of the press at the beginning of Watergate in part on the
press' belief in the power of the presidential mystique).
Critics claim, for example, that journalists believed and reported false government re-
ports about the progress of the Vietnam War for too long. See R. ENTMAN, supra note 221,
at 5; D. HALLIN, supra note 243. It was only when Harrison Salisbury reported from Hanoi
the bombing of civilian installations in North Vietnam in 1966 that the press in general
started to be more critical about official reports of the military conflict. M. EMERY & E.
EMERY, supra note 225, at 476; H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 249. Similarly, the press
accepted at face value Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's early, false assurances that
the United States was not bombing Laos or Cambodia. See S. HERSH, supra note 82, at 54;
D. WISE, supra note 39, at 344 (on the secret war in Laos). Journalists, blindly following
official handouts, failed to understand the unrest in Iran before the overthrow of the Shah.
P. STOLER, supra note 86, at 89-91. The press' failure to quickly grasp the significance of
events can also be seen to some extent in the Watergate affair, during which the media,
with the exception of the Washington Post, only provided sporadic reports in the 1972
election year. See R. ENTMAN, supra note 221, at 5-6; P. STOLER, supra note 86, at 83-84;
K. LANG & G. LANG, THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC OPINION: THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESS, AND THE
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press in the past to rely on government and official information
had not fundamentally changed. 7 3 Reporters still had over-
whelming incentives to rely upon authoritative sources in order to
make and explain news.17 ' The adversarial press did act as a
check on government in many instances, but it also led to the
development of a more complex-and often more problem-
..atic-type of dependence on confidential sources .2 7 The particu-
lar problems associated with anonymity became even more cen-
tral when the universe of sources was expanded to include voices
critical of official policy.
All this is not to say that the press, notwithstanding its protes-
tations, is simply an unwitting slave to masterful politicians and
government officials. The simple fact is that sources need the
press. Politicians and government bureaucrats, not to mention
business interests, seek favorable, predictable, and frequent press
coverage .2 7  News coverage reaches a large percentage of the pub-
POLLS DURING WATERGATE (1983). Similarly, despite sporadic stories before November,
1986, the media as a whole accepted until then the Reagan administration's denials of
Colonel Oliver North's activities on behalf of the Nicaraguan contras. See R. ENTMAN,
supra note 221, at 6-7, 68-74 and sources cited therein. See generally M. HERTSGAARD,
supra note 3.
273. See supra notes 245-63 and accompanying text. Indeed, some contend that the
critical impulse and the adversarial character of the press only become evident when gov-
ernmental policies are already sharply contested and when government itself is deeply
split. See, e.g., M. HERTSGAARD, supra note 3, at 93-96; D. HALLIN, supra note 243, at 9-11.
274. See, e.g., R. ENTMAN, supra note 221, at 3, 7-8, 19-20; ETHICAL CONNECTION, supra
note 217, at 13; D. HALLIN, supra note 243, at 71-75; E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 5;
Epstein, supra note 76, at 60; Weaver, supra note 252, at 91-93; Schudson, supra note. 2,
at 80-81.
Admittedly, the construction of news is an interactive process; journalists are not merely
passive observers and reporters of events. See J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 316-17; READ-
ING THE NEWS, supra note 2, at 3-4. The press often does have an effect on the policymak-
ing process, at least to the extent that officials respond to the media. See Practicing Re-
sponsible Journalism, supra note 98, at 133-38 (describing interaction between the press
and the Carter administration on Love Canal relocation). Yet, this cannot deny the cen-
trality of the primary actors in news events. J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 317-18; REPORT-
ERS, supra note 36, at 134; B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at 3 (quoting press commentator Will
Irwin on the hearsay nature of journalism); Sigal, supra note 239, at 12, 15. News events
are initially determined by governments or "natural forces," not reporters, but the form of
events increasingly adjusts to the needs of the media. These accommodations necessarily
affect the nature of the events. REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 134. See infra notes 307-11
and accompanying text.
275. See infra Section III. B., discussing the dangers of confidentiality.
276. Press attention is critical for politicians running for office who need to generate
public recognition and support. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 11; J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at
81; Cook, supra note 271, at 161-62. Elected officials need publicity in order to promote
their programs and future candidacies. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 130, 133-35. Appointed
688 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:609
lic, appears more disinterested than paid advertisements, and is
thought to influence public opinion."' At the same time, there
are many possible sources of information on many matters, and
there is more news than can possibly be covered by any newspa-
per or broadcaster in any given day. Sources' need for the press
thus gives reporters significant leverage and often permits them
to take a critical stance toward politicians and government offi-
cials. 78 Yet, the direct and indirect power of the political estab-
lishment often weights the symbiotic relationship against the
press.2 79
Therefore, the current story of the press and the institutions on
officials, bureaucrats, and members of regulatory agencies also need favorable publicity, if
only .to perform their functions and influence the allocation of governmental resources to
their organizations. See id. at 11; ETHICAL CONNECTION, supra note 217, at 13 (on Con-
gress' need for the media). Indeed, an empirical study indicates that over 75% of senior
government officials actively engage in press relations and very few at the highest levels of
government are not involved. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 83. Both politicians and bureaucrats
employ professionals to garner favorable media attention. The White House employs the
White House press secretary as well as other public relations specialists to orchestrate the
dissemination of news. J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 55-59, 206-14. Members of Congress
have staffs to handle publicity. D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 234. Administrative agencies
have public information officers. See generally IMPACT, supra note 4. Political campaigns
increasingly rely on media consultants. See supra notes 2 and 3. Organizations in the pri-
vate sector also have representatives and lobbyists in Washington. Skilled staffs are em-
ployed by corporations, trade associations, civic groups, and educational institutions to
generate favorable publicity with press releases. J. HULTENG, supra note 6, at 134. All
these professionals-many of them former working journalists-put the best possible
"spin" on information they provide journalists. See D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 146.
Ironically, in view of the size and complexity of modern government, officials also need
the media in order to obtain information about government itself. See IMPACT, supra note
4, at 70, 84; W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 11-12, 18-19.
277. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 5-8. And since the development of the
mass media, elites are more attentive to general public opinion than to party standing. R.
ENTMAN, supra note 221, at 127.
278. J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 85-93.
279. In terms of press "victories," a rather facetious, although probably correct, accotint
suggests that "it takes combined bad luck, inattention, blunders, political treachery, and
perhaps even an inclination -to commit political hara-kiri for the relationship to turn
against the politician." C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 67. See also N. ISAACS,
supra note 3, at 54 (characterizing the relationship between reporters and public officials
as "purely the angling of baited hooks, with the fingers of politicians firmly on the rods
and lines"); W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 13. Particularly in connection with the presi-
dency, the White House press machine is thought by reporters to have "won" the way the
president is covered most of the time since the Eisenhower presidency, with the exception
of the Carter Administration's handling of the hostage affair. D. BRODER, supra note 34, at
194-95. This is in no small part due to the fact that staffing, financial, and deadline limita-
tions on many press organizations give the upper hand to the very large and sophisticated
government public relations machine. See, e.g., T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 72.
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which it reports is multi-faceted. The press is both critical of gov-
ernment and interdependent with it. Journalists have a profound
effect on agenda-setting and policymaking, °80 and news sources
have a profound effect on the content of reported news. Shrill
claims of complete independence and adversarialism, although
personally and institutionally satisfyifig to journalists,"'1 do not
accurately depict the complex reality of the press' role. Collec-
tively, it is a combination of adversarialism and cooperation; indi-
vidually, it differs depending on the relationship of particular re-
porters and sources.28 2 A realistic image of the press requires the
recognition of the simultaneously powerless and powerful charac-
ter of modern media.283
280. See IMPACT, supra note 4, at 32-36, 79-81, 84-86, 112-18 (96% of senior federal
policymakers polled found that press had impact on federal policy); Practicing Responsi-
ble Journalism, supra note 98, at 139-40; supra note 221.
281. See, e.g., E. LAMBETH; supra note 34, at 97-98 (noting journalistic popularity of
self-description as adversarial).
One commentator has interestingly explained the press' adversarial attitude and claimed
hostility toward government by the psychoanalytic notion of reaction formation, according
to which the subject vehemently denies precisely the thing which most influences his con-
duct. See Pool, Newsmen and Statesmen: Adversaries or Cronies?, in ASPEN NOTEBOOK ON
-GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA 15 (W. Rivers & M. Nyhah eds. 1973); IMPACT, supra note 4,
at 17. Yet another commentator has characterized the myth of a truly autonomous press
more positively-as a "functional" myth which may help newspeople resist the temptation
of "cooptation" by sources. D. WEAVER & G. WILHOIT, supra'note 61, at 95. Still another
approach is to view adversarialism as a way for reporters to distance themselves from poli-
cymaking, in order not to bear any responsibility for the impact of their reporting on
government. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 19; Practicing Responsible Journalism, supra note
98, at 138.
282. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 18.
283. O'Neill, supra note 221, at 32.
The national media are now no longer just observers and messengers but lead
actors in government, creating, shaping, and often distorting the informational
base of decision-making, magnifying as well as reporting the conflicts of power,
advocating, nagging, and harassing as well as explaining. They are the targets of
manipulation by every party to every issue, the objects of guile and deception,
the victims of conflicting pressures, witting and -unwitting participants in the
management of crisis and in the formation of policy, both the collaborators and
adversaries of government.
See also R. ENTMAN, supra note 221, at 7-9 (noting "the paradoxical coexistence of jour-
nalistic vulnerability . .. with the growing power of the press"); C. PRESS & K. VERBURG,
supra note 34, at 21 (describing the relationship of press and politicians as one of
"guarded cooperation"); E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 5 (characterizing consensus view
that strict media independence is a "myth"); J. 'ALTSCHULL, supra note 120, at 253; J.
DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 53 ("Journalists are inescapably manipulated by the government
in the ordinary process -of gathering and reporting news."); D. WEAVER & G. WILHOIT,
supra note 61, at 95 (image of completely-independent journalists is a "romantic myth");
Practicing Responsible Journalism, supra note 98, at 140 ("The engagement [between the
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B. The Types of Dangers Posed by Confidential Sources
Confidential communications are the medium of exchange be-
tween reporters and government officials because there are signi-
ficant incentives for reporters to use confidential communications
widely. One obvious incentive is the concern that at least some
important stories would be less likely to emerge without promises
of anonymity to the source.
But there are additional incentives which lead to the excessive
use of confidentiality. First, given the tradition of confidential
communications even in connection with trivial stories, it would
be difficult for a reporter to succeed in the competitive climate of
political reporting without using confidentiality as an induce-
ment.28' A scoop from a source on an important story may well
mean a Pulitzer prize for the reporter and boosted circulation for
her newspaper.2 85 A -carefully cultivated long-term relationship
with an important source can provide a reporter entree into "the
big leagues," both in government and in journalism.88 Second, re-
press and government] is competitive, but collegial nonetheless."); T. WICKER, supra note
34, at 18, 259-60 (on the simultaneous power and timidity of the press, and its longing for
respectability in the established political and economic order).
In addition, one cannot discuss the power of the press without noting the many forms of
government harassment the press has been subjected to in the past 30 years. See, e.g., D.
BRODER, supra note 34, at 165 (recounting examples of Nixon administration attempts to
coerce press); S. HERSH, supra note 82, at 91-97 (describing Secretary of State Kissinger's
use of wiretaps to discover identity of leakers).
284. See supra note 260. There are, after all, many other reporters in Washington, and a
source could easily find one who would be willing to promise anonymity in return for
information. The reporter less willing to adhere to the traditional norms of confidential
discourse would then be at a significant competitive disadvantage. The Washington Post
quickly learned this lesson when it declined to send reporters to background briefings,
only to find that other news organizations failed to support its boycott. See infra note 296.
285. See D. WISE, supra note 39, at 310. Modern press organs are businesses, subject to
the same competitive pressures as the ordinary enterprise in American society. See gener-
ally B. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (1987). Their success as businesses hinges on
their audience reach. Reporting a "hot" story, getting an "exclusive," or "scooping" the
competition by being the first to report a story are all deemed ways of increasing audience
reach and advancing competitive position. See, e.g., E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 67.
Exclusive, important stories benefit both the careers of individual reporters and the stand-
ing of their press employers. C. PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 15-16.
286. See, e.g., T. WICKER, supra note 34, at 132. It can do so in a variety of ways. First,
the reporter can rise in his own institution or create opportunities to advance to more
prestigious institutions if he is well connected with news sources who provide important
information. Second, access to important newsmakers puts the reporter into the elite of
those who know and shape policy. Reporters seek proximity to "powerful and colorful
people." REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 52. Third, and in view of the revolving door be-
tween journalism and government, connections in the power elite may well advance the
690
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porters, like others, are not immune to the romance and allure of
having secrets2 8 7 Many post-Watergate reporters seek to mold
themselves in the heroic and glamorous image of intrepid investi-
gative journalists who break earthshaking stories on the basis of
tips by anonymous sources.2" Third,. to the extent that reporters
are allowed to withhold source identities, even from their editors,
reporters gain autonomy within their organizations. 89 Finally, re-
porters recognize that much more work against tight deadlines
would be required in order to gather information more easily and
conveniently obtained from a source in exchange for
confidentiality.""o
Despite the many incentives to rely on confidential sources, the
journalistic community recognizes that anonymity presents an op-
portunity for highly invidious consequences. However unrealisti-
cally, the industry-wide code of ethics" 1 for the newspaper indus-
journalist's mobility into high-echelon public positions. See, e.g., D. BRODER, supra note
34, at 146-47, 359-64; W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 98 (stating that many government
"flaks" are recruited from the Washington press corps). Moreover, by participating in
small background sessions-with their attribution limitations-the included reporters can
feel more privileged than excluded members of the journalistic corps. Wallach, supra note
103, at 53.
287. One commentator suggests that there is a "mystique" to the use of confidential
sources, as increasing numbers of reporters come to believe that their reports will be
"more interesting and dramatic if they contain a secret source or two." H. GooDwIN, supra
note 34, at 122-23. See N. ISAACS, supra note 3, at 52.
288. H. BRAY, supra note i20, at 135; M. SCHUDSON, supra note 225, at 188, 191; T.
WICKER, supra note 34, at 15, 145-46.
289. REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 20.
290. See B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at 50 (quoting Larry Batson of the Minneapolis Trib-
une); see also H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 123.
291. Associations of journalists have adopted several codes of ethics since the early 20th
Century. The ethics code of the Kansas Editorial Association, adopted in 1910, was repor-
tedly the first such document. H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 14. A number of state press
associations, as well as individual newspapers, followed suit. Id. The American Society of
Newspaper Editors ("ASNE") adopted the first national code of ethics in 1923. Id. Simi-
larly, the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, adopted a code in 1926. Id.;
Schmuhl, supra note 252, at 3. Both of those associations later revised their codes-ASNE
in 1975 and Sigma Delta Chi in 1973. Id. at 7-8; H. GoODWIN, supra note 34, at 14-15. The
Radio-Television News Directors Association ("RTNDA") has also adopted a code, appli-
cable to broadcast journalists. Id. at 130; P. MEYER, supra note 102, at 17-24.
The early codes were no more than general ethical statements which served as aspira-
tional norms. H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 14. Most did not address the issue of confi-
dential sources specifically. See N. CRAWFORD, supra note 237, at 183-240 (reproducing
various early codes). Like the current codes, they had no enforcement mechanisms. H.
GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 14. An early attempt (in 1924) to have reporters expelled from
or censured by ASNE for violation of its code did not carry a majority of the membership
and no such sanctions have been imposed since. Id. at 14-15; P. MEYER, supra note 102, at
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try counsels caution in the grant of promises of confidentiality.2 2
Similarly, most major news organizations have policies discoura-
ging the practice.2 93 Nevertheless, numerous journalists and edi-
tors claim that the practice of granting confidentiality has been
18. See generally Note, Standards Governing the News: Their Use, Their Character, and
Their Legal Implications, 72 IOWA L. REV. 637, 637-42 (1987) [hereinafter Iowa Note] (on
journalistic attitudes regarding industry-wide standards of ethics).
292. The Statement of Principles of ASNE states that "[piledges of confidentiality to
news sources must be honored at all costs, and therefore should not be given lightly. Un-
less there is a clear and pressing need to maintain confidences, sources of information
should be identified." American Society of Newspaper Editors, Statement of Principles,
Article VI Fair Play (Oct. 23, 1975), quoted in Iowa Note, supra note 291, at 695-96. Simi-
lar references to confidentiality exist in the policy statements of the wire services and
many news organizations. The Code of Ethics of the Associated Press Managing Editors
Association, for example, states that "[niews sources should be disclosed unless there is
clear reason not to dc' so. When it is necessary to protect the confidentiality of a source the
reason should be explained." Associated Press Managing Editors Association Code of Eth-
ics, Responsibility (Apr. 15, 1975).
293. Jones, supra note 160, at 22; T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 219-21 (referring to
findings of a 1983 study conducted by the ethics committee of ASNE); H. GOODWiN, supra
note 34, at 16-17, 124-26, 130-32. See generally Iowa Note, supra note 291, at 642-49 (dis-
cussing the adoption of written standards by news organizations).
For instance, the editor of The Los Angeles Times issued a memorandum in 1982 stating
that "[u]nnamed sources should not be used unless there is no other way to get needed
information in the story . . . . When we do use them, we should give the reader all the
information we can-short of indirectly identifying the source-that establishes his or her
credibility. ... Memorandum from William Thomas, quoted in T. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 34, at 219-20. The Louisville Times and Courier Journal-whose policies have appa-
rently been copied by many other news organs-requires that "extreme caution" be exer-
cised in the use of anonymous sources; that the reason for the source's anonymity be ex-
plained in the story; that information from an anonymous source be confirmed with other
sources; and that anonymous sources not be allowed to attack anyone's character or credi-
bility in print. H. GOODWIN, supra note 34, at 130-31 (quoting Louisville Times and Cou-
rier Journal policies). The same sort of conditional approval of the use of confidential
sources can be found in the policy statements of the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Washing-
ton Post, the Associated Press, and the television networks. Id. at 131-32. The New York
Times forbids the use of anonymous pejorative remarks and does not permit direct quotes
by unnamed sources. T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 220.
Many news organizations try to ensure the accuracy of their unidentified sources by
requiring additional cross-checks whenever possible. Poll Finds Editors Split on Naming
of Sources, supra note 179, at 22. Moreover, many now require their reporters to provide
their editors and producers with the names of unidentified sources, either as a matter of
course or upon request by the editors on sensitive stories. See, e.g., National News Coun-
cil, Who Said That?, A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL ON THE USE OF UNIDENTI-
FIED SOURCES 2, 7 (1983). A study by the ethics committee of ASNE in 1983 concluded
that newspapers generally had adopted a rule requiring reporters to disclose their sources
to their editors. T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 219. See also H. GOODWIN, supra note 34,
at 125-26. At the New York Daily News, for example, lead editors were instructed after
the discovery of reportorial deceptions at other news organizations, see infra note 296, that
they had an obligation to request source identification on "sensitive" stories and to ask for
corroboration of the source's information. T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 217-18.
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abused by the press.294 They suggest that confidentiality be
294. See E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 39; N. ISAACS, supra note 3, at 52-54; Foreman, Confi-
dential Sources: Testing the Readers' Confidence, 10 Soc. RESP.: JOURNALISM, L. & MED.
24 (1984); Adler, Reflections on Political Scandal, N.Y. Times Book Rev., Dec. 8, 1977, at
20. Further complicating the picture is the fact that editors and publishers may, for insti-
tutional reasons, be less willing than journalists to use confidential sources.
At some level, there is an inherent ambivalence in the relationships between reporters
and editors. See D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 311-12 ("Editors are friends and adversa-
ries."); L. SIGAL, supra note 37, at 20-31, 49-52. Editors clearly represent the newspapers
and broadcast entities-the institutions-by which they are employed. Although many of
their decisions are dictated by their own news judgments, they are part of the manage-
ment of the news organization. See B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at 33. While they are often
former reporters, they have achieved a sufficient increase in institutional status to move
up in the hierarchy. They are not out "on the beat" gathering stories. They are not the
parties creating and nurturing relationships with sources in order to obtain information.
They do not compete with reporters. Rather, they assign scarce space to reporters who
compete with one another for it. Sometimes, "[t]hey have their own ideas of what makes a
good story and try to influence which stories a reporter pursues." D. BRODER, supra note
34, at 312.
Reporters, on the other hand, compete with one another for space in the newspaper or
time on the broadcast outlet. In order to do that, they are "whip[ped] and goad[ed]" by
editors to tie up stories and make deadlines. Id. at 311. They develop relationships with
sources and participate directly in the gathering of news. Their focus is on their own sto-
ries rather than the contents of the newspaper as a whole. Their role is to resist their
editors' attempts to edit their pieces and undermine their independence.
The use of confidential sources may well be an area in which reporters and their editors
will clash. See, e.g., P. MEYER, supra note 102, at 209 (describing ASNE survey which
found that while 40% of staff members thought confidentiality should be kept at all costs,
only 20% of the editors thought so; survey also showed that 71% of editors, in contrast to
51% of staff members, thought that confidentiality should be breached in some unusual
circumstances). Anecdotal evidence seems to support the hypothesis of some difference
between reporters and editors on the issue of breaching confidentiality. It is clear, for
example, that in Cohen the reporters wished to keep their promises of confidentiality to
Cohen and were overborne by their editors. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying
text. The reporters presumably were thinking of their responsibility to their sources and of
their future ability to gather the news. Perhaps they were also trying to establish their own
autonomy from their editors. The editors, on the other hand, testified that they were
thinking about the integrity of the newspaper as an institution. See Oberdorfer, supra
note 11, at 8 (quoting journalism professor's view that the Cohen case was "a battle be-
tween editors and reporters"); Randolph, Editors Reporters at Odds Over Confidential
Sources, Wash. Post, June 13, 1988, at A4, col. 2 (quoting characterization of Cohen as
trial between reporters and editors). Similarly, the Editor in Chief of Newsweek stated
that the magazine's obligations to its readers required disclosure of Oliver North's identity
as a confidential source for the magazine's reporting of the Achille Lauro hijacking in
1985. He approved the disclosure over objections by Newsweek's Washington bureau.
Zuckerman, supra note 89, at 61. See also supra note 102.
When the Washington Post disclosed Henry Kissinger as the source of a 1971 deep
background story on Nixon's plans for a summit in Moscow, see supra note 102, the re-
porter on the story charged the paper with engaging in "unprofessional, unethical, cheap
journalism," while editor Ben Bradlee excoriated the background briefing as a way for
government to use the press without taking responsibility. See D. WISE, supra note 39, at
.301-02.
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granted only when absolutely necessary in order to obtain impor-
tant information. 5
Recent expressions of antipathy to grants of confidentiality
have been triggered by two events. First, revelations that ano-
nymity has been used by reporters for prestigious news organiza-
tions to mask fabrication of sources have rekindled challenges to
traditional journalistic practices of confidentiality. 96 Second, fear
Publishers, even more than editors, have the reputation and economic status of their
newspapers as a central concern. In a libel case discussed at infra note 400, for example,
the Daily News in Los Angeles ordered two of its reporters to disclose their sources. The
paper faced damages of $60 million in the suit, and the publisher argued that the survival
of the paper outweighed the reporters' promises of confidentiality. See, e.g., Friendly, Re-
porters Who Hid Identity of Sources Win Libel Ruling, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1984, at B9,
col. 1.
Nevertheless, despite these differences, both reporters and editors work for the same
institution and are rewarded commensurately with its success. It benefits both reporters
and editors for their institution to "get the scoop" on a story in advance of their competi-
tors in the marketplace. Moreover, many journalists-including David Nimmer from the
Minneapolis Star-contend that they have not been prohibited by management from writ-
ing stories even if they were critical of major advertisers. B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at 36-37.
And both editors and publishers criticized the Daily News' attempt to force their reporters
to disclose sources in a libel action in 1982. See Libel Decision Against Coast Paper is
Lifted, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1983, at A24, col. 4; Lindsey, Paper Orders Reporters to
Identify Source Accusing Ex-Iran Hostage, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1982, at A8, col. 1; infra
note 372.
295. Even Bob Woodward of Watergate fame is quoted as expressing dissatisfaction
with the reliance on confidential sources as a matter of course. See National News Council,
supra note 293, at 16.
296. As a result of the recognition that a climate accepting of secret sources can lead to
the perpetration of hoaxes and frauds by unscrupulous journalists, news organizations
have publicly reevaluated their norms with regard to sources. One of the most infamous
hoaxes was the discovery that the Pulitzer prize-winning Washington Post article by Janet
Cooke called "Jimmy's World" had been entirely fabricated by the author. Cooke,
Jimmy's World, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1980, at 1. See D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 309-11;
T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 215-18; Friendly, A Movie on the Press Stirs a Debate,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1981, at Bi, col. 1. The Washington Post editors did not recognize
the problem because they permitted the reporter to rely on an allegedly confidential
source whose identity they did not require her to divulge, even internally. T. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 34, at 219. See Brown, Bybee, supra note 36, at 47 n.11 (noting that 57% of
news executives reported policy changes with respect to anonymous sources as a result of
the Cooke affair).
Although the issue of confidential sources has been perceived as problematic in the jour-
nalistic community for years, some news organizations have abandoned the effort to esta-
blish clear rules on the subject of confidentiality. The Washington Post reportedly ad-
hered for a short period of time to what became known as the Bradlee rule "that a
maximal effort be made to identify all sources by name in one-on-one interviews and that
press briefings be for direct attribution or the Post reporter would leave." S. KLAIDMAN &
T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 75, at 16. The rule was quickly abandoned "because it was too
confining and because other newspapers did not adopt it." Id. See also H. GOODWIN, supra
note 34, at 128-29; D. WISE, supra note 39, at 302-03. Similarly, a poll of editors in 1980
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of contract liability similar to Daniel Cohen's jury verdict has
prompted newspapers to review and restrict their policies on the
use of confidential sources.29
These events underscore the journalistic community's recogni-
tion of the grave dangers posed by excessive use of confidentia-
lity. Many prominent journalists, editors, and press commenta-
tors criticize the practice of granting confidentiality on the
grounds that anonymity reduces the credibility of news stories,
allows government officials to manipulate the press, and permits
sources to lie without accountability.2 9 Journalists often publicly
showed that 38% of the respondents believed that it would be "impossible" and "unfruit-
ful" to create policies for dealing with unidentified sources. Poll Finds Editors Split on
Naming of Sources, supra note 179, at 22.
297. Jones, supra note 160, at 22; Jones, As Sources Vary, So Does Their Protection,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1989, at B8, col. 1.
For instance, The Minneapolis Star Tribune, one of the defendants in the Cohen litiga-
tion, established formal guidelines shortly after the initial jury verdict. Kramer, Dan Co-
hen Lawsuit Should Prompt Other Newspapers to Clarify Muddy Policies on Granting
Confidentiality, ASNE BULL., Sept./Oct. 1988, at 4; Radolf, Anonymous Sources: Newspa-
per Issues New Guidelines After Losing Court Case, Editor & Publisher, Aug. 27, 1988, at
17, 19, 33. The guidelines provide that, before using anonymous information or quotes,
reporters and editors must be satisfied that the information is of significant news value,
reliable, and impossible to get on the record. Radolf, supra, at 19. Reporters must obtain
their editors' permission before promising confidentiality to a source when the information
is "potentially damaging to others [and] where there is a reasonable chance that the
source's identity could become as big a story as the information." Id. at 17, 19. This would
include, but would not be limited to, smear tactics in political campaigns. Id. Reporters
must also make every effort to determine "what the information is generally about and
where it comes from" prior to any promises of confidentiality. Id. at 19. The guidelines
cite three circumstances in which confidential source identities might be disclosed: subse-
quent discovery by the paper that the source lied, life or death situations, and court or-
ders. Id. at 17. Like the policy of the New York Times, the new Star Tribune policy for-
bids the use of anonymous quotes "to express negative opinions about individuals or
organizations." Id. at 19.
In another attempt to provide greater precision, the Wall Street Journal has adopted a
new policy, distinguishing between confidential and anonymous sources. Jones, supra, at
B8, col. 1. While the paper will pledge to keep secret the identities of confidential sources,
anonymous sources for a story could, for 'example, later be revealed in a libel suit. Id.
298. See supra Section III.A. (on the history of manipulation of the press). As Tom
Goldstein puts it: "The problem with the anonymous quote is that it holds no one ac-
countable, and there is great potential for someone with an axe to grind-including a re-
porter-to malign or ridicule from the safety of anonymity." T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34,
at 220. Adversarial reporters have ironically made "a significant trade," in that "no longer
prisoners of official sources, they become entrapped by those who leak information." C.
PRESS & K. VERBURG, supra note 34, at 88. See also E. ABEL, supra note 1, at v ("[Iln one
sense, the presstoday is even more a handmaiden of its news sources than ever before.");
N. IsAAcS, supra note 3, at 54; Isaacs, Change or Be Changed, in JOURNALISM ETHICS: WHY
CHANGE? 9-10 (1986) (remarks by former Chairman, National News Council); D. BRODER,
supra note 34, at 317 ("nothing contributes more to the press' credibility problem than the
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note that readers find attributed information more credible than
unattributed reports.2 99 These critics doubtless realize that
phrase 'sources said' "); E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 108; Practicing Responsible Jour-
nalism, supra note 98, at 147-48 (suggesting that the press think about eliminating anony-
mous sources, particularly those who provide opinions and not facts); H. GOODWIN, supra
note 34, at 120-24 (recounting views of editors and reporters); REPORTERS, supra note 36,
at 166; B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at 49-50; D. WISE, supra note 39, at 303-04; Friendly,
supra note 294, at 71; Foreman, supra note 294; Epstein, supra note 76, at 63; Adler,
supra note 294, at 20-23.
A 1980 poll of editors revealed that approximately one-half the respondents were con-
cerned that dependency upon anonymous sources undermined the watchdog role of the
press. Poll Finds Editors Split on Naming of Sources, supra note 179, at 22. 87% of the
responding editors thought that unnamed sources were less believable. Id. Stephen Hess's
study of Washington reporters indicates that more than two thirds of his respondent re-
porters felt that journalists "make it too easy for sources to go on background." REPORT-
ERS, supra note 36, at 166. Similarly, Tom Goldstein reports that many respondents to a
poll of newspaper editors conducted three years after the Washington Post's "Jimmy's
World" debacle "felt that anonymous sources were abused in Washington." T. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 34, at 189. Goldstein himself characterizes the New York Times' policy of for-
bidding the use of anonymous attacks as "probably as fair a [policy] as can be devised,"
but expressed the concern that it may hamstring some newsgathering activity: "it builds
restraints into journalism which make it especially difficult for reporters to assess a public
figure currently in a powerful position. In the minuet that passes for political discourse,
few public people say on the record what they really think of people with whom they must
deal regularly." Id. at 220. The ambivalence expressed by Goldstein appears to find a
parallel in Stephen Hess's prior finding that 71% of the Washington journalists he studied
thought that the public benefits from backgrounders (although they are thought to be too
easily granted), while 16.9% thought that the public loses, and 9.3% stated that it both
gains and loses. REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 166.
. It is impossible to quantify whether there is a significant difference between editors and
journalists on the subject of the use of confidential sources. Many of the reports noted
reflect the concern of editors, but it is also evident that responsible journalists are wary of
anonymous sources. Moreover, while 81% of editors responding to Stephen Hess's study of
Washington journalism stated that unnamed sources were less believable than identified
sources, 87%' nevertheless thought that the use of leaks was, on balance, a good practice.
REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 166. See also supra note 294 (discussing differences between
editors and reporters on breaches of confidentiality agreements once they have been
made).
299. See, e.g., D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 319.
I know that when many people read that sources said something, they think the
reporter has made it up, or someone else has, and the reporter was too naive to
question it. Mostly, I think they resent not being told. Using the weasel word
"sources" advertises that the reporter knows something, the speaker's identity,
that he will not share with the reader. The perfectly human response is, You
don't trust me. Why the hell should I trust you?
See also THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 25
(1947); Blasi, supra note 19, at 244, 248-49; Note, Disclosure of Sources in International
Reporting, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1657 (1987) [hereinafter Southern California Note].
Interestingly, the public itself appears to be more evenly split with respect to the use of
unnamed sources: 42% of respondents to a poll on investigative reporting techniques ap-
proved the use of such sources, while 53% disapproved (with 5% expressing no opinion).
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sources court journalists for their own undisclosed and often un-
suspected reasons. 0e
In addition to serving as the messengers of their sources' agen-
das, reporters who rely on confidential sources also have an incen-
tive not to investigate too closely the activities of their long-term,
fruitful contacts.301 This can, in turn, allow such sources to avoid
the scrutiny of the press for their own wrongdoing. Moreover, the
leaking of selected information can forestall scrutiny of the
sources by government investigators as well.302
At a deeper level, reliance on confidential sources in news re-
ports is one of the factors303 that often undermines the press'
ability to explain events to the public in addition to reporting
them. News is defined by journalists in collaboration with news-
See E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at 120 (reporting survey by the Investigative Reporters
and Editors association); see also Wulfemeyer, supra note 36, at 86 (suggesting that "read-
ers are not terribly concerned about anonymous attribution").
300. As press critic Edward Jay Epstein has put it:
When journalists are presented with secret information about issues of great im-
port, they become, in a very real sense, agents for the surreptitious source. Even
if the disclosure is supported by authoritative documents, the journalist cannot
know whether the information has been altered, edited, or selected out of con-
text. Nor can he be certain what interests he is serving or what will be the even-
tual outcome of the leak.
Epstein, supra note 76, at 65.
Furthermore, the nature of the journalism business-with its competitiveness and dead-
line pressures-conspires to lead to the "co-optation" of reporters by sources by making it
difficult for reporters to verify leaks. See id. at 64-65. This practical problem is exacer-
bated by the more intractable facts that even if verification is attempted, reporters often
do not have any principled way of distinguishing between conflicting accounts or of estab-
lishing that an account is true rather than simply widely believed within the source com-
munity. Id. at 65.
301. See IMPACT, supra note 4, at 199. For example, commentators claim that reporters
neglected to investigate Oliver North's activities for at least three years because he served
them as a confidential source. M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 543; E. ABEL,
supra note 1, at 27-28; Alter, When Sources Get Immunity: Was North Pampered?,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 54. See also J. HULTENG, supra note 6, at 84-85 (on the
"you'll scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" attitude); M. GROSSMAN & M. KUMAR,
supra note 4, at 6 (on the press' ginger handling of Henry Kissinger's role in the protrac-
tion of the Vietnam war and in Nixon's illegal attempts to ferret out leaks); H. BRAY,
supra note 120, at 127-28; Blasi, supra note 19, at 245 (on pressure to write favorably
about regular sources).
302. See Adler, supra note 294, at.32 (suggesting that the CIA itself used an unwitting
Daniel Schorr to leak the Pike Report, a congressional committee report on the agency, in
order to undermine the credibility of the oversight committee and to "close off [the] sub-
ject of investigation for good"); see also D. SCHORR, supra note 36, at 179-81 (on Pike
Report episode).
303.. See Carey, The Dark Continent of American Journalism, in READING THE NEWS,
supra note 2, at 166-71 (exploring the various factors).
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makers.304 Readers cannot understand the meaning of facts and
the selection of news without a contextual explanation.015 Since
sources are in large part the news, attributing stories to faceless
officials or to the very ether eliminates precisely those explana-
tory signals which would situate the reader. Thus, when the press
does not attribute the story, it often becomes a medium for coded
messages and closed conversations decipherable at most by insi-
ders and government, but impenetrable to the public at large.3 06
When the press does not attribute its sources, it also runs the
risk of misleading readers and truncating public debate as to
journalists' own roles in the construction of news. The news is
never solely a mirror of an independent reality reporters simply
observe whole and report.307 Facts or events are only the raw ma-
terial with which the news is made."0 ' The news is in fact a narra-
tive, a "story" which characterizes, organizes, interprets, and situ-
ates the actual events.3 09 The press chooses not only the narrative
for any individual event, but also the order and organization of all
the stories in a given day." 0 Diversity in reporting demonstrates
that the press' imposition of order is chosen rather than naturally
dictated: there is never only a single story to tell about any fac-
tual event.311 Accordingly, alternative readings of events or em-
304. See Sigal, supra note 239, at 15-16; supra notes 258, 274.
305. Sigal, supra note 239, at 24-26 ("knowing how the news is made is the key to un-
derstanding what it means").
306. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 56; PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 109; Carey,
supra note 303, at 156-58; Adler, supra note 294, at 30-31 (use of non-attribution code
words "tease[s] the ordinary good faith reader while they signal only to the cognoscenti in
a debased, knowing complicity").
307. Carey, supra note 303, at 159-60; Manoff, Writing the News (By Telling the
"Story"), in READING THE NEWS, supra note 2, at 228-29; Romano, The Grisly Truth
About Bare Facts, in READING THE NEWS, supra note 2, at 39-42, 75-78; Sigal, supra note
239, at 15-16. See generally G. TUCHMAN, MAKING NEWS 5, 182-97 (1978); D. GRABER, MASS
MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLITICS 70-99 (2d ed. 1984).
308. Manoff, supra note 307, at 197.
[T]he nature of reality itself is only one of the conditions shaping the reports
about it. Stories also reflect the identities of the people reporters talk to, the
places they go, the things they believe, the routines that guide how they work,
and the conventions that govern what they write.
309. Id. at 228. "[A]lthough newswriting operates according to an objective canon that
emphasizes the facts, it does so within the requirement that it represent the events it
reports in the form of stories." Id.
310. See Rosenblatt, Journalism and the Larger Truth, in BELIEVING THE NEWS 236 (D.
Fry ed. 1985).
311. Manoff, supra note 307, at 228 ("No story is the inevitable product of the event it
reports; no event dictates its own narrative form.").
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phases are inevitably available.3 12 When the press relies on confi-
dential sources in published reports, it chooses not to air some of
these alternative readings. This can lead to the suppression of the
"real" stories or, at least, of the "better" narratives .31  Examples
abound-from leaks of a vice presidential candidate's medical
records to the dissemination of a Defense Department memoran-
dum-in which the identity of the leaker would have been an
equally good or "better" story than the substantive reports actu-
ally filed."" By reporting part of the story, journalists can become
accomplices in the cover-up of a power struggle within govern-
ment.1 5 In foreclosing important narratiye possiblities, the press
obscures recognition of its active role in the shaping of news and
its involvement in the process of governance.
The phenomenon of leaking can also be counter-productive to
open government and the judicial function. Since press coverage
312. Id. at 229.
313. Epstein, supra note 76, at 68 ("By concealing the machinations and politics behind
a leak, journalists suppress part of the truth surrounding a story.").
314. Manoff, supra note 307, at 198-210. For example, immediately prior to Ronald
Reagan's 1985 arms control summit with Mikhail Gorbachev, a leak provided the New
York Times and the Washington Post with a letter from Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger to the President, addressing Soviet treaty violations and warning against cer-
tain arms control commitments. Journalistic conventions and narrative forms led many of
the subsequent reports to characterize the story as one about discord and disarray in the
Reagan administration. Yet, Robert Manoff suggests that the letter did not contain any
particularly new substantive information; that the timing of the letter was "a peg but not
really the news"; and that "the real story in this incident"-the story that was not re-
ported-was the identity and motive of the leaker. Id. at 209. Stories focusing on the leak
"would have taken a better measure of the events than those which in fact appeared" and
would have "put the real 'who,' the leaker, back in the center of the story were he be-
longed." Id. at 210. In like vein, media critic Jay Epstein has suggested that Senator
Thomas Eagleton's medical records are no more important than the means by which those-
records were obtained and leaked to the press organization which was granted the 1973
Pulitzer Prize for disclosing their-contents, especially since copies of the presumably ille-
gally obtained records were later found in the White House safe of John Ehrlichman. Ep-
stein, supra note 76, at 68. Similarly, Epstein argues that the "motives and circumstances"
behind the "well-timed" leaks by Nixon administration officials which forced the resigna-
tion of Justice Abe Fortas from the Supreme Court "do not necessarily make a less impor-
tant part of the story" than the substantive allegations about Fortas. Id. For another ex-
ample of a story in which the identity of the leak is characterized as far more the "real"
story than the information leaked, see Squires, When Confidentiality Itself Is Source of
Contention, JOURNALISM ETHICS REP. 7 (1985-86). See also Greenfield, Must Reality Be
Off the Record?, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1984, at A21.
315. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 68 (quoting media critic Jay Epstein: "if journalists re-
present news as being accidental when in fact it is deliberate, then they may willy-nilly
assist in camouflaging the interest behind the disclosure, and thereby be part on a grander
scale of the cover-up of an intra-government power struggle"); supra notes 301-02.
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has an effect at least on the process of policymaking, 16 leaks can
lead to rushed and "conspiratorial" decisionmaking designed to
limit the number of people with access to information to leak to
the press.3 17 In the context of criminal investigations, leaks can
raise due process and fair trial issues.3 18
These undesirable consequences of excessive leaking are parti-
cularly ironic because of the uncertain effectiveness of leaking.
Studies show that leakers' strategies sometimes backfire 31 9 and
that the success of leaks in changing substantive policies is
unpredictable. 20
C. The Many Stories of Reporter-Source Relationships
The relationship between reporters and their confidential
sources has been described in a variety of conflicting ways. Some
claim that it is a relationship weighted heavily in favor of the re-
porter, involving the seduction and subsequent betrayal of the
source.321 In this version, the journalist is a smooth and deceptive
confidence artist and the source a simple Scheherezade, needing
to spill all her information in a desperate attempt to keep the
reporter interested.2 2 This picture denies both the manipulation
of reporters by powerful sources and the ambivalent loyalty re-
316. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 107-12, 182-83, 188 (finding that press coverage speeds up
'policymaking and moves decisionmaking up the ladder).
317. E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 65; IMPACT, supra note 4, at 182-83; PRESS CONNECTION,
supra note 36, at 93-94.
318. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 181-82 (discussing leaks in the criminal investigation bf
Vice-President Spiro Agnew in 1973).
. 319. For example, Stephen Hess has suggested that because leaks are episodic,' because
leakers are either so "clever or so inept as to be totally misunderstood," and because
"messages get garbled in transmission," leakers' strategies misfire. PRESS CONNECTION,
supra note 36, at 92-93. See also E. ABEL, supra note 1,,at 21-25.
320. IMPACT, supra note 4, at 184, 185-87 (substantive impact of leaks, although possi-
ble, is difficult to anticipate).
321. Janet Malcolm, for example, caused a furor in the journalistic community by
charging that "[e]very journalist ... knows that what he does is morally indefensible. He
is a kind of confidence man, preying on people's vanity, ignorance, or loneliness, gaining
their trust and betraying them without remorse." J. MALCOLM, supra note 107, at 3. See
also id. at 158, 162 ("The moral ambiguity of journalism lies not in its texts but in the
relationships out of which they arise-relationships that are invariably and inescapably
lopsided."). Malcolm's attack was sparked by a breach of contract action against Joe Mc-
Ginniss, author of "Fatal Vision," brought by Jeffrey MacDonald, a convicted murderer
and the subject of McGinniss' book. MacDonald claimed, and Malcolm agreed, that Mc-
Ginniss had misled his subject into believing that he would write a favorable account. See
supra note 107.
322. J. MALCOLM, supra note 107, at 20.
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porters sometimes feel toward their sources.
Others take the opposite view of the relationship, suggesting
that sources control and manipulate reporters, who submit out of
laziness, coziness, and "scoop" mania.32 3 In this version, it is re-
porters who are hoodwinked and held captive. 24 The problem
with this view is that it denies the reality of the journalist's power
in some relationships with sources.
Still others take an apparently cynical and pragmatic view, not-
ing that both sources and reporters knowingly use one another.32 5
This is a vision premised on a market exchange model. In this
version, reporters are neither deceivers nor lapdogs, but rather
traders whose professional norms and skeptical attitudes permit
them to advance newsgathering interests while recognizing
sources' desires to promote their own agendas. This is presumably
the attitude of the reporters who claim that their sources' motives
for leaking are irrelevant so long as their information is true.32 6
This vision differs from the others in that it, does not admit the
significant consequences of disparities and shifts in power be-
tween the parties to the reporter-source relationship. Nor does it
admit the illusory security of relying on professional newsgather-
ing norms to'guarantee independence. Finally, this view is flawed
in that it fails to account for the existence of some level of trust
in the relationships between reporters and sources. A picture of
autonomous individuals with conflicting aspirations is simply too
abstract to describe the contradictory tugs on each of the partici-
pants in the relationships.
None of these three characterizations of reporter-source rela-
tionships is entirely correct in itself, in large part because none
captures the complex variety of such relationships as a whole, or
323. See, e.g., N. ISAACS, supra note 3, at 54 ("bait and reel in" game played by politi-
cians); Lukas, The Journalist: A Source's Captive or Betrayer?, WASH. MONTHLY, May
1990, at 44.
324. These press observers warn that oral research makes reporters run the risk of be-
coming "prisoners" of their sources, REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 17, or the sources'
"handmaidens." E. ABEL, supra note 1, at v. Using a dance metaphor, they suggest that
sources do the leading most of the time because "the dancers are not equal partners." Id.
at 1.
325. See, e.g., ETHICAL CONNECTION, supra note 217, at 13 ("Each party to . . . [the
complex relationship between reporters and legislators] understands that the other seeks
to turn the relationship to his own advantage. Both use the relationship and feel used by
it."); W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 224 (quoting Theodore White).
326. See E. ABEL, supra note 1, at v; PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 78.
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the ambivalence within them individually. 327 Far from following a
single model, the relationships differ depending on the identity,
status, and motivations of the source; the importance of the
source's information; the prestige and power of the reporter; the
duration and character of the relationship; and the institutional
setting of the disclosure. The identity of sources and their reasons
for requesting confidentiality have a significant impact on the na-
ture of their relationships with reporters. Specifically, reporters
often have different, and less guarded, relationships with sources
who they perceive as whistleblowers and dissidents than they do
with powerful officials at the highest levels of government. More-
over, relationships between reporters and sources are not always
fully worked out at the outset. Like other relationships, reporter-
source relationships which involve more than single transactions
change and evolve over time, both in response to external circum-
stances and as a consequence of their own dynamics.
The one thing common to all confidential reporter-source rela-
tionships is that they pose dangers to both participants. They in-
volve mutual seduction, interdependence, and the possibility of
mutual betrayal. Disclosure of the source's identity can harm the
source in a variety of ways. 28 Similarly, reporters risk their pro-
fessional reputations and careers when they pass along false or
incomplete information from leakers.3 29 Thus, all relationships
between reporters and their sources are based on some kind of
mutual trust.330 The reporter must trust the source to have pro-
vided a true and complete story and the source must trust that
the reporter will not betray him by divulging his identity.
Despite the baseline requirement of some trust, the degree of
trust and the reasons for it differ markedly in different sorts of
relationships between reporters and sources. Even within a single
relationship, the level of trust may be different for the reporter
and the source. Sometimes, the source trusts completely in the
reporter. Such complete trust may arise either from the very act
of disclosing the information to the reporter 33 1 or from a belief in
327. See, e.g., ETHICAL CONNECTION, supra note 217, at 13 (describing relationships be-
tween reporters and legislators as "exceedingly complex").
328. See supra note 86.
329. "If the information turns out to be false or distorted, there is no refuge for the
reporter in anonymity." E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 39.
330. Id.
331. See W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 128 (quoting columnist Jack Anderson's state-
ment that "[slometimes when someone opens up to you .... a sort of confessor relation-
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the reporter's loyalty. The assumption of loyalty can in turn be
based on the development of a personal relationship between the
reporter and the source, as a result of which the source feels the
reporter to be sympathetic to him.3 2 This is most common with
unsophisticated sources, whistleblowers, and sources who feel suf-
ficiently socially alienated to view the institutional press as sim-
ply another arm of the "Establishment. '" 333 The assumption of
loyalty can also arise from a notion of shared ideology or ethnicity
which the source sees as a fundamental common ground with the
reporter.33 4
With more sophisticated sources-Washington insiders and
sharp political operatives-both the level of trust and its bases
are more varied and complex. In those relationships, loyalty is
most often assumed to arise not from personal fealty or shared
ideology, but from the instrumental nature of the relationship
and the institutionally accepted ethic of confidentiality. Such re-
lationships have many of the hallmarks of business exchanges in
ship develops and the person will continue to talk to you"); J. MALCOLM, supra note 107,
at 32 (on the "childish trust and impetuosity" common in relationships between sources
and reporters). This is presumably most common with unsophisticated sources.
332. Investigative reporter Nicholas Gage has been reported as saying that "[s]ources
won't trust you unless you're close to them." Rupp, Investigative Reporters Tell How
They Do It, Editor & Publisher, Jan. 11, 1975, p. 12, quoted in B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at
22. See also W. RIVERS, supra note 39, at 70. Instructive in this regard is the recent contro-
versy over Joe McGinniss' condemnatory book about Jeffrey MacDonald, a physician ac-
cused of brutally murdering his family. See supra notes 107, 321. The book was written
after an extensive period during which MacDonald claimed to have been induced to be-
lieve that McGinniss would write an exculpatory account. McGinniss' failure to disclose
his book plans for fear of losing MacDonald's cooperation indicates that reporters them-
selves see the need to obtain sources' trust, whether in good or bad faith.
333. See N. HENTOFF, supra note 36, at 227 (suggesting that members of "tightly knit
political group[s] outside the mainstream of society" will only talk to reporters they trust);
Blasi, supra note 19, at 241.
334. For example, Jesse Jackson's references in 1984 to New York as "Hymietown" and
Jews as "Hymies" were made to Washington Post journalist Milton Coleman and another
black journalist after Jackson suggested that they "talk Black talk." Coleman, supra note
102, at C8. See also D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 347; T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 187.
Coleman later stated in print that he assumed Jackson's assertion of a racial bond indi-
cated that he wished to speak "on background"-without attribution. Coleman, supra
note 102, at C8; D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 347; T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 187;
Blasi, supra note 19, at 240.
Similarly, reporters who covered the Black Panther party in the 1960's indicate that
they would not have been privy to the group's activities if the Panthers had not perceived
them as trustworthy and anti-establishment. See N. HENTOFF, supra note 36, at 228; D.
WISE, supra note 39, at 240-41 (recounting the argument by Earl Caldwell, one of the
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), defendants, for resisting a grand jury subpoena).
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which people who otherwise have no relationship deal with one
another for their own reasons and their own advantage. Yet, even
there, a certain level of personal trust, or at least an expectation
that reporters will adhere to their promises and ethical norms,
will develop in long-term relationships."'5
Ironically, these expectations of fidelity on the part of
sources-whether they are grounded in a personal connection or
instrumentalist expectations-are played -out against the reality
that secrets are virtually never absolutely sacrosanct. When any
secrets are shared, there is a danger of some exposure.33 6 This re-
335. The intensely personal-and highly ambivaient-nature of the relationship be-
tween reporters and sources may account for the intimate, romantic, and even erotic meta-
phors with which it is described by journalists and press commentators. Those who write
about the relationship often use the notion of seduction in describing it. See, e.g., J. MAL-
COLM, supra note 107, at 3, 5, 59 (characterizing the source as "the credulous widow who
wakes up one day to find the charming young man and all her savings gone..." and the
journalist-subject relationship as a "story of seduction and betrayal"); Greider, Reporters
and Their Sources: Mutual Assured Seduction, 14 WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1982, at 10. Re-
porters indicate that they both "court" and "are courted by" sources. They often socialize
together, both to meet and to maintain their relationships. See B. SWAIN, supra note 36, at
21-23. The vulnerability which both-experience is to some extent reminiscent of the vul-
nerability that is a hallmark of intimate relationships. Some descriptions of reporters and
sources are reminiscent of marriages in which the parties hate but need one another:
"[e]ven though there is no love lost between the partners in the dance, they remain locked
in close embrace." E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 2. Other descriptions focus on the meretri-
cious character of relationships based in secrecy. Bill Moyers, for example, has described
the rules of background briefings as "permit[ting] the press and government to sleep to-
gether, even to procreate, without getting married or having to accept responsibility for
any offspring." Id. at 56 (quoting Moyers); Randolph, supra note 294 (quoting PBS' Mike
Sullivan on the relation with confidential sources as sexual barter: "Having got in bed with
the source and taken information, the only real choice left was not to publish the story.
...In the end, a deal's a deal."). Finally, while the name "Deep Throat" probably serves
well as a facetious reference to a then-current pornographic film, the sexual association
may well not be coincidental.. The metaphors of dancing, marriage, and barter that are
used to describe the relationship between reporters and sources also point to the highly
ritualized and etiquette-laden character of the relationship. Ballroom dancing has esta-
blished steps and routines; conventional marriages hew to certain established conventions;
those who see the traditional family as the central social unit believe that there are rules
governing sexual relationships; and even prostitution has stock understandings.
336. In discussing the Jesse Jackson episode, see supra note 334, journalist Tom Gold-
stein faulted Jackson for "ignor[ing] a cardinal reality of public life: If you do not want
something repeated, do not say it to anyone, especially a reporter, in the first place." T.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34,'at 187. Similarly, David Broder suggested that "realistically, in
the heat of a presidential campaign, nothing genuinely significant-nothing truly revealing
of character, plans, or policies-can remain secret if the candidate -utters it in reporters'
presence." D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 351. Indeed, sometimes reporters will threaten
sources with disclosure in order to get additional information. See B. SWAIN, supra note
36, at 25; see also'J. MALCOLM, supra note 107, at 8 ("[O]f course, at bottom, no subject is
naive. Every hoodwinked widow, every deceived lover, every betrayed friend, every subject
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sults not only from the temptation to share secrets as such, but
also'fromthe complex set of loyalties experienced by reporters in
their relationships with sources. Reporters must be acutely aware
of their bilateral obligations: while they have relationships with
sources and varying degrees of loyalty:to them,:they bear respon-
sibilities: toward their readers as well.-37 The strictures of repor-
ters' :obligations to the latter thus require that they be somewhat
self-conscious with the former.
The distribution of power within reporter-source relationships
is also highly variable. When viewed abstractly, there appears to
be'an equipoise of power in all such relationships. After all, while
the source is in control because she has information desired by
the reporter, the reporter controls the source's access to the mass
public and holds, as the trump card, the possibility of disclosing
his source. This apparent balance of power is illusory, however. If
the source is a powerful, highly-placed public official with many
other news outlets, and if she is a long-term source whose contin-
uing cooperation is necessary to the reporter's career, the reporter
cannot afford to exercise his trump card and the source in fact
has a significant amount of coercive power.3 38 But if the source is
not particularly powerful, if her position and influence have be-
come precarious, if the reporter's career would.not be harmed by
closing off that source, or if the reporter has access to other
sources from whom he can obtain the requisite information, 339
then the balance of power in the relationship tilts in favor of the
reporter.
The distribution of power is affected not only by the realities of
the status of the parties, but also by the parties' perceptions of
power. Journalists, while expressing ambivalence about their rela-
tionships with sources and abstractly recognizing the possibility
of writing knows on some level what is in store for him, and remains in the relationship
anyway, impelled by something stronger than his reason.").
337. See, e.g., ETHICAL CONNECTION, supra note 217, at 33-34 (describing journalists'
views of themselves as representatives of the public). Moreover, reporters also have insti-
tutional loyalties to the news organizations- for which they work.
338. See D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 321 (characterizing as "a matter of professional
survival" the need to abide by attribution ground rules: "[y]ou live by the conditions you
accepted-or forget ever using that source again").
339. Institutional characteristics of the government may affect this, of course. For ex-
ample, reporters- are likely to have fewer sources in the higher executive branch because
the information generated by the executive can be more tightly controlled than informa-
tion and sources in Congress. REPORTERS, supra note 36, at 17. See also supra notes 41,
248.
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of being manipulated, nevertheless share the human trait of de-
nying powerlessness. While they admit to the fact that their rela-
tionships with sources have the character of a "high wire act,""8 '
they nevertheless believe that they can keep their balances on the
wire. Similarly, sources must keep reporters interested while still
perceiving that they maintain the upper hand in the relationship.
The many different variables in the relationships between re-
porters and sources create incentives for sources not to reveal
more than is absolutely necessary and incentives for reporters to
push for as much information in their own interest as they can
obtain. Consequently, the relationships are fundamentally ambi-
valent-simultaneously friendly and adversarial for both the re-
porter and the source. It is against this complex background that
we need to address the validity of legal claims by sources against
the press for breaches of anonymity promises.
IV. TOWARD A CONTEXTUALIST ALTERNATIVE
Having described the inadequacies of existing approaches to
the resolution of contract claims by sources against the press, and
having drawn a realistic picture of the circumstances and conse-
quences of journalists' use of confidential sources, this Article
now proposes a historically grounded and context-sensitive analy-
sis of the problem.
A. Setting the Stage: The Contradictory Character of
Secrecy
"Terms such as 'confidentiality' . are used as code words to
create a sense of self-evident legitimacy. '"34 1 Yet, we feel ambiva-
lent about secrecy both at the individual and at the collective
level because we recognize that it has a "double-edged"
character. 42
At the individual level, control over information about the self
is central to autonomy and individuality.343 Individuals see them-
selves as such in part because they control what they reveal to
340. J. HULTENG, supra note 6, at 84.
341. S. BOK, SECRETS 115 (1982) [hereinafter SECRETS] (discussing the limits of confi-
dentiality with regard to the professional secret).
342. K.L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 308
(1988).
343. Id. at 302.
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others and thereby affect how they are perceived. Moreover, the
selective revelation of secrets to others fosters the development of
solidarity, intimacy, and community."'" Human beings define
themselves and their social worlds by processes of inclusion and
exclusion. They develop feelings of self-worth, self-esteem, and
acceptance by being part of a chosen group. Sharing secrets and
knowledge unavailable to those outside the selected group rein-
forces those feelings of acceptance, bonding, and community.
Simultaneously, however, sharing secrets is dangerous. It leads
to vulnerability and anxiety by establishing the preconditions for
disloyalty. Having imparted a secret to someone gives that person
the power to disclose it. Thus, sharing secrets can be destructive
when utilized as a form of psychic exchange that fosters neurotic
dependence.45 Secrecy also creates the risk of manipulation,
domination, and exclusion. It permits people to control others'
choices by hiding information that they would consider relevant
in making decisions. 346 By keeping them ignorant of that manipu-
lation, "secrecy itself can be used to hide the manipulative uses of
secrets.34 7 Thus, the very practice which can lead to feelings of
autonomy and empowerment can also lead to experiences of be-
trayal, disempowerment, and manipulation.3 "
Secrecy is also double-edged at the collective, societal level. For
example, while some level of governmental secrecy is necessary
for national security and the efficient operation of the state, it
simultaneously impedes monitoring, undermines accountability,
allows for corruption, and permits megalomaniacal judgments.3, 9
344. Id. at 303-04.
345. See id. at 305 ("That another knows one's secrets can be a distressing situation
indeed and may make it near impossible to reestablish one's independence. While the ini-
tial sharing of secrets may have been an expression of autonomy, the bonds that secrets
create may enslave. The extreme case of blackmail illustrates the point.").
346. Id. at 304. By manipulation in this context, I refer to the exercise of power by one
party over another through the strategic withholding of information which impedes the
ability of the manipulated person to make the most informed, rational, and independent
decisions she can.
347. Id. at 305.
348. See id. at 304 ("Secrecy, at the individual level, is a social form that possesses the
power to destroy what it generates.").
349. While few would contest the value of national security in the abstract, it is the
claimed scope of the interest that gives rise to controversy. With respect to governmental
operations, many have argued that organizations cannot function effectively without some
significant level of secrecy or confidentiality as to the proposals and deliberations preced-
ing ultimate decisions. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 47, at 340-41; H. KISSINGER,
YEARS OF UPHEAVAL 115 (1982). In the area of foreign affairs, for example, government
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Moreover, secrecy plays potentially contradictory roles in social
control and social structure.350 Those practices of secrecy which
are subject to criticism when employed by government and other
powerful elites can have empowering effects in different contexts.
For example, while secrecy and the monopoly of information can
lead to systemic inequality, they can also serve as weapons by
which the disempowered can claim power. 51 It can also help citi-
zens and groups to resist social control. 2 2 Finally, while shared
knowledge enables the creation of a social structure, 353 it also
serves as the basis for alternative, competing social structures as
well.3 54
Because secrecy is not a uni-dimensional social form, but rather
one that can have radically different uses and consequences, "all
the interesting information about secrets consists in how they are
being used by whom for what purposes under what set of con-
straints in what contexts." 355 It is in particularized contexts that
we make determinations about the moral value and social worth
of different practices of secrecy.3 56 In turn, our normative stan-
dards determine not only our evaluations of the worth of particu-
larized contexts of secrecy, but also our descriptions of those
contexts. 57
officials often argue that totally open treaty negotiations can reify early positions and
commit the parties to undesirable courses, at least partly because of negative publicity
that might result from perceived retreats. Similarly, governmental investigations are said
to require secrecy in order to be effective. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7)(A) (1988) (exempting from disclosure records or information compiled for fe-
deral law enforcement purposes to the extent that their release "could reasonably be ex-
pected to interfere with enforcement proceedings").
350. K.L. SCHEPPELE, supra note 342, at 306-08.
351. Id. at 306. See also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Paterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-66
(1958) (recognizing right of NAACP to keep its Alabama membership secret).
352. K.L. SCHEPPELE, supra note 342, at 306-07.
353. Id. at 307 (when social structure is defined as durable patterns of association be-
tween people, "secrets provide the rough draft of social structure").
354. Id. at 308.
355. Id.
356. That we make contextual and particularistic determinations about the social value
of secret-keeping does not mean that, for purposes of convenience and control of ambigu-
ity, we do not develop idealized prototypes or models to serve as frames against which we
visualize the particular circumstances. See infra notes 360-69 and accompanying text.
357. This view supposes that there is a fundamental interdependence between norma-
tive and positive questions. See K.L. SCHEPPELE, supra note 342, at 319 (taking the same
position and adopting a "model of mutual construction of rules and facts"). In other
words, our view of facts is profoundly influenced by our moral principles. The ways in
which we describe facts and situations in our world-what we deem relevant and how we
choose one out of any number of possibly conflicting characterizations-imply particular
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B. Sources, "Sourcerers, "358 and the Social Values Impli-
cated in Press-Source Confidentiality359
Promises of confidentiality are given by journalists to sources
in a variety of situations. Like secrets in other circumstances, we
deem only some of these practices of confidentiality worthy of
protection. Reflecting our ambivalence about secrets and their
disclosure in the journalistic context, we pass legislation protect-
ing whistleblowers 86 ° while publicly deploring anonymous disse-
minators of government disinformation campaigns and political
"smear tactics. '381 This dichotomy yields two polar prototypes3 2
sets of values and cultural norms we bring to the task of description. Conversely, I believe
that facts do-and should-affect our moral sense. Wholly abstract categorical impera-
tives are highly problematic. Our normative principles do-and should-take account of
the consequences that follow from their particularized applications.
358. See Smyser, supra note 33, at 13.
359. This account does not seek to justify the social values underlying social reactions to
the prototypical models described in text. It merely seeks to identify them as cultural
norms. Assuming their legitimacy, it seeks to use them as guideposts for the attempt to
make normative claims about the social worth of promises of confidentiality to sources in
different circumstances.
360. Both federal and state legislation protecting whistleblowers has been enacted since
the 1970's. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat.
16 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (1990); Civil Service Re-
form Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-16, 2302, 7121 (1988), amended by The Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989 (federal civil servants); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. § 5851(a) (1988) (employees in nuclear power industry); see also S. KOHN & M.
KOHN, THE LABOR LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF EMPLOYEE
WHISTLEBLOWERS 2 (1988); Kohn & Kohn, An Overview of Federal and State
Whistleblower Protections, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 99 (1986); Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower
from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 J.L. REFORM 277 (1983). See generally Powell, Whistling
in the Dark: The Problem of Federal Whistleblower Protection for In-house Reporters of
Corporate Wrongdoing, 68 OR. L. REV. 569 (1989) (discussing the judiciary's use of eco-
nomic analysis when interpreting whistleblower protection statutes); Vaughn, Statutory
Protection of Whistleblowers in the Federal Executive Branch, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 615
(discussing the history, interpretive problems, and adequacy of protections of the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978).
361. For example, disclosure of the plaintiff's identity as a confidential source in Cohen
led to journalistic charges of unsavory political tactics. See supra notes 119 and 121 and
accompanying text.
362. As prototypes, these are artificial and idealized constructs. Moreover, people will
often differ when they actually have to decide which prototype is implicated by any given
anonymous disclosure. For example, it is probable that many people see Deep Throat as a
prototypical whistleblowing hero. Others, on the other hand, might focus on his disloyalty
to the regime or wonder about the purity of his motivations for leaking. See, e.g., J.W.
DEAN, supra note 103, at 33-34 (challenging Deep Throat's status as "noble"). Neverthe-
less, the fact that such prototypes exist and have some significant cultural resonance as
abstract paradigms is useful in the attempt to develop a method for resolving contract
disputes between the press and its confidential sources.
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of individuals seeking anonymity: the sympathetic "source" or
whistleblower 6 s  on the one hand, and the manipulative
"sourcerer" or strategic policy leaker on the other.3 "
The culturally sympathetic prototype of the whistleblower is
often described as having a number of idealized characteristics.
He imparts true and important information to oversight bodies or
to the press, serving to enhance government accountability and
enlarge and enrich public discourse by revealing hidden abuse.365
363. This characterization of whistleblowers as sympathetic characters derives not only
from legislative materials (see, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE
WHISTLEBLOWERS: A REPORT ON FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WHO DISCLOSE ACTS OF GOVERNMENT
WASTE, ABUSE AND CORRUPTION, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter
LEAHY REPORT, after the principal testimony of Senator Patrick Leahy]), but from popular
culture as well. See, e.g., M. GLAZER & P. GLAZER, supra note 59, at 239 ("The courage of
whistleblowers is. . . coming to be more widely appreciated and publicly acknowledged.");
Safran, Women Who Blew the Whistle, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Apr. 1985, at 25.
Whistleblowers have often come to be regarded as cultural heroes. Despite his ostracism
from the Police Department, for example, Frank Serpico became a folk hero and the sub-
ject of a Hollywood film as a result of his exposure of corruption in law enforcement in
New York. Serpico (Paramount 1973). M. GLAZER & P. GLAZER, supra note 59, at 55 (not-
ing that Serpico was cast as "the quintessential American hero" in the popular book and
movie about him and that "his name became nationally identified with integrity and
courage").
This is not to say that the scholarly literature on whistleblowing has been entirely sym-
pathetic to the practice or has depicted an unambiguous public approval of all
whistleblowing activities. Some commentators have described the whistleblowing decision
as involving "a hard moral issue," entailing an activity in conflict with established values
of organizational loyalty. F. ELLISTON, J. KEENAN, P. LOCKHART & J. VAN SCHAICK, supra
note 59, at 3; Fisher, supra note 59, at 358-63 (describing social attitudes about
whistleblowers as ambivalent); M. GLAZER & P. GLAZER, supra note 59, at 262; SECRETS,
supra note 341, at 210-16; Rongine, Toward a Coherent Legal Response to the Public
Policy Dilemma Posed by Whistleblowing, 23 AM. Bus. L.J. 281, 284-86 (1985) (discussing
the loyalty argument against whistleblowing); supra note 85 (citing to scholars who discuss
loyalty as the focal point of the whistleblowing dilemma). See also Elliston, Anonymity
and Whistleblowing, 1 J. Bus. ETHICS 167, 170-73 (1982) (arguing that whistleblowers
should identify themselves publicly if their charges are to be taken seriously).
Nevertheless, whistleblowing to expose abuse in the public sector has been described as
an ethical duty, see LEAHY REPORT, supra, at 5, and "a sincere commitment to make this
Government more responsive to people's needs and more worthy of their trust," id. at 4-5.
See also M. GLAZER & P. GLAZER, supra note 59, at 11, 38, 239 (describing whistleblowers
as "ethical resisters" and whistleblowing as a "nascent social movement tied together by a
common ideology of accountability..."); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and Reorgani-
zation Plan No. 2 of 1978: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 859-869 (1978) (testimony of Senator Patrick Leahy). See generally
R. NADER, P. PETKAS & K. BLACKWELL, WHISTLE BLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE
ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1972) [hereinafter R. NADER].
364. See Smyser, supra note 33, at 13-15.
365. See, e.g., LEAHY REPORT, supra note 363, at 1-2, 4-5 (on whistleblowing to the au-
thorities); D. SCHORR, supra note 36, at 179 (noting that anonymous sources became re-
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Like David taking on Goliath, he is a disempowered dissenter act-
ing altruistically in the public interest."' The whistleblower takes
tremendous personal risks in order to benefit the public at
large. 67 Her cooperation enables the press to function as an inde-
pendent and critical watchdog of government and other powerful
groups. She seeks anonymity solely for self-protective reasons. 6 8
Not being a sophisticated political player, she relies entirely on
the press' discretion to keep the secret of her identity and trusts
in the journalists to whom she confides.
The counter-prototype to the sympathetic whistleblower is the
"sourcerer" or strategically manipulative leaker. What is deemed
specifically unsympathetic or despicable about that sort of source
depends on the particular circumstances, but again, public dis-
taste appears to be based on some idealized conceptions. Unlike
the pure whistleblower, these anonymous sources are thought to
be politically savvy. They act with selfish motives in order to pro-
mote their own agendas rather than the public interest. Even if
they believe they are acting to promote public aims, their purpose
in talking to the press "is not so much to pass information along
to the public . . .[but rather] to use the press, and ultimately the
spectable after Watergate because they had been mainly "good guys" blowing the whistle
on the misdeeds of "bad guys"); Smyser, supra note 33, at 13-14.
366. See,'e.g., LEAHY REPORT, supra note 363, at 2, 6 (describing whistleblowers as "sin-
cere," honest, and motivated by the precept of loyalty to country in the Code of Ethics of
Government Service); R. NADER, supra note 363, at 6-11; Smyser, supra note 33, at 13-14;
M. GLAZER & P. GLAZER, supra note 59; Jos, Tompkins & Hayes, In Praise of Difficult
People: A Portrait of the Committed Whistleblower, 49 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 552 (1989) (find-
ing whistleblowers to be committed to strong moral principles). Of course, not all
whistleblowers are motivated purely by the public interest as opposed to self-interest; in-
deed, they may feel that their own interests and those of the public coincide. They may
blow the whistle "for spiteful or petty reasons . . . [or in order] to insulate. [themselves]
from disciplinary or other personnel actions." Vaughn, supra note 360, at 617. While some
scholars emphasize the issue of motivation in their discussions of whistleblowing, see, e.g.,
N. BowIE, BUSINESS ETHICS 143-44 (1982), others argue that the whistleblower's purity of
motive is logically distinct from an analysis of the legitimacy of the act of whistleblowing,
see, e.g., Rongine, supra note 363, at 284. Even so, general public acclaim of
whistleblowers appears in part to be due to assumptions of altruism and public-spirited-
ness on their part.
367. See, e.g., LEAHY REPORT, supra note 363, at 1-5; M. GLAZER & P. GLAZER, supra
note 59, at 133-66 (on retaliation against whistleblowers).
368. Like all the other descriptions in this account, this is an easily deconstructed dis-
tinction. For example, the fact that whistleblowers seek anonymity for self-protective rea-
sons does not distinguish them on that ground from the less sympathetic "sourcerers."
The public focus on the distinguishing character of the whistleblower's self-protective
motivations in seeking anonymity is thus an attempt to disavow ambiguity and find yet
another reason for which the whistleblowing activity should be substantively preferred.
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public, as a means to an end."369 Thus, they manipulate the press
and public discourse. They often lie or mislead. They hide behind
anonymity in order to conduct "dirty tricks" or engage in "smear
tactics" for their own self-interest and without accountability.
The ways in which we describe the models-the particular set
of characteristics we attribute to each opposing proto-
type-suggest the cultural values which underlie public sympathy
for the "source" and public disdain for the "sourcerer. '"370 Specifi-
cally, the prototypes reflect a commitment to the following ideals:
fully-informed, truthful"' public discourse; open, clean, efficient
and accountable government;3 72 conformity to law in industry and
government; and a powerful and independent press capable of in-
forming the public and policing the state. 73 Consistent with our
369. Smyser, supra note 33, at 14.
370. Just as the description of the whistleblower and the strategically manipulative
leaker in text are mere prototypes, the abstract values which underlie social sympathy for
one prototype and social opprobrium for the other are themselves simply ideals. These
norms do not necessarily represent the world as it "really is" and, indeed, may sometimes
be instrumental in masking a less-than-ideal reality. See infra note 376. See generally,
e.g., M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1988).
371. One of the reasons for which truthfulness is valued is its contribution to public
discourse in a democracy. As the Supreme Court has pointed out in the defamation con-
text, false statements of fact are not perceived as properly adding to public debate. Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). Norms of truthfulness also promote auto-
nomy and self-determination-both for individuals and the collective public. Indeed, one
of the reasons that lies are thought to be reprehensible is that they involve the deliberate
abuse of power over persons in weaker informational positions and undermine people's
prospects for self-determination. See, e.g., S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LIFE 18-20, 30-31 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter LYING]; Sweetser, The Definition of
Lie: An Examination of the Folk Models Underlying a Semantic Prototype, in CULTURAL
MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 43, 59 (D. Holland & N. Quinn eds. 1987).
372. Government practices of confidentiality and secrecy are often thought to be sus-
pect because they undermine accountability. See LYING, supra note 371, at 18-20, 30-31.
See generally A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 47, at 332-76 (describing the early distaste for
secret government and overuse of government secrecy); Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress,
the Courts, and National Security Information, 103 HARV. L. REV. 906, 906-14 (1990)
[hereinafter Harvard Note]; Lewis, National Security: Muting the "Vital Criticism," 34
UCLA L. REV. 1687 (1987); Marro, When the Government Tells Lies, 23 COLUM. JOURNAL-
ISM REV. 29 (1985); Diamond, Morality in Government: The Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion in the McCarthy Period, in VII HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 167 (1986) (describ-
ing the FBI's Dissemination Policy in the 1950's, pursuant to which the Bureau would
secretly make its files on suspected subversives available to state governors, while publi-
cally insisting on the complete confidentiality of its information). While they are subject
to numerous exceptions, statutes like the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552 (1988), and state "sunshine" laws suggest a recognition of the value of open govern-
ment. See also LEAHY REPORT, supra note 363.
373. See M. GLAZER & P. GLAZER, supra note 59, at 167 ("[W]ithout the attention of
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vision of ourselves as a democratic society, 374 the prototypes point
to a belief that the election process should be conducted not with
lies, omissions, and misleading statements, but in such a way as
to promote independent and well-informed exercise of the
franchise. 75 Most generally, adverse reactions to "dirty" politics
and politically-motivated leaking reflect some abstract sense that
there should be norms of decency and fair play adhered to in
public life.376
independent reporters, many resisters would be forced to end their protest after the initial
reprisals. The willingness of journalists to listen, evaluate, and publicize allegations of
wrongdoing is often a central component in facilitating whistleblowing.").
374. It is beyond the scope of this Article to describe the different visions of democracy
that have held sway during different periods of our history. See Schudson, The News Me-
dia and the Democratic Process, Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies 3-11 (1983). See
generally R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989).
375. The negative public response to negative campaigning, see supra notes 85, 120-21,
and increasing public distrust of government evidence a commitment to this ideal. For
examples of adverse reactions to political smear campaigns and the political backlash to
the discovery of being engaged in "dirty politics," see generally B. FELKNOR, supra note 85,
at 122. Of course, this ideal assumes a vision of democracy in which electoral choice is
based on reasoned discourse and selection.
376. Of course, such norms are not universally regarded as being equally implicated in
every revelation of politically-motivated leaking. Some would narrowly define "dirty"
politics as the dissemination of completely untrue or misleading information about politi-
cal opponents. See, e.g., Rosenthal, The Tape: What Sin?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1987, at
A16, col. 1. Others would additionally focus on the manner in which the information was
obtained, limiting disapproval to that obtained illegally or in violation of privacy. Id.
Moreover, such norms of decency change over time. The American press, for example,
had a history of turning a blind eye to the amorous adventures of presidents from
Roosevelt to Kennedy. As is evident from the Miami Herald's exposure of presidential
candidate Gary Hart's extramarital affair, however, the press is now far less reluctant to
report on the private lives of officials and candidates for office. Dickenson & Taylor,
Newspaper Stakeout Infuriates Hart, Wash. Post, May 4, 1987, at Al. Although the press'
reporting of such personal matters has been controversial, there does not seem to be a
public consensus on its inappropriateness. Hays, The Sex Scandal Stages a Comeback,
Wash. Times, Aug. 15, 1989, at El. Accordingly, whiie we can discern an abstract commit-
ment to decency and fair play in public life, the precise contours of the norms cannot be
defined concretely.
Most generally, all of the social norms described above, see supra notes 371-75, only
achieve consensus at an abstract level and are subject to limitation by other beliefs. Most
would agree, for example, that truthfulness in discourse cannot be an absolute value. In
addition, there is a large area involving statements not subject to empirical verification
where truth is impossible to establish and may be irrelevant altogether. Similarly, the
value of a free and independent press-may also lead to a countervailing fear of the power
of the press itself and its incursions into private life. The political value of an open govern-
ment may be counterbalanced, for many, by the perceived values in leadership, efficiency
of decision-making, and national security.. See supra note 349. The values of self-determi-
nation and autonomy, which are necessarily implicated by secrecy, may theoretically be
countered by values in community. The value in resisting manipulation is subject to the
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Obviously, the source prototypes are unrealistic. Virtually no
actual sources will conform perfectly to all the idealized charac-
teristics of either prototype. In reality, we can visualize relation-
ships of confidentiality between the press and its sources as rang-
ing over a spectrum between the two poles.377  Yet, by
representing unambiguous antinomies, the models serve to frame
more particularized assessments of the value of secret-keeping.
C. Considerations Relevant to a Contextual Analysis of
Source Confidentiality Claims
Schematically put, in order to determine whether to enforce
particular press promises of confidentiality to sources, courts
have to develop richly textured pictures of the circumstances of
confidentiality and where they fall on the imaginary spectrum be-
tween the whistleblower and the strategic manipulator. Naturally,
although this will require courts explicitly to measure shades of
gray, guideposts in that project can be discerned from the cul-
tural values underlying our sympathy for whistleblowers and from
criticism that we often cannot profitably distinguish between manipulative and non-ma-
nipulative conduct. The value in an informed electorate is subject to limitations on the
ability to process information and the countervailing value of efficiency in government.
Practical problems with norms of full information abound: no individual can ever truly
have it; no two parties agree on what it is; and at a certain point, too much knowledge may
be paralyzing and dysfunctional.
Despite the abstract conflicts within our social values and our own ambivalence about
the extent of our commitment to them, some of the difficulties will be mitigated by rich
contextualization. The norms will not always be equally compelling when addressed in
particular contexts and situations. For example, although most people would not take is-
sue with the necessity of some level of secrecy in government dealings, they may well be
suspicious of blanket claims based on government secrecy and national security. History
has demonstrated that governments tend to overclassify their documents and unduly hide
behind the cloak of national security in seeking secrecy. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, supra
note 47, at 342-45; Harvard Note, supra note 372, at 906-14. There is no reason to suppose
that other bureaucratic organizations do not share the same tendency. ESSAYS IN SOCIOL-
OGY, supra note 247, at 233-34. With respect to norms about information, we generally
believe that more information is better because it permits us to behave as citizens, even
though it does not guarantee that we will not make mistakes. In other words, given the
power of government and other quasi-public interests, we should promote those practices
of source confidentiality which will lead to the dissemination of information counteracting
existing disempowerment, even if they do not provide all possible information and even if
we cannot wisely or rationally absorb all of it.
377. See Lewis, Trading News for Anonymity: Washington Reporters Bargain Daily
With Sources Over Who May Be Identified, ASNE BULL., Apr. 1988, at 3, 6 (suggesting
that "[t]he gamut of objectionable obscurity runs between these extremes," referring to
whistleblowers on the one hand, and political sources who have the "desire to escape pub-
lic accountability for their statements" on the other).
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the realities of the press' relationship with government.
Therefore, this Article suggests that the following five consider-
ations be addressed by courts seeking to envision the contexts of
breach of contract actions by confidential sources: (1) the charac-
ter of the source's substantive information;3 7 (2) the source's rea-
sons for leaking; (3) the relevance of the source's identity; 79 (4)
the press' reasons for disclosure; and (5) the nature of the rela-
tionship between the reporter and the source."' 0
Any proposal that apppears to invoke a variety of contextual
factors within the frame of some kind of analogical process inevi-
tably raises questions about identifying methodology. Is this an
interest balancing test? If so, to say only that the different con-
siderations must be balanced is to beg the question.381 How ex-
actly is a court to balance the relevant factors in making its deci-
sion? How is the court to decide what evidence is relevant in the
first place for that task?
Instead of a conventional interest balancing test, this Article
proposes a historically and democratically grounded contextualist
method. In fact, it seeks less to promote a formal test than to
foster an attitude and direct a sensibility.
The approach, at base, relies on the assumption that the judi-
cial decision-making process is not too different from the highly
context-sensitive way in which we regularly make decisions in our
lives. 2  In turn, experience suggests the following characteriza-
378. This would, in turn, involve inquiry into the truth of the information; whether it
was a plant; its nature and relative importance; and whether its original disclosure was a
crime. See FED. COMM. Comment, supra note 19, at 312-13 (agreeing, although in the con-
text of a different analysis, with the usefulness of some of these considerations).
379. The inquiry with respect to this factor would require an examination of why the
source sought anonymity and whether, how, and to what extent the identity of the source
was relevant to the story. See infra note 393 on the use of the term "relevance" in this
context.
380. This consideration would require an assessment of the power position of the source
in her own hierarchy, her sophistication in dealing with the press, the particular character-
istics of the relationship at issue, and the specificity of the promise of confidentiality.
381. For a history and critique of balancing in the constitutional context, see Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
382. This Article does not attempt the theoretical project of articulating jurisprudential
justifications for the approach it suggests. Nor does it seek formally to espouse any partic-
ular decisionmaking theory in the social science literature. Rather, it is intended both to
suggest and to represent a useful, common-sensical way of structuring and guiding judicial
inquiries. Nevertheless, it should be obvious that my thinking has been influenced by the
Realist tradition, and shares elements in common with current feminist legal methods,
applications of cognitive theory to law, and recent work on the role of empathy in judicial
decision-making. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 215; Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods,
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tion of that decisional process. First, decisions are not made ab-
stractly. Analytically, they are preceded by a descriptive or
characterological moment, in which we attempt to develop a com-
plete, coherent picture of the decisional stakes and circum-
stances. 83 Second, it is at least in part that picture which deter-
mines which decisional factors we will consider relevant in the
circumstances."8 ' The character of the picture influences how we
think about it. Third, a number of such pictures are often ration-
ally possible in any given context and the selection of one rather
than another may have significant normative consequences.
By richly describing the complex institutional history of the
American press and by rejecting abstract and uni-dimensional
characterizations of particular press-source relationships, this Ar-
ticle proposes a reality-based framework for the judicial descrip-
tive moment. In other words, it cautions judges to eschew com-
forting platitudes about the press either as a fierce guardian of
freedom or as an unprincipled seeker after fortune. Rather, it ex-
plicitly requires them to focus on the actual democratic values at
stake in the interactions between the press and its confidential
sources.
103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 849-50 (1990) (describing "feminist practical reasoning"); Hender-
son, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1576 (1987); West, Taking Preferences
Seriously, 64 TULANE L. REV. 659, 701 (1990); Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the
Agon Between Legal Powek and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989).
383. I use the visual metaphor for reasons of convenience and not to take a position on
whether, and to what extent, cognition is in fact conducted largely by visualization. More-
over, I do not mean to suggest that the descriptive moment is necessarily conscious, intel-
lectual, or solitary and self-generative. In the judicial context, for example, it is the parties
who provide the decision-maker with the choice of contextual descriptions or stories with
which they hope to persuade her.
384. Professor Schauer, for example, has criticized proposals for contextualized under-
standings of the Constitution because "the call to context and the idea of decision accord-
ing to rule are fundamentally in conflict." Schauer, Context and Constitutionalism, 12
HAMLINE L. REV. 59, 66 (1988). In his view, the effect of constitutional rules is to dictate
choices among contextually relevant factors-"to remove from the context of decision cer-
tain factors that are part of the context of the event." Id. at 67.
Whatever the ultimate merits of Professor Schauer's position, his critique of contextual-
ism is not inconsistent with the sense of context-specificity proposed here. The description
in text relates to a common-sensical observation about relevance determinations: that dif-
ferent rules of decision will be called forth by different characterizations of a set of facts.
Cf. Tribe & Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057,
1065 (1990) (on the outcome-determinative character of differences in levels of generality
at which constitutional rights are described).- Moreover, it is a thesis of this Article that
the first amendment and existing social norms can provide the guideposts for shaping the
descriptive, contextualizing moment. Thus, rules may be less constraining, and context
more so, than Professor Schauer suggests.
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1. The Character of the Information
a. Falsity
In theory, neither contract doctrine nor cultural norms about
when to respect promises of confidentiality would support en-
forcement of such promises when the information provided by the
source is false. The prime example of such a situation would be a
blatant and empirically verifiable lie, such as a government dis-
information campaign. Both norms of truthfulness and dictates of
the democratic vision entail that high government officials who
intentionally lie to the public should not then be able to sue the
press for uncovering the lie and reporting on the circumstances in
which it was disseminated. It would fundamentally hamper the
press' roles as informer, interpreter, and watchdog to allow the
Secretary of Defense a cause of action against the press for having
revealed his role in disseminating an outright lie.38
Nevertheless, falsity is a problematic notion to use as a thresh-
old exclusion in all but a small set of very clear-cut situations.
First, there is often a time period between the disclosure of infor-
mation by the source and the press' ability to confirm its truth.
Second, and more importantly, the truth about a piece of infor-
mation consists not only of its narrow empirical verifiability, but
also of its broader context. Often, then, while a source's disclosure
will be true in a narrow sense, it will not disclose the entire story.
Therefore, a narrowly interpreted notion of truthfulness will
often inaccurately assess a particular source's disclosure. Finally,
a focus on falsity alone will not address the knowledge and culpa-
bility of the source in transmitting the information.
b. Whether the disclosure was a plant
The classic example of press manipulation is the plant. Because
by and large the press is the only mass conduit of most informa-
tion, manipulating or misleading the press necessarily dis-
empowers the public as well. 86 Even if the planted information is
385. Another simple situation in which truth should be dispositive is the case of a
source passing a fraudulent document to a reporter. For example, during the 1980 Presi-
dential election, a source known to columnist Jack Anderson only as "Lloyd" leaked an
alleged CIA document which predicted a 60% loss of the Iran hostages in the event of a
rescue attempt. Anderson printed the story after the election and it was subsequently dis-
covered that the memorandum had been forged. See E. ABEL, supra note 1, at 38.
386. The fact that the press also manipulates the public, though important, does not
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in a narrow sense true, the device of the plant is a potent weapon
in the hands of official authority to manage the press and pre-
clude more searching inquiry. Plants allow journalists to think
that they are crafting the vision of reality being disseminated to
the public, while they are, in reality, simply serving as tools of
those in authority. The danger of this is, of course, that it relaxes
the press' vigilance, further entrenches the power of government
officials, and undermines the separation between the press and
government by turning journalists into unwitting propagandists.I While plants are disempowering by definition, it is often very
difficult to distinguish a plant from an unauthorized leak. 7
Moreover, there will presumably be situations in which journalists
knew that they were simply passing on planted information and
nevertheless agreed to confidentiality for the source. Finally, the
nature of the information, the degree and source of authorization,
and the relevance of the particular planter's identity to a full un-
derstanding of the status and character of the plant itself may all
affect our assessment of the level of public disempowerment en-
tailed by anonymity for the source. All this suggests that the
question of whether the information was planted should not alone
be determinative of whether a particular promise of confidential-
ity to a source should be enforced.
c. The nature and importance of the information
The nature and importance of the information provided by the
source are obviously relevant both to the substantive concern of
promoting well-informed public discourse and to the institutional
value of enhancing the independent, critical role of the press. For
example, this factor might become central when considered with
other factors, such as the relevance of the source's identity to the
story. Suppose, for example, that the disclosure concerned per-
sonal information about a minority political leader, which was
collected and confidentially leaked by the FBI in order to under-
mine his political support. Thus, the nature and importance of
the source's information will often be a critical guidepost in de-
termining the "real" story in a source disclosure situation.388
justify a different rule as to government. Moreover, whatever the scope of its power, the
press is still systematically less powerful as an institution than the state.
387. See supra Section I.A.3. (on the difficulties of distinguishing leaks and plants).
388. See supra note 314.
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d. Criminality of the original disclosure
The press defendant will presumably argue, as a threshold or
categorical matter, that its promise of confidentiality should not
be enforced when the initial leak by the source would itself con-
stitute a criminal act or would otherwise violate statutes or ad-
ministrative rules. 89 The press defendant might make this argu-
ment, for example, if the source had leaked classified information
or documents. 390 This Article suggests that the criminality of the
source's disclosure simply be one consideration used in the deter-
mination of whether a particular agreement is to be deemed bind-
ing, rather than a threshold factor that voids the agreement. In
most instances, the reporter is fully aware of the potentially crim-
inal nature of the source's activity and should be subject to the
"unclean hands" defense. It would be particularly counter-intui-
tive to prevent recovery by prototypical whistleblowers under
these circumstances, while enabling strategically manipulative
high public officials-who have the authority to reveal or declas-
sify information at their own discretion-to sue the press on its
promises.39 1
2. The Source's Reasons for Leaking
An attempt to characterize the reasons for a source's original
leak will be useful in developing the context of the confidentiality
transaction. Sometimes, the source's subordinate role in her hier-
archy and her whistle-blowing reasons for leaking will be clear.
Similarly, it will sometimes be obvious that a source with a politi-
cal interest in an issue engaged in a trial balloon or a policy leak.
Conversely, the fact that the exposed information had little rele-
vance to the leaker's position and occupation might suggest that
389. Such an argument would rest on the doctrinal proposition that courts do not en-
force illegal bargains. See supra note 142.
390. Although the United States has no official secrets act which would criminalize the
unauthorized publication of confidential government information, various federal statutes
impose criminal penalties on disclosure of certain categories of information. See generally
Note, Plugging the Leak: The Case for a Legislative Resolution of the Conflict Between
the Demands of Secrecy and the Need for an Open Government, 71 VA. L. REv. 801
(1985); Blasi, supra note 216, at 644; Edgar & Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Pub-
lication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973); Note, The Constitutiona-
lity of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 83 COLuM. L. REV. 727 (1983).
391. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 47, at 355 (on high level of leaks of classified
information by government itself); D. MINOR, supra note 267, at 13-15; Harvard Note,
supra note 372, at 910-16 (on selective declassification).
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the information was revealed for ego, goodwill, or animus reasons.
However, this consideration in itself cannot serve to determine
whether promises of confidentiality should be enforced in any
given circumstance. In large part, this is because there is no con-
sensus that, at the abstract level, any of these categories of rea-
sons for leaking should be disapproved per se. s92 Furthermore,
reasons for leaking will often tend to be mixed or unclear.
3. The Relevance of the Source's Identity
An inquiry into why the source sought anonymity and whether,
and to what extent, his identity was relevant to the story93 is
392. While this may not be the case with respect to animus leaks, they often cannot be
distinguished or separated from other politically-motivated leaks.
393. Relevance here simply refers to the pertinence of the source's identity to the
story-whether there is a "close logical relationship" between the identity of the source
and the substance of the story. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (2d College ed. 1972).
See also infra text accompanying note 398. I use the concept of relevance of the source's
identity to the story rather than the more common notion of "newsworthiness" because of
the tautological meaning of newsworthiness-what is newsworthy is what the press thinks
is fit to print or broadcast. One way of trying to attach some independent meaning to the
notion is to define newsworthy information as information that relates to a matter of pub-
lic concern. Of course, even that attempt is subject to criticism at least at an abstract level.
How do we establish what information is a matter of public or general concern? Neverthe-
less, despite the potentially large penumbral areas in which the distinction between pri-
vate and public concerns may be hard to draw on a consistent and principled basis, it
seems relatively uncontestable that at least narrowly political matters fit into the core of
newsworthy information of public concern. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32
(1961) (on core applications of rules); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political
Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 300
(1978) (contending that while the scope of first amendment protection is narrow, it clearly
encompasses political speech); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (asserting that constitutional protection should only be
extended to speech that is expressly political). Even if what the public is in fact interested
in discussing does not include these matters, we ought to consider them fundamentally
newsworthy in light of the appropriate role of the press in a democracy.
In fact, the concept of "public concern" as a test for press rights has had a checkered
history in the Supreme Court. In the defamation context, a plurality of the Court in Ro-
senbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 45-49 (1971), agreed upon a subject matter
rather than a status-based test for application of the New York Times standard. Fearing
that this inquiry left the door open for judicial content control, the Court rejected the
subject matter approach in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974), and
returned to the plaintiff's status as the trigger for constitutional privilege. Nevertheless, a
focus on "public concern" has reappeared in the guise of a speech-defining test. See, e.g.,
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,.475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (establishing that pri-
vate figure plaintiff bears burden of proving falsity when defamatory statement involves
speech of public concern); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749,
761-63 (1985) (allowing the imposition of presumed and punitive damages for defamatory
speech about a private figure when the statements do not involve matters of public
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useful in determining whether the disclosure of the source's iden-
tity permitted the press to assert its independence and to trigger
a readjustment of the distribution of power between the govern-
ment and its citizens. Bacon's adage that knowledge is power is
particularly apt in this context.
As noted above; there are a number of situations in which a
source might seek anonymity in order to avoid public attention. If
anonymity is critical to the accomplishment of the source's sub-
stantive aims, then this strategic reason may be substantively re-
levant. An assessment of whether the reasons for the source's de-
sire to avoid publicity should justify enforcing the promise of
confidentiality in any given case will depend on substantive judg-
ments about the social harm of hiding the source's identity and
about the relevance of the identity to the full story. 9 For exam-
ple, the publication of a trial balloon does not in itself necessarily
truncate or discourage public debate. In any given case, the court
will have to decide how much it matters to public discourse and
the substantive desirability of the proposal that a particular
source is attempting to float a particular trial balloon. 39 5 Simi-
larly, sources may seek anonymity because they feel that their
identities will somehow overshadow the substantive merit of their
policy proposal.396 In those circumstances, the relevance of the
identity of the source to the story is a much more complex mat-
ter. By contrast, courts might decide that a story has a funda-
mentally misleading impact on public debate if, for example, the
source sought anonymity in order to present a false appearance of
neutrality. 97
Whether a particular source's identity 'would be relevant and
whether its non-disclosure would undermine public discourse can-
not be categorically predicted in advance. First, relevance is a re-
concern).
394. Of course, that itself will hinge on a determination of what the "full" or "real"
story is-which will involve an assessment of the nature and importance of the source's
information. See supra Section IV.C.I.c.; supra note 314 and accompanying text.
395. For example, most people would agree as to the relative importance for public de-
bate of whether a trial balloon concerning a planned cease fire in the Persian Gulf War
originated in the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or in that of a state
legislator.
396. This refers to a situation, for example, in which a policy proponent's fame, notori-
ety, or previously espoused ideological positions may undermine substantive discussion of
her proposal.
397. Here, for example, we might include the classic case of the anonymous dissemina-
tion of false statements about opponents in political campaigns.
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lative concept. It requires an assessment of the nature and impor-
tance of the substantive information and exactly how the identity
of the source is pertinent to it."" Second, while the identity of the
whistleblower, the ego leaker, or the goodwill leaker often may
not be particularly relevant to the substantive story being told,
that will not necessarily always be the case. 9
The question of the relevance of the source's identity need not
rest solely on the court's probabilistic assessments, however.
Since the issue will necessarily arise in the context of a lawsuit by
the source subsequent to disclosure, some sense of the public's
actual reaction to the identity of the source may be available
through press accounts.
4. The Press' Reasons for Disclosure
The issue of why the press divulged the identity of the source is
also fraught with difficulties and cannot be considered indepen-
dently of the other factors. Although circumstantial evidence may
be useful for establishing reasons for particular disclosures, there
may be multiple motivations for a particular breach of a promise
of confidentiality.
The media could have exposed a source primarily for economic
or reputational self-interest. 00 The source could also have been
398. See supra note 393. For example, it could be argued that Daniel Cohen's actions in
leaking the information would pale in relevance if the substantive information he deli-
vered were earth-shattering. See supra note 114.
399. Suppose, for example, that the Department of Defense has commissioned three
studies on the effects of radiation from nuclear testing, and has only chosen to make pub-
lic the studies which minimize those effects. If a leaker provides the press with the third
study, which contradicts the findings of the others, the justification for its publication
would be that it results in a readjustment of power in the relationship between the gover-
nors and the governed: it gives the governed the opportunity for self-determination. Sup-
pose, furthermore, that the leaker authored the study; had had less access to relevant data
than the other authors; and was an unduly alarmist personality who had been fired be-
cause he jumped to conclusions too quickly on the basis of available data. Under those
facts, his identity would be relevant to the story in that it would cause the public to
reevaluate the information and place it in a larger context. Then the revelation of the
leaker's identity would also lead to an empowering readjustment.
400. Litigation presents one prototypical instance in which self-interest has prompted
some news organizations to contemplate the disclosure of their sources. A few news
oganizations enter into explicit agreements with their sources which stipulate that the
sources' identities may be disclosed in the litigation context. See E. LAMBETH, supra note
34, at 143. The Chicago Tribune and the Wall Street Journal, for example, distinguish
between anonymity and confidentiality, and advise their anonymous sources that although
their names will not appear in published stories, they may be disclosed in litigation or
"other unusual circumstances." Jones, supra note 160, at 12; Jones, supra note 297, at B8.
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disclosed through inadvertence.0 1 If the source were disclosed by
See supra note 297.
For those news organizations without disclosure agreements with sources, the defama-
tion action presents a paradigmatic instance of economic incentives to disclose source
identities. One publicized instance involved the order by the management of the Daily
News in Los Angeles to two of its reporters to disclose the identities of their confidential
sources in a libel action brought by one of the former Iran hostages on a story about him.
Lindsey, supra note 294, at A8, discussed in Berger, The "No-Source" Presumption: The
Harshest Remedy, 36 AM. U.L. REV, 603, 603-07 (1987). Although the issue became moot
when the reporters persuaded the sources to allow themselves to be identified, the incident
demonstrates the economic incentives for disclosure in defamation actions.
Courts have imposed a variety of sanctions, including judgments in plaintiffs' favor and
jury instructions that the source did not exist, on news organizations which seek to rely on
confidential sources in defending against defamation claims while refusing to divulge the
identities of the sources. See Berger, supra, at 613-24; Southern California Note, supra
note 299, at 1641-43; Kirtley, Discovery in Libel Cases Involving Confidential Sources
and Non-Confidential Information, 90 DICK. L. REV. 641, 662-63 (1986); Note, Source Pro-
tection in Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 338, 339 (1981); Note,
supra note 177, at 363, 371. Although many state shield laws protect journalists from hav-
ing to disclose their confidential sources in defamation actions, some states explicitly ex-
empt defamation defendants from protection. Kirtley, supra, at 644 n.30. Even without
the specific imposition of such sanctions, juries may well be uncomfortable with the press'
reliance on confidential sources and may discount the credibility of the defendant's testi-
mony as to the existence and reliability of unknown sources. In view of the currency of
multi-million dollar verdicts against the press in defamation actions in the past decade,
economic self-interest will often counsel breach of promises of confidentiality in these cir-
cumstances. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th
Cir. 1987) (award of $3.05 million in defamation action); see also Report Says Media Far-
ing Better in Libel Suits, Broadcasting, Sept. 11, 1989, at 133 (describing libel judgment
statistics for media companies compiled by Libel Defense Resource Center).
A media organization might also disclose a source's identity in order to vindicate its own
reputation. This would occur, for example, when the press organization attracts bad pub-
licity as a result of its reliance on a confidential source. See E. LAMBETH, supra note 34, at
143 ("public ill will often generated by a refusal to testify"). An analogous situation which
has been the topic of much public controversy is the legitimacy of press
promises-extracted in return for interviews-to refuse to reveal the location of terrorists
and other fugitives. In May, 1986, for example, NBC broadcast an exclusive interview with
Mohammad Abu Abbas, the mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking in October, 1985.
M. EMERY & E. EMERY, supra note 225, at 531. The network obtained the interview after
promising that Abbas' whereabouts would not be publicly disclosed. Id. See A Question of
Ethics, MACLEAN'S, May 19, 1986, at 25. This is, of course, only an analogy because the
negative public response was due not only to the public's lack of knowledge per se, but to
their disapproval of practices which make the media complicitous with those who commit
crimes. See, e.g., Parachini, AMA Journal Death Essay Triggers Flood of Controversy,
Los Angeles Times, Feb. 19, 1988, part 5, at 1, col. 2 (describing controversy over medical
magazine's refusal to identify author of article confessing to euthanasia); Nagel, How to
Stop Libel Suits and Still Protect Individual Reputation, 17 WASH. MONTHLY 12, 15
(1985) (criticizing Phil Donohue and Bob Greene for "harboring" criminals by keeping
interviewees secret). Nevertheless, the example is useful to demonstrate the existence of a
current debate on press confidentiality in more general terms.
401. For example, such mistaken disclosure can occur because of technical problems, for
example. Particularly in the broadcast context, existing technology may sometimes fail to
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the press in a defamation suit, and if the identity of the source
were not particularly relevant to the story, then a court could
conclude that disclosure by the press would not be justified as
promoting democratic values. The analysis would be different if
the media were to claim that they disclosed the source's identity
because it was already known to large segments of the commu-
nity, or because of what they perceived to be the public interest.
This might occur as a consequence of changes in the cirumstances
subsequent to the moment of agreement. In one such type of case,
press disclosure might hinge on a change of circumstances preci-
pitated by the source which provides a new reason for regarding
his identity as germane to the story. Suppose, for example, that a
source confidentially tells a journalist of his involvement with a
public official in some illegal, unethical, or morally questionable
activity and thereafter runs for public office himself. Or suppose
that a source, particularly a governmental source, publicly lies
about his communications with the press for reasons other than
merely protecting his identity. Newsweek offered this justification
when it reported in 1987 that Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North
had been the magazine's anonymous source for its 1985 cover
story on the Achille Lauro hijacking. 02 Disclosure in those situa-
disguise a source completely while on the air. Because both visual images and the subjects'
voices have to be distorted and disguised, technological failure can affect confidentiality at
a number of points in the process. Even when technology does not fail, the complexity and
bureaucracy of modern broadcast and print news operations increase the possibility that
sources' identities will be disclosed by mistake. Since many news organizations today re-
quire their reporters to share the identities of their sources internally-with their editors,
for example-many people in the news organization have the opportunity to err by disclo-
sure. See supra note 293.
402. See supra notes 102 & 294. The problem with North's actions was not only that he
had himself put in issue his status as a leaker. He had also sought to make Newsweek an
accomplice in his lie to Congress. Moreover, if his falsehood had not been unveiled by the
magazine, his substantive charge that Congress' "leakiness" justified lying might have
been legitimated.
An analogous disclosure occurred during the Eisenhower administration, when Admiral
Robert Carney, who had been quoted as predicting war in the Formosa Strait during a
deep background meeting, testified before a Senate committee that he had been mis-
quoted. Although a reporter who was present at the briefing had taken verbatim notes
that confirmed the original reports, he felt that he could not use them because of his
agreement not to quote or attribute the information gained at the meeting. Instead of
simply keeping silent, however, he gave his notes to a fellow newsman who had not been at
the meeting and thus did not feel bound by the background rules. He apparently did so
because of his "outrage" that the Chief of Naval Operations could predict war without
attribution. D. WISE, supra note 39, at 289-90.
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tions would "set the record straight. 40 3
In the second type of case, disclosure would not be predicated
on external events affecting the newsworthiness of the source's
identity. Rather, after granting confidentiality, the reporter might
realize something which makes the source's identity a subject of
public concern. This can happen in a variety of ways, the most
obvious of which is the reporter's realization that the source's in-
formation is a plant, misleading, false or incomplete, or that the
identity of the source is otherwise material to the story.0 4
5. The Nature of the Relationship
a. The particular dynamics of the interaction
An inquiry into the power position of the source in his own hi-
erarchy, his sophistication, and the particular dynamics of the re-
lationship between the reporter and the source can help in ad-
dressing the fairness of enforcing the press' promise under the
circumstances. It can also illuminate the extent to which we
should worry about the institutional disempowerment of the press
in a particular case. If, for example, the relationship is one close
to pure seduction and betrayal by the press-in which the jour-
nalist has pursued the source, earned his trust, and lied to him to
ensure his cooperation-then it is unlikely that the promise of
confidentiality was unwillingly extorted from the journalist by a
powerful, strategically manipulative source. If, on the other hand,
the relationship is more ambivalent and complex, then a much
more searching inquiry is warranted into the effects of enforcing
the promise.
403. Responding to the North disclosure, for example, the Editor of the Louisville Cou-
rier-Journal stated that it would be incumbent on the press to set the record straight
"where the source publicly accuses someone else of leaking a story for devious purposes."
Zuckerman, supra note 89, at 61.
404. The simplest example occurs when the reporter promises confidentiality on the ba-
sis of the source's information and discovers the source's identity only after making the
promise. Suppose, for example, that an unidentified source reveals his personal know-
ledge-from having been involved himself-that a nominee for a high government post
was involved in atrocities in Vietnam and only after a promise of confidentiality admits
his identity as a member of Congress himself.
A similar scenario arises when the source requests confidentiality without first providing
sufficient information for the reporter to understand the potential newsworthiness of the
conjunction of the source's identity with the information ultimately provided. This is one
way of characterizing what happened in Cohen. See supra note 114 (quoting the actual
language of Cohen's offer of information to the reporters).
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b. Specificity of the non-disclosure agreement
In addition to the apparent dynamics of the relationship be-
tween the reporter and the source, the particulars of the agree-
ment of confidentiality may suggest whether the parties initially
understood one another's assurances and expectations. Most
agreements of confidentiality in the press context are oral. Many
are implicit or are sought part-way through the process of disclo-
sure rather than at the beginning. 05 In addition, since many
source-reporter relationships are of long duration, they involve,
over time, the exchange of information at different levels of sensi-
tivity. There may not be discrete agreements as to the level of
confidentiality accorded to each piece of information. Moreover,
reporters often bargain with long-term sources for changes in the
ground rules of confidentiality.406 Finally, sources and reporters
may assign different meanings to the language that has become
conventional in these situations.40  The identity of the source and
405. In addition, changes in ground rules at government briefings can become very con-
fusing to all parties involved. J. DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 71.
406. See Blasi, supra note 19, at 243. The revelation by then-Washington Post editor
William Greider of David Stockman's serious reservations about Reagan's 1981 budget
policies, while Stockman was still director of the Office of Management and Budget, pro-
vides an excellent example. See generally W. GREIDER, supra note 55; Greider, supra note
335, at 10; see also supra note 102. Despite an original agreement that their interviews
would be off the record, Greider persuaded Stockman to permit him to use some of the
interviews on a background basis for his stories in the Post. Finally, Greider contended
that he received Stockman's permission to use the material in a magazine piece in Septem-
ber, 1981. The revelations were explosive and sensationalized by the rest of the media,
although neither Greider nor Stockman thought they would be. In the resulting flap,
Stockman claimed that he and Greider had a misunderstanding as to the ground rules of
their meetings. See D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 343-47; W. GREIDER, supra note 55. Ne-
gotiations on attribution rules also characterize government briefings for reporters. J.
DEAKIN, supra note 36, at 71.
407. As discussed above, a sophisticated set of terms of art has developed in the disclo-
sure context, particularly among government sources and the Washington press corps. See
supra note 39. However, there is no single definition unchangingly adhered to by all play-
ers. The terms are ambiguous and are often interpreted to mean different things by those
who use them. See T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34, at 189-90; Jones, supra note 297, at B8;
Rosenfeld, supra note 39, at 7-9.
Uncertainty as to the particular meaning intended is most probable when sources are
uninitiated in the etiquette of talking to the press. This is a particularly thorny problem
for unsophisticated sources. See, e.g., D. BRODER, supra note 34, at 341 (recounting unso-
phisticated source's surprise that journalist friend would report statements he assumed
were made in confidence). Many government bureaucrats as well do not know the rules of
the press-politician relationship and will ask for confidentiality after they have spoken.
PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at 36. Even sophisticated sources like David Stockman
may feel-or at least claim-that their ground rules of confidentiality may have been mis-
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the particular dynamics of the reporter-source relationship should
influence a court's assessment of who should bear the risk of such
misunderstandings.
In sum, the approach suggested in this Article requires courts
to determine where a particular source plaintiff fits in the contin-
uum between the prototypical whistleblower and the prototypical
"sourcerer." That determination in turn requires that courts be
sensitive to issues of power, position, motivation, and effects in
any given disclosure action by sources against the press. A con-
text-sensitive assessment in any such lawsuit should enable courts
to discover and reveal what is truly at stake for the culturally
valued norms of well-informed public discourse, democratic gov-
ernment, and an independent press.
D. The Approach Applied
Because the approach suggested here is a context-sensitive
model, it cannot abstractly be used to predict the results of par-
ticular contract actions by sources. However, it does suggest that
there will be some easy cases. If classic whistleblowers Karen
Silkwood and Ernest Fitzgerald '0 e were to sue the press for a
breach of promise of confidentiality, the various factors listed
above would make it easy for courts to find their agreements en-
forceable. If Henry Kissinger were to have sued the press for
breaching the anonymity ground rules of a backgrounder in which
he lied about United States military intervention in Cambodia,
however, the social policy considerations underlying the deci-
sional guidelines would clearly dictate that he .lose. Those are the
easy cases, in which real life closely parallels the idealized proto-
types of the sympathetic whistleblower and the despicable
manipulator.
What about Joseph Fries and Daniel Cohen, who both sought
legal redress for their injuries and whose contract actions frame
understood by reporters. See supra note 406. Some sophisticated sources have been ac-
cused of allowing their contempt for the press to stop them from learning the distinctions
in the vocabulary. PRESS CONNECTION, supra note 36, at xiii (providing Alexander Haig as
an example). This is particularly so when explicit understandings are not arrived at by
reporters and sources and when sources do not use the traditional, albeit ambiguous, terms
of art for the rules of their discourse. A case in point is journalist Milton Coleman's revela-
tion of controversial remarks made by then-presidential candidate Jesse Jackson in 1984.
See supra notes 88, 104, 334 & 336.
408. See supra note 59.
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this Article?40 9 Officer Fries would probably recover in his con-
tract action under this Article's proposed approach, if any misun-
derstanding as to the scope of the promise of confidentiality were
resolved in his favor.4 10 After all, according to the available facts,
Fries was a classic whistleblower, taking the risk of retaliation to
provide potentially important information about the operation of
a fundamental governmental service.
Dan Cohen's story is more ambiguous. My sense is that, all
things considered, the approach suggested in this Article should
not lead to a victory for Daniel Cohen.'" A fact-sensitive look at
Cohen shows a close-to-prototypical "sourceristic" situation. Con-
fidentiality was sought strategically and misleadingly by a sophis-
ticated source whose political partisanship was critical to the
story. The source's identity was already known in the commu-
nity." ' Keeping the promise of confidentiality would have re-
sulted in skewed public debate and would have misled voters as
to the tactics and character of the Republican candidates on the
eve of the election.'" Yet a'court might wonder whether actual
409. See supra Section I.D., in which the Fries and Cohen cases are first discussed.
410. See supra note 111.
411. This is far clearer under the proposed approach than under the alternative of ap-
plying a version of the constitutional privilege in defamation. See Minnesota Note, supra
note 16, at 1584-85.
412. Oberdorfer, supra note 11, at 8.
413. While the substantive information provided by Cohen was true, Cohen's leak was a
conspiratorial attempt by Republican supporters to harm the Democratic campaign at a
time close to the election, making it difficult for them to recover from the negative public
image. Confidentiality was necessary to achieve the objective sought, lest the tactic back-
fire and subject the Republicans to charges of unfairness.
Why did the reporters promise confidentiality? The facts indicate that Cohen gave the
reporters only a vague reference to "documents about a candidate for statewide election"
before extracting a promise of confidentiality from them. He did not tell them to which
candidate his information Pertained. He did not tell them that the information could be
found in public records. On the basis of his initial approach, each of the reporters could
well have expected to receive critical information that could sway the vote. It could well
have been the stuff of which Pulitzer Prizes are made. In addition, Cohen did not dissemi-
nate the information on an exclusive basis. This is precisely an example of the type of
situation in which, because of the media's own competitive concerns, the journalists were
at a disadvantage in contrast to Cohen.
What about the information itself? It seems clear that publicity about an arrest for
unlawful assembly in the course of a peaceful civil rights demonstration to promote minor-
ity hiring by the city would not be seen by the voting public as a major blot on the candi-
date's record. At most, that information would make her position clear with respect to
minority hiring issues. It might even have had a positive impact on her candidacy, at least
for like-minded voters who would see her as having the courage of her convictions.
Thus, the more substantively important element of Cohen's information was the vacated
728
1991] CONFIDENTIAL PRESS-SOURCE RELATIONS 729
disclosure of the source's name was necessary or whether suffi-
cient positional identification might have adequately protected
the public interest. It might be swayed by the suggestion that Co-
hen did not specifically know the full circumstances of the crimi-
nal record he disclosed. Nevertheless, because the specific identi-
fication of Cohen lent needed credibility to the report and
diverted suspicion from other possible leakers, because disclosure
gave the voting public the "full" story, and because Cohen's inte-
rest in seeking anonymity for an authorized "dirty trick" was not
particularly worthy of protection, I would suggest that the Cohen
situation is closer to that of Kissinger than that of Silkwood.
There will presumably be much harder cases than Cohen. In
those cases, various of the identified considerations and underly-
ing policies will clash in more direct ways. The resolutions
reached by courts will require their overt admission that some
substantive value was highlighted for reasons not somehow com-
pelled by the logic of the case. The requirement that courts arti-
culate these substantive visions as a precondition to making deci-
sions in these cases is not particularly novel; in fact, it is
descriptive of judicial desicion-making. Courts always have sub-
stantive visions as background rules whenever they choose be-
tween one set of potentially applicable legal rules and another.
Moreover, given the malleability and interpretability of facts,
courts will differ in the ways in which they choose to interpret
and characterize the factual context of any given source-confiden-
conviction for shoplifting. The story in the newspapers made clear that the arrest and
conviction were for shoplifting $6.00 worth of sewing supplies shortly after her father's
death, when she was, in a distraught state and forgot to pay for the supplies. The potential
effect of this information on the voting public is obviously hard to assess. It does seem
unlikiny that given her consistent community involvement and service thereafter, the pub-
lic would decide that a 12-year-old, vacated conviction for a petty misdemeanor would ipso
facto make her unfit to hold office as Lieutenant Governor. Even Justice Yetka of the
Minnesota Supreme Court in dissent characterized the revelations as "rather trivial infrac-
tions." Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d at 206.
Cohen himself seemed to recognize that the information itself did not appear to be sub-
stantively fatal to the Democratic candidacy. In an argument similar to that used to justify
the press' interest in Gary Hart's adulterous love life during his bid for the Presidency,
Cohen claimed that the importance of his information lay in the fact that the candidate
did not disclose it herself and that the non-disclosure called into question her integrity
and judgment.
Yet, in view of the marginal importance of the substance of the information, what made
the stories really newsworthy was that the indirect attack on the Democratic candidate's
integrity and judgment was being made by the Republican camp practically on the eve of
the election-. without attribution and responsibility.
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tiality case.
A discretionary standard, which requires courts to articulate
ideological presuppositions and deal with particular cases in a
contextual fashion, is subject to two sorts of criticism with respect
to judicial application. First, given the manipulability of facts and
the predictable availability of a number of characterization scena-
rios, a discretionary standard may lead to significant uncertainty
in application. Second, an explicitly discretionary standard may
run the risk of being applied in a fashion contrary to that pro-
posed in this Article. 14 In other words, those who have a different
vision of the power of the press and government, or a different
expectation of the process of politics, might well apply the stan-
dard in a press-suppressive fashion.
These are indeed dangers. With respect to the first, some
greater level of certainty may develop over time, as the common
law in this area develops. With respect to the second, the re-
sponse is that it cannot be avoided by less discretionary rules.
The purely doctrinal approaches are no less ideologically-laden
characterizations of the facts at issue in these cases than the un-
dertaking proposed by this Article. A doctrinal rule enforcing all
press promises of confidentiality to sources harkens to a particu-
lar political vision while disguising its substantive character. A
rule barring all contract actions by sources against the press for
disclosures in political contexts leaves to the haphazard process of
self-regulation an institution motivated in no mean part by its
own business interests. Neither result is more inherently justifia-
ble than an approach which attempts to alert courts to the social
policies implicated in promises of confidentiality to sources and
to require that they consider those policies in a self-conscious
fashion.
CONCLUSION
The issue as to which the United States Supreme Court has
414. See, e.g., Unger, supra note 210, at 616; see also Z. CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND
MASS COMMUNICATIONS 709 (1947). Chaffee warned, while discussing government content
regulation of broadcasting,
It is very easy to assume that splendid fellows in our crowd will be exercising the
large powers over the flow of facts and opinions which seem to us essential to
save society, but that is an iridescent dream. We must be prepared to take our
chances with the kind of politicians we particularly dislike, because that is what
we may get.
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granted certiorari in Cohen is whether the first amendment
grants the press "immunity from liability for damages caused by
dishonoring promises of confidentiality given in exchange for in-
formation on a political candidate."'1 5 This Article has suggested
that such formal "immunity" is neither mandated by existing
first amendment precedent, nor compelled by the policies under-
lying the constitutional freedoms of speech and press. 16 This Ar-
ticle has also suggested that the confidential source lawsuit is not
fertile ground for the simple transplantation of the existing first
amendment-based defamation privilege." 7
.Courts must initially realize that conflicts over confidentiality
constitute struggles for power. Specifically, the new trend of con-
tract actions by disclosed sources raises important questions
about whether, and to what extent, to alter the balance of power
between sources and journalists individually, and between gov-
ernment and the press institutionally. Easy absolutes do not
properly answer that inquiry. After all, if all promises of confi-
dentiality are generally upheld as ordinary contracts, courts will
tilt the balance of power in favor of press manipulation by en-
hancing the security of those who plant government information.
If, on the other hand, they are never upheld, then the balance will
tip too powerfully in favor of the press, leaving prototypical
whistleblowers at the mercy of malicious, careless, or purely self-
interested news organizations. Instead, courts must adopt a
method which adequately takes into account the complex ways in
which press power is affected by different circumstances of
confidentiality.
This does not mean, however, that the first amendment does
not play an important role in the analysis proposed here. Com-
mon law language and modes of analysis are far from strangers to
constitutional interpretation. This Article seeks to mine the most
nuanced aspects of the common law method in order to create a
reality-focused, contextualist approach to first amendment-based
privilege." 8 In other words, what I propose is a sensibility which
would require triers of fact to ascertain and describe the circum-
stances of any particular breach of confidentiality by the press
415. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Cohen V, cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 578 (1990) (No. 90-634).
416. See Section II.B.1.
417. See Section II.B.2.
418. I mean to contrast this suggestion to the apparently much more mechanical, status-
triggered defamation privilege.
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with sensitivity to the particulars of the relationship, the institu-
tional role of the press, and the democratic ideals underlying the
first amendment.
